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動的経路切り替えを用いた Tor ネットワークの性
能改善に関する研究 
 
カレ,	 ティモシー	 ギリ 
 
概要	 
 
Tor ネットワークは分散サーキットスイッチによるアプリケーションレベルオーバ
レイネットワークであり、世界中に配置されているオニオンルータによって、匿
名性のある通信を提供する。異なる転送速度を持つサーキットが TCP コネクショ
ンに集約されてデータを転送するために競合が起き、Tor はネットワーク輻輳やパ
フォーマンスに対して脆弱になっている。Tor では利用可能なネットワークの容量
の大部分はバルクのユーザのトラフィックによって消費されているため、対話性
のある軽量トラフィックの遅延が増大している。サーキットの不公平なトラフィ
ックの分配によって、Tor ルータがボトルネックとなり、遅延が増加し、通信品質
も低下する。この問題のため、多くの Tor ユーザが Tor ネットワークを利用する
動機を低下させ、その結果、Tor ネットワークのパフォーマンスと匿名性が大幅に
低下している。 
	 本論文では、まず、Tor ネットワークの遅延の問題を調査する。Tor サーキット
のトラフィックと暗号科通信のための計算遅延の詳細の分析をするために測定分
析を行った。測定は研究室内に設置したテストベッドと実際の Tor ネットワーク
で行い、遅延がどこで発生し、パケット損失がどのように遅延を引き起こすかを
分析した。Tor ネットワークで遅延増加の原因はサーキットの集約であることを明
らかにした。分析により、Tor ネットワークの設計は、低いネットワーク容量、大
きな遅延、TCP の送信バッファのキュー長の増大に対していくつか性能の問題が
あることを明らかにした。 
	 この性能低下の問題を解決するために、動的なサーキットスイッチ方式を用い
て、限られたネットワーク容量の問題に対処する。トラフィックの輻輳の監視と
より大きな帯域幅をもつ OR へのサーキットを動的に構築するのため、エントリ
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OR に提案方式を実装した。提案方式では Tor の現在のアルゴリズムを修正し、バ
ッファオーバーフローやソケット書き込み不可のイベントを考慮したメトリック
を用いることでサーキットの多重化の問題を改善する。実験の結果、軽量とバル
ク両方クライアントのトラフィックが複数の Tor ルータに分散することで、Tor ネ
ットワーク容量を増大させ、TCP ソケットバッファが短くなることでエンドツー
エンド遅延も低減され、サーキットの集約の問題が改善されることを明らかにし
た。 
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Network with Active Circuit Switching 
 
Kale, Timothy Girry 
 
Abstract 
 
Tor is an onion routing overlay network that provides anonymous communication in the 
public Internet, by routing the messages on random onion routers around the world. Tor 
experienced many performance problems such as network congestion because the circuits 
with different transferring rates are competing to transfer their data through a single TCP 
connection. Tor users who transfer larger traffic always consume larger bandwidth 
resources, which resulting in increasing delays for the light interactive users. The unfair 
distribution of light and bulk traffics makes the bottleneck in the Tor routers and degrades 
the quality of communication. This problem discourages many Tor users from joining the 
Tor network; as a result, the Tor performances and the anonymity services are significantly 
degrade. 
Firstly, we explored the occurrence of latency problems in Tor. Experiments were 
carried out to observe the details of latency by circuit traffic and computational latency. We 
observed that multiplexing circuits in a single OR causes the delays to increase in the Tor 
network. We measured the effects of multiplexing the light and bulk circuits to single TCP 
connection in a setup testbed environment and partly in the live Tor network. In our 
experiments, we observed that current Tor design encountered problems from several 
performance issues relating to lower network capacity, lower throughput and increasing 
queuing delays in Tor and TCP buffers.  
To solve these problems, we applied an active circuit switching approach to address 
the limitation of Tor network capacity. We implemented the circuit switching in the entry 
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ORs, which monitors the occurrence of traffic congestion and construct the TCP 
connection to higher bandwidth ORs. We performed small modification in the current 
algorithm of Tor and implemented our control metrics to show our proposal has improved 
the multiplexing issues of buffer overflowing and socket un-writable events. We showed 
the design for the proposed method and the details of circuit switching procedures.  
Finally, the experimental results showed the distribution of circuit traffics between the 
light and bulk clients are improved, and the TCP socket buffers and network capacity are 
also improved. The end-to-end throughput is increased and the end-to-end latency is 
reduced compared to the default stock Tor.   
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction	  
 
Tor is the abbreviation for the onion routing. Tor uses the onion routing techniques to 
provide anonymity to any users around the world by routing their traffics through random 
selected onion routers (ORs). Its primary goal is to provide privacy and security for Tor 
users who access the Internet via web applications. These are achieved by encrypting data 
flows through independent OR that does not have same subnet. Tor aims to ensure that no 
knowledgeable adversaries or attackers can quickly view or compromise the whole Tor 
network.  
Tor’s user has grown by thousands every year, which make it one of the widely used 
privacy network nowadays. As the number of Tor user increases, the performance of Tor 
network degrades rapidly due to less network capacity. This problem contributed to 
increasing end-to-end latency, throughput degradation and poor quality of services.  
This thesis explains why Tor is slow and also shows our approaches to address the 
problems in the Tor network. Over the past 4 years from 2010 to 2014, our study focuses 
on node based delays and approaches to identify the problems in Tor and implement new 
method to improve the performance of the Tor network. We have shown the foundation of 
our work for performance improvements by applying the circuit switching approach. 
We have identified some of the main reasons that contributed to degrade the 
performance of Tor and discussed what we should do, and have already done to improve 
those problems. 1. Tor’s scheduler mechanism does not operate well. We need to improve 
the scheduler protocols of Tor to fairly distribute the traffics between the light and bulk 
circuit traffics. 2. Tor users overloaded the Tor network with many bulk traffics, which 
contributed to increasing delays on low bandwidth ORs. We need to come up with 
approach that gives priority to light circuit traffics but does not degrade the performance of 
bulk circuit traffics. 3. Tor network has limited capacity to accommodate millions of users 
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who wants privacy in the Internet. We need to develop new techniques and approaches for 
increasing the overall network capacity. 4. Tor’s path selection algorithm does not 
distribute the load correctly over the network. We need to implement suitable ways to 
estimate the delays on each OR and capacities when selecting the best path in the Tor 
network.  
Finally, we need to implement the control metrics in Tor to quickly detect the 
congestion and, automatically shift the bulk traffics to new TCP connection to give better 
throughputs to both light and bulk users.  
 
1.1. 	  Research	  Aim	  
 
The aim of our research work is to enhance the general performance of the Tor network. As 
the Tor network turn out to be surely understood and broadly utilized by millions of users 
around the world, we understand that Tor fails to provide better quality of communication 
because of higher end-to-end latency and, lower network capacities. Tor exchange data 
through many ORs to improve its anonymity services as TCP packets transfer over TLS in 
Tor application level. Tor also experience longer queues at the TCP socket and Tor output 
buffers due to unfair distribution between the bulk and the light circuit traffics. There is a 
need to proper address these problems in order to improve the overall performance of Tor.  
We begin to achieve our aim by studied the effects of delays in the Tor ORs and 
understand the root causes of all problems, that contributed to degrade the performance of 
Tor. We analyzed the current problems in the Tor architecture relating to unfair distribution 
of light and bulk traffics, longer queues in the Tor output buffer and TCP socket buffers, 
kernel memory mismanagement, increase packet drop rates, variances of network 
capacities, increasing latency and lower throughput.  
Secondly, after we have identified the problems in Tor, we implemented our proposed 
method of active circuit switching to addressed the problems, and improve the overall 
performance of Tor. We observed that connecting any congested OR to higher capacities 
ORs could certainly improve the network capacity and end-to-end throughput. In addition, 
the queue length on both Tor and TCP socket buffers can be reduced. Our research aim is 
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easily achieved when we reduce the congestion problems in Tor application and TCP 
socket after switching the bulk circuit that contributed to congestion. In addition, the 
overall network capacities are improved and the end-to-end throughput for both light and 
bulk circuit traffics are increased.  
 
1.2. Research	  Approach	  	  
 
To clearly understand the approach of our studies, in the first approach, we showed the 
computational problems and configuration states of the current Tor network architecture, 
which leads to significant high latency problems when information exchange through the 
Tor network. We investigated how Tor scheduler selection algorithm influences the 
multiplexed circuits1 and how packet drops can bring about increasing queue length across 
all circuits. We demonstrated that multiplexing circuits to single TCP connection affects 
the Tor performance since packets are queued for a longer period in the sending TCP 
buffer.  
For our first approach, we observed that the main critical problem, which contributed 
to Tor performance degradation, is how Tor combines bulk circuit traffic with the light 
circuit traffic. We believe the problems are caused by the Tor’s end-to-end push back 
mechanism, since the TCP back-off mechanism and Tor scheduler design does not works 
well, and always slows down every circuit at once when packet drops occurs. Combining 
multiple circuit traffics to one TCP connection is a good approach in terms of providing 
anonymity, since multiplexing circuits to same TCP connection prevents any attackers 
from performing traffic analysis. However, this approach degrades the overall performance 
of Tor when packet drops occurs.  
Simple approaches we took to understand the levels of congestion avoidance in Tor are 
based on analyzing the problems contributing to increase delays in the Tor application 
layer and the host TCP buffers. These approaches enable us to understand the significant 
high latency problems occur when data transfer through the Tor network and queued for a 
                                                            
1 The bulk and light traffics are unfairly distributed. Bulk circuit traffics consume a lot of bandwidth and 
always have higher priority to send their data first than the light circuit traffics. 
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longer period in the sending buffers. Furthermore, we are able to discuss the Tor’s protocol 
stack and analyzed some of the current problem issues needed to be addressed.  
On the second approach, we addressed the previous problems by applying an active 
circuit switching method to reduce the bottleneck on the congested ORs and, giving more 
bandwidth to the light traffics users. In addition, these approach aims to improve the 
limitation of Tor network capacity. We implemented the circuit switching in the entry ORs, 
which monitored the occurrence of traffic congestion and constructed the TCP connections 
to higher bandwidth ORs. We performed small modification in the current algorithm of Tor 
and implemented our control metrics to monitor the congestion in Tor and TCP socket un-
writable events. Finally, we showed the design for the proposed method and outline the 
details about its implementation.  
 
1.3. 	  Contribution	  of	  Our	  Work	  
 
The following are contributions of our work. 
Firstly, we identified the major causes of latency in the Tor network, which causes the 
delay in the Tor node (OR) output queue to increase and degrade the quality of 
communication in Tor. The metrics for node-based delay we analyzed are; TCP receive 
(input) and sending (output) queuing delays, TCP kernel memory usage and TCP window 
size limitations. These metrics dominates the Tor network latencies, which result in the 
unfairness of TCP flow control. 
We showed that when data sits for longer period in the TCP socket buffers, the 
queuing delays in the sending TCP buffer occasionally increase, which results in longer 
delay before being dispatched to the outgoing circuit traffic. These problems contributed to 
increase the delays in the ORs compared to the end-to-end propagation and RTTs delays 
from client onion proxy (OP)2 to the exit web server.  We concluded that the increase of 
total delay along the circuit is highly contributed by the delays through each node (ND).  
                                                            
2 In Section 2.7, we explained the details of Tor streaming cells.  
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Furthermore, we found out that as the queuing packets from many circuits increases in 
the Tor ORs, a major problem occurs, which stops the allocated kernel buffers on sending 
single TCP socket to read new data (the maximum size of the kernel buffer is reached).  
Secondly, to address the identified problems in Tor, we proposed the circuit switching 
method and offered the improved results to network capacities, end-to-end throughput and 
end-to-end latency in Tor. The effectiveness of circuit switching approach improves the 
flow rates of data in the Tor application level and TCP level. 
We implemented and showed the overview design of our approach for switching the 
bulk traffics at the Tor application level to different output buffer, after congestion is 
detected. We applied are simple control schemes to monitored the buffer occupancy and 
TCP socket un-writable events in the Tor entry OR (see Section 5.3). The beneficial of our 
approach enables Tor to quickly detect the congestion that occurs along the circuit, and 
prevents the congestion to degrade the overall performance of the Tor clients. Furthermore, 
the bulk traffic that causes the congestion to occur is switched to different TCP connection, 
which put more space to light users to transfer their data. This switching method is proved 
to be effective in our experiment testbed evaluation and partly in the live Tor network.  
 
1.4. Organization	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
 
The greater need to improve the performance in Tor lies in directly with metrics about 
network performance, such as latency, throughput and overall network capacities. We 
showed the solutions approaches, and use the approaches to solve the unfair distribution in 
Tor without badly affecting the anonymity services of Tor. This is a matter of provisioning 
better path selections with enough network capacity to allow more bits-per-second transfer 
from client to servers and vice versa. To do so, it is necessary to make careful decisions, 
based on number of OR capacities and geographical position of the selected ORs and, 
adjusting or changing the way ORs participated in the Tor network. 
In Chapter 2 we explained the technical background and basic operation of the Tor 
network. And in Chapter 3, we discussed the existing related works that focuses to address 
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the problems in Tor. We identify the problems of the related works and showed our 
approach to address the problems.  
To begin our enquiry, Chapter 4 presented our exploration and determination where 
and why the latency occurs most in Tor. We presented the latency approximation 
measurement techniques to measure the packet latency, RTTs and packet drops in Tor. We 
discovered that the unfair distribution between the bulk and light traffics caused data to 
become delayed inside Tor buffers and TCP buffers.  
We presented the explanation of our proposal in Chapter 5 to solve the identified 
problems in Chapter 4. We discussed how circuit-switching method is implemented and 
providing results for our circuit switching method in Chapter 6.  
Furthermore, in Chapter 6, we compared the end-to-end latency, end-to-end throughput 
and overall changes of network capacities. We performed timing analysis of changes 
occurs to ensure that these metrics shows improvements when applied our method in Tor. 
Our experimental results showed some insights that our method could address the improper 
use of Tor’s scheduling design. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Technical	  Background	  of	  the	  Tor	  Network	  
Chapter 2 explains the technical background with general facts of Tor and the basic 
operation of Tor clients.  
In Section 2.1, we discussed the overview of the Tor network, which shows the general 
purpose of Tor to provide security and anonymity for its users. The Tor mix network 
provides anonymity by reducing the chances of adversary who performs the traffic analysis 
to identify the physical location of the cells.  
To understand how Tor provides anonymity to its users, in Section 2.2 we explained the 
Tor basic operation. The basic operation illustrates how Tor client onion proxy (OP) 
constructs circuit and exchange data through multiple hops of ORs. 
In Section 2.3, we discussed the Tor’s protocol stack. We outlined the details of Tor 
transport layer in Section 2.4 to clearly explain the communication between the client 
onion proxy (OP) to onion router (OR), OR to OR and exit OR to the web server. 
Section 2.5 explains the details of circuit construction procedures in the Tor network 
from client to the exit OR. The procedure includes the deffie-hellman (DH) handshake of 
key exchange between the client OP and the Tor ORs. 
After the circuit is successfully created in Tor, Section 2.6 shows the details of 
transmitting the TCP streams of 5 bytes message to the webserver. The communication 
involves the client application data routed to Tor with the HTTP GET request method to 
the web server.  
Finally, we outlined the details of Tor streaming cells in Section 2.7. We explained the 
details of Tor streaming cells, which are control and relay cells. In addition, we further 
outlined the specific functions for each cell header when transmitting through the Tor 
network.  
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2.1. Overview	  of	  the	  Tor	  Network	  	  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Tor network architecture. 
 
Tor was first built in the US Naval laboratories and it is classified as the second generation 
of onion routing project [1]. Tor’s main goal is to prevent hackers from discovering the 
physical location of Tor users and contents from various destinations [2]. In addition, Tor is 
an open-source, which any computer with a connection to Internet can join the Tor network 
as a client or onion router (OR) (OR also called Tor node/node, relay/relay node or server). 
The general principle of OR, which Tor inherits is to provide security and privacy for 
transferred streams by using layers of encryption. Tor OR uses layers of encryption 
techniques, which wrapped around the data like a vegetable onion, where each layer a 
removed or added at each OR as cell traversed through Tor. This prevents the data from 
looking the same to any hackers who perform traffic analysis. 
Tor uses mixed network techniques to enhance its security and privacy communication 
[1, 2]. A mix network consists of multiple ORs that provide anonymity to Tor users. The 
ORs accepts fixed length of 512 bytes cell from the Tor client and performs cryptographic 
transformation on the cells, before forwarding them to the next OR. 
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Figure 1 shows the Tor network architecture. The Tor client sends the message 
through the Tor mix network to reach the web server [1, 2]. The ORs in the mix network 
operates as follows: (1) the sender attached the receiver IP address and port number to the 
message and encrypts the entire package in a form of onion layers by using the routers 
public keys; (2) each OR collects the message from the client and decrypt the message to 
obtain the next receiver (OR) address; (3) as the message arrived at the exit OR, the exit 
OR does the final decryption and sends out the decrypted message along the decrypted path 
to the web server. Processing and reordering of cells enhances the anonymity of Tor client 
as the data traversed through the Tor network [2].  
The Tor client knows all the ORs in a circuit. However, all the ORs know only their 
previous and subsequent node within a circuit. By considering the geographic location and 
diversifying of the ORs in a mix network, Tor aims to prevent any attacks for one-hop OR. 
The choice of an exit OR is based on its exit policy, which is set by its operator (volunteer 
users). The exit policy states which Internet protocol (IP) address and port numbers the exit 
OR allowed for the client to use to reach their destinations. Giving this choice to OR 
operators is important because the final destination only sees the exit OR as a client.  
 
2.2. Tor	  Basic	  Operation	  
 
Tor software packages containing Tor browser and Tor algorithms, which give all users the 
opportunity to browse anonymously through the Internet.  All users’ needs only to 
download an archive file, extract it, and run a program. The Tor browser is based on web 
application, but it also includes many patches, which improve privacy and security [3].  
Users around the world run the ORs on voluntarily basis, and the Tor directory 
authority servers are responsible to monitor the status of each OR. Each user can download 
a free open source Tor program and run their relay to become an OR. Note that each OR 
can assign only one unique IP to reduce the risks of easily comprised by adversaries.  
Figure 2 shows the basic operation of how Tor works. Before the client can connect 
anonymously through the Tor network, it must first bootstrap by downloading the network 
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consensus, a relays list from the Tor directory authority server that contains all the network 
information. 
 
 
Figure 2. How Tor works. 
 
 
The network information includes the contact information such as the IP addresses and 
port numbers of every OR in the network, their capacities and public keys with assign 
performance flags. This consensus is signed by a majority of the directory authorities. Next, 
the OP constructs circuits3 through the Tor-network to transfer the cells. The OP randomly 
selected the three ORs based on their bandwidth capacity in the mix network and construct 
circuits to web server 1 and 2. After certain times of connections, the Tor client can choose 
to use the same path created initially or build new circuit path to reach the desired 
destination. The connection from the client OP to the exit ORs are encrypted with TLS 
protocols, while the connection from the exit OR to the web servers are not encrypted 
(decrypted circuit) for the web server to easily understand the contents of data send from 
the Tor network.  
                                                            
3 Each OP can build up to 6 circuits to reach the web servers, this is so that when any circuit are drop or tear 
down, the OP can easily use another back up circuits. 
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The Tor client runs an Onion Proxy (OP) to connect and send the cells through the Tor 
network. The circuit constructed by Tor client passes through 3 hops by default, which is 
the entry ORs, middle ORs and exit ORs through which the cells are routed. The first OR 
in the circuit is called the entry OR and is the only OR aware of the original sender (Tor 
client). In the current Tor approach, the OP can use the same set of three entry guards ORs 
for as long as 30 to 60 days. This approach enables the client OP to maintain the reliable 
services in Tor and enhances the security against the adversary who can perform end-to-
end attacks [5]. The middle ORs are responsible for transferring data they receive to entry 
ORs or exit ORs. The final OR on the circuit is called the exit OR; the exit OR is 
responsible for communicating with the web servers. The communication between exit 
ORs and the web server happens outside of Tor network. And the communication between 
Tor OP and entry OR, OR-to-OR are secured using transport layer security (TLS) security 
protocol. There is usually just a single connection between two ORs and all circuits are 
multiplex to share it. We further explained this scenario in Section 2.4. 
Tor’s design for circuit selection emphasize that ORs on the circuit should be selected 
on different geographically location [4]. This approach makes it difficult for any 
adversaries to compromise all the ORs with different IP addresses. Circuit selection also 
attempts to avoid multiple ORs in a same circuit path that come from distinct /16 networks. 
 
2.3. Tor	  Protocol	  Stacks	  
 
To deeply understand how Tor works, firstly it is useful to understand the current 
architecture and the protocol stacks involves in the Tor network. This Section describes the 
Tor’s protocol stack from the transport layers to the application layers when a Tor client 
constructs a circuit, and transfer data to the web server. 
Figure 3 shows the active Tor’s protocol stacks involve when constructing a circuit 
and transferring data. The figure demonstrate the situation when the client OP has a circuit 
that passes through the entry OR, middle OR and exit OR [6].  
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Figure 3. Active Tor protocol stacks when constructing a circuit and transferring data. 
 
In this scenario the active protocol layers that allow the application data from client to 
successfully routed through Tor are;  
• Application: The client uses the application to sends application data via the 
SOCKS proxy that acts as the generic interface for TCP connection.  
• SOCKS protocol: As the application contacts the SOCKS protocol, the SOCKS 
protocol encapsulates the application data with a SOCKS header and carries out 
the SOCKS handshake.  
• Onion Proxy (OP): Client uses OP to presents a SOCKS proxy interface to 
local applications. When an application makes a TCP connection to the OP, the 
OP splits it into fixed-size cells, which are encrypted and forwarded over a 
circuit composed of 3 Onion Routers (by default the number of hops is 3). 
• TCP protocol: By default Tor uses the TCP protocol to contact with client and 
OR.  TCP protocol is responsible for providing hop-by-hop congestion control 
between clients and OR, in-order delivery of transfer packets, and reliability for 
TLS data. 
• IP protocol: The IP protocol is responsible for routing IP packets between the 
client and ORs. 
• Setup protocol: Tor uses setup protocol at the application level to provide 
connection setup, authentication and management of key exchange.  
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• TLS protocol: Tor uses TLS protocol to provide communications security 
between client and ORs. It is responsible for providing hop-by-hop 
authentication, integrity and confidentiality. 
• Circuit protocol: Tor uses the circuit protocol to provide confidentiality. At the 
circuit level is where de-multiplexes/multiplexes between different circuits occur. 
Circuit protocol also performs label-switching routing of cells to its right output 
buffers. 
• Cell Auth: The cell authentication protocol in Tor is responsible for end-to-end 
integrity check for all transferred cells.  
• Gateway protocol: Tor's gateway protocol receives SOCKS packets from the 
application SOCKS layer, reads the header and payload information, and breaks 
it into fixed size cells. These cells are then exemplified in the same path as 
control messages, and transferred to exit OR via middle OR. At the exit OR, the 
gateway receives cells, and sends it out to the proper host by means of the host 
TCP/IP stacks. 
Note that the middle OR only have TLS and circuit protocols in Tor application level. 
The main function of the middle OR is to receive the cells from TLS and does 
encryption/decryptions and, de-multiplexes/multiplexes at the circuit protocols and sends 
the cells to other ORs.  
 
2.4. Tor	  Transport	  Layer	  
 
Figure 4 shows the communication in the Tor network, which involves the application (Tor 
client as an initiator) makes an anonymous connection to the entry OR (by relaying the 
“begin cell” to the OR1), and get a reply from the OR1. The procedure of communication 
on the Transport layer are explained below: 
(1) The OP splits the TCP segment into 512 bytes of fixed-size cells and performs the 
encryption of message. Then it sends the message to the first entry OR1.  
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(2) After the client OP makes the TCP connection with the entry OR1 and starts the 
TLS on that connection, the client OP instructs the entry OR1 to relay the begin cell to 
middle OR2. The entry OR1 receive the incoming cell through the entry funnel and continue 
transfer the “begin cell” to the middle OR2. Note that at the entry funnel, the entry OR1 can 
also receive multiple incoming TCP connections from different clients; each OR is 
designed to multiplex4 multiple circuits via the entry funnel to a single outgoing TCP 
connection.  
 
Figure 4. Tor communication network. (Note the image of onion used in the diagram is free 
image provided by torproject.org).  
	  
(3) The client OP then sends the instruction “begin cell” to the middle OR2 to extend 
the connection to exit OR3, and the TCP connection with TLS are made between middle 
OR2 and exit OR3. After the entry OR1 sends the “begin cell” to the middle OR2, the 
middle OR2 further transfer the “begin cell” to the exit OR3.  
(4) The last exit OR3 performs the de-multiplexing of circuit connection from the 
middle OR2 and opens the connection5 to the responding web server, and reports a one-byte 
status message back to the client application proxy. 
                                                            
4The Tor OR is built to accommodate and multiplexing multiple circuits at one entry (at the circuit layer) to a 
single outgoing TCP connection [7].  
5The exit OR3 makes a TCP connection with the destination web server by means of the exit funnel. The 
circuit is created with hop-by-hop TCP connections protected by TLS [8].  
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Next Section gives the full details of circuit construction procedures in the Tor 
network from the client to the exit OR. 
 
2.5. Circuit	  Construction	  
 
This Section explains how the client OPs constructs a path through the Tor overlay network.  
Figure 5 shows Alice as the client OP who builds a 3 hops circuit. By default, Tor uses 
the deffie-hellman (DH) technique to securely exchange the cryptographic keys over a 
public channel. The procedures including the circuit development are explained as follows, 
(1) Firstly, Alice sends a CREATE cell6 to the first entry OR1 with the first half of 
deffie-hellman (DH) handshake. The entry OR1 responds back to client OP with a 
CREATED cell and its second half key of the DH handshake [9].  
(2) Secondly, to extend the circuit from the entry OR1 to middle OR2, Alice sends the 
extend relay cell to instruct the entry OR1 to extend the circuit to middle OR2. The entry 
OR1 sends the CREATED cell and the middle OR2 replies with CREATED cell and second 
half key of DH handshake to Alice.  
(3) Lastly, Alice sends the extend relay cell to instruct the middle OR2 to extend the 
circuit to exit OR3. The middle OR2 sends the CREATED cell and the exit OR3 replies with 
CREATED cell and second half key of DH handshake to Alice.  
Note that the payload of the create cell consists of the first step of the DH handshake 
data (known as g^x). The cell is encrypted in an onion-like way and forwarded with the 
symmetric keys (kf1), (kf2) and (kf3). When each OR on the circuit decrypted the CREATE 
and RELAY cells, the OR discovers the means to create another cells of the circuit to 
another node. When sending the CREATED and RELAY cells back to the client OP to 
confirm the circuit connection and key exchange, each OR encrypted the cells using their 
                                                            
6 The create cell is used by the OP to construct a new circuit [9]. 
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respective backward symmetric keys, (kb3), (kb2) and (kb1). The client OP (Alice) will then 
decrypt the cells using the shared secret keys7.  
 
 
Figure 5. Tor circuit construction. 
 
 
2.6. Transmitting	  TCP	  Streams	  
 
In this Section, we explained how the cells are routed in Tor from the client OP (Alice) to 
the web server (Bob).  
Figure 6 illustrates the TCP streams transfer from the client OP (Alice) to the web 
server (Bob). Since the startup of circuit creation includes key exchange, Alice as of now 
has the shared keys for all the selected ORs on the circuit and can encrypt or decrypt the 
transferred cells. 
First, Alice application contacts the OP as the SOCKS proxy (SOCKS Port 9050) 
locally. The OP learns the destination IP address and port of the destination server and 
                                                            
7The secret keys consist of forward key (kf) and backward key (kb). 
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sends a relay cell to the exit OR3. The OP encrypted the cell {{{Begin < IP, Port 
>}kf3}kf2}kf1 by layers which represent the onion skin in accordance to the positon of ORs 
along the circuit. The curly braces represent the onion layers and kf is the shared forward 
key. Each layers of the encryption is decrypted as the cell processed in each OR. When the 
exit OR3 decrypted the last layer with its forwarding shared key kf3, the exit OR3 
recognizes the IP address and destination port to the web server. The exit OR3 then opens 
the TCP connection to the web server Bob and sends a connected cell back to Tor client 
(Alice).  
At the point when Alice transmits the TCP streams of 5 bytes "Hello message" to the 
webserver, the OP breaks down the message from Alice application and sends it through 
Tor (entry OR1, middle OR2 and exit OR3) with the HTTP GET request method to get 
response from the web server Bob [8, 9]. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Transmitting TCP streams. 
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2.7. Tor	  Streaming	  Cells	  
 
In this Section, we discussed in details the Tor’s streaming cells. The Tor streaming cells 
consist of two main cells, (1) the control cell and (2) the relay cell [9]. The control cell 
always interpreted by the OR that receives them since it holds the circuit identification 
(CircID), data command (Data Cmd) and the data, whereas the relay cells carry the end-to-
end data.  
 
 
Figure 7. Tor cells format 
 
Figure 7 shows the cells format (512 bytes) of control cell and the relay cell. For the 
control cell, CircID in the header indicates the circuit identification, which specifies circuit 
cells that are transferring through the Tor network, since many circuits can multiplex to 
single TCP and TLS connection. CircID is unique for each connection between nodes. The 
data command (Data Cmd) in the control cell header describes the action the ORs will do 
to the cell’s payload. Data Cmd is padding cell which a used for keep alive and also usable 
for link padding such as CREATE or CREATED cells used for circuit construction.  
Next we examined the relay cell. The relay cell has additional header, which 
comprises of the relay command header (Relay Cmd). The Relay Cmd comprises of a few 
vital commands that instruct the OR what to do, such as (1) transferring cell for conveying 
data. (2) Relay begins to open the stream. (3). Relay connected to confirm OP that relay 
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begin is succeeded. (4) Relay truncate and truncated to tear down circuit. (5) Relay 
SENDME cell for congestion control.  
The recognized header field has 2 bytes, which is constantly situated zero in any 
decoded relay payload. The Digest header field is processed as the initial 4 bytes that have 
been bound for the hop of the circuit, seeded from the forward or backward respectively. 
At the point when the recognized header field of a relay cell is zero and the digest is right, 
the cell is viewed as "recognized" for the purpose of decryption. 
The length header field (Len) of a relay cell contains the number of bytes in the relay 
payload, which contains genuine payload information. The rest of the payload is padded 
with NULL bytes. The "StreamID" header holds the stream identifier of the transfer TCP 
streams along the circuit. At the point when the OR gets a relay send me cell with 
"StreamID" zero, the OR augmentations its packaging window. At the point when new 
anonymous TCP connection is build, the OP open a circuit to the exit OR that can connect 
with the destination address, and chooses the arbitrary "StreamID" that a not yet utilized on 
that circuit, and builds the relay begin cell with a payload encoding the location and port of 
the destination host [4]. 
Note that the whole contents of both the control and relay cells headers with the 
payload are encrypted or decrypted, with the 128-bit AES cipher in counter mode to create 
a cipher stream [2]. The clients assign the digest, and then iteratively encrypt the cell 
payload with the symmetric shared key of each respective hop of OR.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Related	  Works	  	  
 
In this Chapter, we discussed the related works of studies that are similar to our studies. 
There are a number of existing related works and approaches that aim to improve the 
performance of Tor. The related works covers are wide areas of techniques, methods and 
protocols, which we now detailing.  
 
3.1. Prioritizing	  Techniques	  	  
 
To improve the priority techniques in Tor for light and heavy circuit traffics, Tang and 
Goldberg [10] proposed a method to improve the unfairness problems of Tor’s round robin 
circuit scheduler. They apply the prioritizing techniques using the exponential weighted 
moving average algorithm (EWMA). They applied the EWMA algorithm to identify 
circuits with light and bulk traffics and, give higher priority to light circuits over bulk 
circuit traffics. Their scheduler algorithm has already been deployed and integrated into 
current Tor deployment.  
Jansen et al. [11] implemented a method focused on throttling the bulk users that 
consumed a lot of bandwidth resources and increase the network congestion. They analyze 
their configuration algorithm in Tor and conveyed their experimental algorithm under a 
range of light to substantial network loads. They found out that their approach of throttling 
the bulk traffics result in significant improvements to light traffics and, lessen the unfair 
distribution between the light and heavy users. Their strategy likewise enhances the 
anonymity of Tor against the adversaries since throttling reduces the chances of leaking 
information compared to un-throttled Tor network.  
However, we found out that there are still limitations and problems to these related 
works [10, 11], since the bulk and light circuits are still using the same TCP connection to 
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send data to the next OR. The unfairness of distributing traffics can happen where there is 
longer queuing packets on the sending TCP kernel buffer. And since the bulk traffics 
always select the larger bandwidth ORs, the bulk circuit traffics can still has the higher 
priority to send data quickly than the light circuit traffics.  
Unlike the approaches in [10, 11], in this thesis we applied the circuit switching 
approach to solve the problems of congestion and unfair distribution between light and 
heavy traffics in Tor. Our method is to switch the bulk circuit that causes the congestion to 
different TCP connection in order to reduce the congestion along the previous circuit path.  
 
3.2. Multiplexing	  Circuits	  	  
 
Reardon and Goldberg [12] stated the problems in Tor about the unfair distribution of bulk 
and light circuit traffics when multiplexed to single outgoing TCP connection. To solve the 
multiplexing problems, they proposed a TCP-over-DTLS, where all the circuits have 
separate user level TCP connection. The DTLS is used for encryption and securing the 
communication between the ORs. Unfortunately, for any pair of Tor routers to utilize TCP-
over-DTLS, all the ORs in the Tor network needs to upgrade their transport design, which 
can leads to other problems of deployment and compatibility.  
Mathewson [13] likewise, examined the same issues concerning the multiplexing of 
circuits to single TCP connection. They implemented an approach to solve the multiplexing 
problems in Tor by utilizing the SCTP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol) for Tor 
multiplexing.  
In contrast to these related works [12, 13], we applied the control metrics of buffer 
occupancy in the entry OR to impose strict rate limits on all circuits that are multiplexed to 
one TCP connection. To avoid unfair distribution of bulk and light circuits in a single TCP 
connection, we applied our control schemes to quickly detect the congestion state in the 
Tor network. Our control scheme monitors the output buffer occupancy in Tor for all 
circuits. This approach helps to reduce the traffic overloaded and reduce the congestion 
problems and unfair distribution between the light and bulk traffics. 
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3.3. Relay	  Selection	  	  
 
By default, Tor uses the bandwidth-weighted selection algorithm to choose the ORs with 
higher bandwidth and develop a circuit [4]. Murdoch and Watson stated that selecting the 
OR based on higher transmission capacity always gives higher throughputs and reliability 
performances for all users [14]. 
In addition, Snader and Borisov [8] recommend an algorithm approach for OR 
accessible in the Tor network. By measuring other neighboring OR congestion state can 
enhance the node selection in the Tor network. Tor clients can utilize the OR performance 
estimations, for example, selecting best RTTs and throughputs to choose less congested OR. 
The benefit to their approach is Tor client can choose fast ORs quickly and enhancing the 
performance and anonymity of Tor. 
Wang et al. [15] proposed a congestion-aware path selection algorithm that allows the 
Tor clients to choose best circuit based on response time and dynamic estimations on ORs. 
Tor client uses latency along the circuit as an indication of congestion, and rejects highly 
congested ORs during circuit construction. They performed their examinations to tests their 
method approach with single Tor client, but it is still unclear how their method can be 
successful if applied in the entire Tor network with numerous client OPs. 
In this thesis, we learned that the problems in Tor are due to congestion in the ORs 
because of increasing queuing of packets in the sending TCP buffer. We think the above 
selection techniques [8, 14] may provide better less congested circuit, but, the approach of 
measuring the circuit congestion alone is not enough to improve the overall performance of 
Tor. The approach we applied, which is circuit switching is based on clients and ORs 
coordinating together to detect congestions on circuits. To be more effective with our 
circuit switching method, we complemented with the above approaches [4, 15] to improve 
the relay selection.  
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3.4. Tor	  Scheduling	  
 
Tang and Goldberg [10] implemented an EWMA algorithm, which permits the OR to stay 
informed to number of cells transferred and schedules for each outgoing circuit. For the 
scheduling decision, the OR transfers the cells from the circuit with the least cell count by 
EWMA algorithm. Their methodology is effective on giving higher priority to circuits that 
have not sent much data8 while preventing the bulk traffic from pulling more data and 
influencing the Tor scheduling priorities. The problem to this approach is, they can 
classified the light and bulk circuit in the application level, but in the transport level, both 
bulk and light circuit traffics are multiplexed together to a single TCP connection. The 
increasing queues in the TCP buffers can be a source of congestion for ORs that 
accommodating many incoming circuits with different incoming and outgoing rates [16, 17 
and 18].  
In contrast to the previous works [10, 16, 17, 18], the circuit switching method in Tor 
uses the per circuit kernel-mode TCP connection after switching the bulk traffic to improve 
the read and writing rates and selection of Tor scheduling. When there are increasing 
queues or packet drops occurs in one TCP socket buffer, it does not affects the other TCP 
connection. See Section 5.2 for more details. 
 
3.5. Tor’s	  Congestion	  Controls	  
 
By default, Tor uses two layers for congestion control in Tor [2], (1) the circuit-level 
mechanism and (2) the stream-level congestion control. (1) The circuit-level is used to 
control the usage of circuit's bandwidth [2]. Tor is responsible to keeps tracks of two 
windows, the packaging window and the delivery window. The packaging window tracks 
what number of relay cells the OR is permitted to package from incoming TCP streams and 
send it back to the OP. The delivery window engraves what numbers of relay cells are 
delivering outside the Tor network [2]. 
                                                            
8 Light circuits have lower EWMA value of all cells count.  
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Both (1) circuit-level mechanism and (2) stream-level congestion control are similar, 
however, for stream-level congestion control, the OR and OP uses the relay SENDME cells 
to execute the end-to-end flow control for individual streams across circuits [2]. The 
stream-level congestion control also has to check if the data has already been sent onto the 
TCP stream. 
AlSabah et al. [23] has studied the congestion flow control in Tor and observed that 
both stream-level and circuit-level windows in Tor are large. Therefore, larger windows 
can queue up cells in a very large length and travel down a circuit in large sizes, which can 
possibly causes overflow and packet drops on a low congestion OR. To improve the flow 
rates of cells, they implement and test an algorithm from ATM network called the N23 
scheme, a link-by-link flow control algorithm [23]. The limitation to their approach is their 
experiments only performed in a testbed environment with a single traffic load; as a results, 
their analysis of expected performance in the live Tor network may leads to a lot of traffic 
load varies and unpredictable results. 
Based on the previous works [2, 23], we believe the reliability of Tor communication 
should be addressed on per-hop basis along the circuits. For this reason, we designed the 
approach of creating new TCP between pair of ORs to improve the network capacity. Our 
control algorithm in the entry ORs monitors the information about the available queue 
space used by the circuit traffics, with respect to maximum circuit queue of outgoing cell in 
Tor. This approach leads to quicker reaction to congestion. In Section 5, we outlined the 
details of our circuit switching method.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Analysis	  of	  Delay	  in	  the	  Tor	  Network	  
 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the overview of the Tor network architecture, protocols 
involves and its basic operations. Then in Chapter 3 we showed the related works.  
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the delay in the Tor network and showed the computational 
problems and design conditions of the Tor network, which leads to significant high latency 
problems when data transfer through the Tor network and queue up for a longer period in 
the kernel buffers.  
As previously stated in the introduction Section, the metrics for node-based delays we 
analyzed are; TCP receive (input) and sending (output) queuing delays, TCP kernel buffer 
usage and TCP window size limitations. These metrics dominates the Tor network 
latencies.  
In Section 4.1, we explained the TCP multiplexing problems, which contributed to 
degrade the throughput performance of light circuit traffics when bulk circuit triggered 
congestion. Next we identified the causes of congestion delays in Tor by analyzing the 
effects of node-based delays in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
In Section 4.4, we presented two analysis approaches in the laboratory setup testbed 
and partly in the live Tor network. The first approach focuses on the node based delays, 
queuing delays in the TCP socket buffers and unequal bandwidth in Tor. The second 
approach focuses on the TCP kernel buffers and TCP advertised window sizes.  
We evaluated the experiment approaches to analyze the delay in the Tor network in 
Section 4.5, and offered the following contributions, 
• We considered how much time each packet is delayed in the TCP stack buffers and 
identified the delays contributions from the router along the circuit. We also 
measured the transferred packets passing through the selected public ORs in the live 
Tor network. 
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• We discussed the TCP receiving and sending buffers significantly increase the node 
based delays, when packets are holding up for too long and not quickly transferred 
to neighboring ORs. 
 
• We further showed that this problem has a direct impact to lower TCP advertised 
window sizes and variances in processing rates. 
 
4.1. TCP	  Multiplexing	  Problem	  
 
Firstly, we investigated the problem issues when Tor multiplexing many circuits to single 
TCP connection. Tor traffic experienced increasing delays at various stages as the cells 
routed in the Tor network [18]. The relatively small amount of traffic from interactive 
circuits9 queued behind the bulk circuit10 traffic in the TCP socket buffers and Tor's output 
buffers [12, 19]. As a result, the occurrences of bottlenecks are further worsened by bulk 
traffics and increase the network wide congestion and end-to-end latency. 
 
 
Figure 8. TCP multiplexing problem. 
 
Figure 8 shows the TCP multiplexing problem when a single TCP connection is shared 
between bulk and light circuit traffics. In this case, only single entry OR and exit OR are 
acting as an entry and exit for all 4 clients. All the circuits are sharing the same TCP output 
                                                            
9Interactive circuits are light web users who used Tor to access web browsing information.  
10Bulk circuits are heavy users who used Tor to transfer large size of files. Example video streaming, SMTP, 
BitTorrent users download/upload 100 MB files etc. 
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buffer after their cells pushed out from the circuit queues in Tor application level. The 
problem of multiplexing circuits occurs when the bulk traffic drops more packets on the 
connection between entry OR and exit OR, the interactive light circuit (web browsing users) 
experiences more delays due to TCP congestion control that was triggered by the bulk 
circuit. As a result, the output buffers at the entry, middle and exit ORs are overflowing with 
queuing data, and the quality of communications for all clients are reduced.  
Figure 9 shows the OR multiplexing the two incoming circuits over a single outgoing 
TCP connection11. The TCP kernel input buffers holds the data from other OR and transfers 
them into Tor application. TCP kernel output buffer on the sender side holds the data from 
the Tor application and transfers them to the outgoing TCP socket. In Tor application layer, 
the input buffers inside Tor holds the incoming cells from TLS socket before transferred to 
the circuit queues in a FIFO order for processing, then further transfer to the corresponding 
output buffer. The output buffer inside Tor holds the processed cells and waiting to be 
transfer to the other OR/OP/or web server [19]. Note that before sending the cells to 
appropriate outgoing TCP socket, Tor must first encrypt the cells with TLS protocol. We 
have identified that the major causes of latency was due to delays of cells in the Tor output 
and TCP socket buffers. This delay is considered higher due to cells are waiting for longer 
period.  
 
 
Figure 9. Multiplexing incoming circuits to single outgoing TCP connection. 
                                                            
11Multiplexing multiple circuits to a single outgoing TCP connection ensures that the flow of receiving data 
appears in the correct FIFO order in which the component streams are multiplexed. 
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4.2. Causes	  of	  Congestion	  Delays	  in	  Tor	  
 
Joel Reardon [19] stated that the encryption computation in Tor does not represent the 
largest sources of delays, since the OpenSSL reads require 30 microseconds and writes 
only requires 40 microseconds [19]. For this reason the cryptography computational delays 
is eliminated12 and Joel Reardon concluded that it is not a primary causes of delay in Tor. 
Some studies [15, 18 and 20] observed that Tor’s token bucket rate limiter contributed 
to bottleneck in the node. Each OR uses a token-bucket approach to regulate the flow of 
traffics per second [15, 18 and 20]. Therefore, congestion delays are detrimental to Tor 
router performance when occurs more frequently on OR that handling large amount of Tor 
traffic. We elaborate more on this problem in Section 4.6.3. 
To further elaborate on the congestion delays in Tor. Next Section explains our studies 
on exploring and examining the sources of latency and effects of congestion delays in Tor. 
We examined the delays in Tor based on the data’s perspective as it travels through the 
circuit. In addition, we extensively consider queuing delays in the TCP kernel buffers13.   
 
4.3. Analyzing	  the	  Effects	  of	  Node	  Based	  Delays	  
 
This Section explains our enquiry of latency in Tor. We begin our analyzing approach in 
pointing out the sources of latency in all the selected ORs in the Tor network. We 
performed the analysis with the Tor’s algorithm and timing functions along the circuit path. 
As previous Sections discussed, the particular sources of latency in Tor is our key areas of 
interests, which we would like to analyze such as,  
• The time taken for cell processing in the OR,  
• The time taken to send data from Tor output buffer and TCP output 
buffer,  
                                                            
12 The latency exists elsewhere instead of encryption computation in the Tor application layer [19]. 
13Data queuing in the receiving and sending TCP buffers waiting to be processed. 
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• The queuing time delay of data spent in Tor and TCP buffers14.  
We analyzed the queuing delays of data spent in the TCP buffer on the receiving side 
and sending side on all our setup ORs. We performed the analysis by capturing the 
incoming and outgoing traffic rates through the TCP sockets. Next Section, further explains 
our evaluation approaches and experimentation measurements.  
 
4.4. Evaluation	  Approaches	  
 
For the evaluation approaches, we performed experiments on two setup environments to 
analyze the delays in ORs and between ORs. 
In the first approach, we measured the node delay by transferring the TCP ping SYN 
packets [21] to the webserver, which passes through entry and texit ORs after constructing 
a circuit. The web server listen on a TCP port and responds with a TCP ACK packet. Then 
we measured15 and calculated the round trip-time (RTT) delays of transfer packet through 
our setup exit OR16. 
We measured the propagation delays between ORs and calculated the node-based 
delays. Furthermore, we determined the TCP queuing delay at the receiving and sending 
TCP buffers when downloading a 6.3 MB file. We used this file size to obtain substantial 
details of packets passing through the selected OR over time. And to possibly determined 
the TCP queuing delays in the kernel buffers. The aim of this first setup is to determine the 
delay encountered in the random public entry ORs, which are located in the public live Tor 
network.  
Next, we conducted the second approach setup of three hops circuit to further analyze 
the factors causing the increasing delays in the ORs. The second approach setup focuses on 
measuring the TCP kernel memory usage and the TCP advertised window sizes. We further 
                                                            
14 The current state of buffers and connections were also measured during execution over time.  
15 Note that we applied the measurement approach performed by Dhungel et al. [18] to determine the round 
trip time (RTT) delays and, calculated the total RTT along the circuit. 
16We collected the timing information of outgoing SYN packets and the incoming ACK packets. 
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analyzed how these metrics can affects the queuing delays in the nodes when downloading 
a 339 MB file. We add another entry OR and control both the entry and exit OR purposely 
to observe their relations regarding the considered metrics.  
Both of the first and second approaches have the same condition of ORs 
accommodating a single circuit that we built from the OP to the web server. However, the 
differences are the number of hops and bandwidth capacities. The first approach uses two 
hops and the second approach uses three hops circuit. We setup the ORs in our laboratory 
so it is easier to do a traffic monitoring17 when constructing a circuit and downloading a 
file. After 5 minutes intervals we constructed another circuit through a new selected entry 
OR and performed another download. The same OR is measured 5 repeated times, since 
the congestion status in the OR and network are varying over time. All delays measured are 
calculated 95% confidence interval. We determined the packet queuing delays in the router 
by capturing the packet transfer rates using a set of python scripts, “nodemonitor.py” of 
TorFlow (Tor network analysis). We also used Wireshark sniffing tool to capture the 
packet header data, and see the destination IP addresses and the window sizes over time. 
We used this information to know the status of traffic flow and processing rates on all the 
selected ORs. 
 
4.4.1. Experiment	  Setup	  for	  the	  	  
4.4.2. First	  Approach	  
 
 
Figure 10. Experiment setup for the first approach. 
 
                                                            
17Note that we only monitored our own circuit traffic when performing experiments.  
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Figure 10 shows the experiment setup for the first approach of node based delay 
analysis. The client (OP) and the exit node are running on our commercial 1 Gbps network, 
which we have controlled over it. Two of our machines, the OP and the exit node (OR) are 
Intel® Core ™ i5-2540 M CPU 2.60 GHz 64 bit with 8 GB of RAM and, Ubuntu 12.04 
LTS CPU 2.60 GHz 64 bit with 8 GB of RAM, respectively. The OP and the exit node are 
running on Tor stable source code 0.2.4.19. We run the exit node for a month to accrue 
traffics in the Internet. We selected the entry nodes one-by-one at random basis from the 
current list of active running routers in the live Tor network. 
For the experiments and measurement analysis, at the client OP side, the measurements 
of time T1 is recorded right after the client sends 26 bytes of TCP ping to the TCP output 
connection. Time T4 is recorded right after the entire cell is read from the TCP input socket 
of the connection at the client. At the exit node, the time T2 is recorded right after the entire 
cell is read from the TCP input socket connection, and time T3 is recorded right after the 
entire cell is written to the TCP output socket of the connection.  
Cells passing through the entry node are going through processing and queuing delays 
before reaching the exit node or client OP. The total circuit delay between the OP and the 
exit node is calculated as, 
 
Total delay (TD) = (T4 – T1) – (T3 – T2)   (1) 
 
To verify the delay exists between OP to entry node and, from exit node to the entry 
node, we determined the latency delay (LD) of transferred cell by measuring the RTTa and 
RTTb. RTTa denote the RTTs for the TCP ping SYN messages and receiving SYN-ACK 
from the OP to entry node, and RTTb from exit node to the entry node.  
The LD is calculated as, 
 
   LD = RTTa + RTTb     (2) 
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Therefore, the node-based delay18(ND), is calculated as, 
 
ND = TD – LD      (3) 
 
Note that ND also includes the processing and queuing delays of cells from the 
receiving TCP buffer and sending TCP buffer. We measured the node-based delay (ND) on 
the exit OR by performing a direct measurement, since we fully control our setup exit OR. 
We ran a python scripts “nodemonitor.py” of TorFlow (EventHandler instance) to capture 
and analyzed the Tor events of reading packets from the receiving TCP connection to 
sending TCP connection. We analyzed the delays due to queuing of packets in the 
receiving TCP socket buffer, the time it took the cells to processed in the Tor application 
layer and queuing delays in the sending TCP connection We obtained those timing 
information to determine the overall node based delays in the exit OR. In addition, we run 
the libspe script to verify the time taken of cell processing in the OR. 
 
4.4.3. Experiment	  Setup	  for	  Second	  Approach	  
 
 
Figure 11. Experiment setup for second approach of node based delay analysis. 
 
Figure 11 shows the experiment setup for the second approach of node based delay 
analysis. The client OP and exit node are the same as the previous settings. The entry node 
runs on the same OS as the exit OR node, as previously stated. The middle node is 
                                                            
18 ND is calculated by getting the difference of Equation (1) and Equation (2).  
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randomly selected in the public Tor. Both of the entry node and exit node are running 
online for a month to easily accrue traffics in the Internet. We analyzed the sources of 
node-based delays in the TCP stack. We aim to observe the increasing queues over time in 
the receiving and sending TCP buffers, whether the allocated TCP kernel memory quickly 
exhausted in Tor. In addition, if the results in the exit node in terms of exhausting all the 
TCP buffer usage and lower TCP window sizes can also affects the neighboring entry node, 
in the same circuit. Note that the measurement of traffic flow is from the web server to the 
client OP when downloading a 339 MB file. 
 
4.5. Experimental	  Results	  
 
4.5.1. First	  Approach	  
 
4.5.1.1. Node	  based	  delays	  
 
Figure 12 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of node delays (ND) measured 
between the receiving TCP socket and the sending TCP socket, for (a) the entry nodes and 
(b) the exit node. The entire experiment was completed in a span of 8 hours for 1,567 
different entry nodes in the live Tor network. The result shows that 50% of all selected 
public entry nodes has the ND less than 2 seconds, while exit node has the 50% of ND less 
than 1.72 seconds. With these measurements results, we can say the propagation delays 
between TCP nodes are relatively small compares to the delays in nodes. 
Table 1 shows the measurement results for the average delays measured between Tor 
nodes (propagation delays) and in Tor nodes (node delays), with 95% confidence interval. 
We observed that, there are variances of RTTa delays from the OP to the entry nodes and 
RTTb delays between exit node and entry nodes, which contributed to the increasing total 
delays TD in Tor. From the result, the total propagation delays from OP to exit node and 
the latency delays LD (RTTa + RTTb) are relatively lower compared to node delays ND. 
From these high differences, we concluded that the increase of total TD along the circuit is 
highly contributed by the delays in each of the node (ND) along the circuit. 
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(a)                                                                     (b) 
Figure 12. CDF of node based delays (ND) measured between the TCP socket on receiving 
side to TCP socket on the sending side for (a) entry nodes and (b) exit node. 
 
 
Table 1. Average delays measured between nodes and delays in the nodes. (95% 
confidence interval). 
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Total delays 
(TD) 
 
 
 
 
(Sec) 
 
0.20 ± 1.51 
 
0.18 ± 1.64 
 
0.38 ± 3.36 
 
0.39 ± 1.54 
 
0.42 ± 1.14 
 
2.13 ± 1.93 
 
2.94 ± 1.77 
 
 
 
4.5.1.2. Queuing	  delays	  in	  the	  TCP	  socket	  buffers	  
 
In this Section, we showed the results and explained why the node based delays contributed 
to increasing overall latency in the Tor network.  
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Figure 13 (a) and (b) shows the cumulative distribution of the TCP queuing delay 
measured19 at the TCP stack of exit node for single circuit during downloading of 6.3 MB 
file. (a) 50% of input queuing delay at the receiving TCP buffer is less than 0.79 seconds 
and, (b) 50% of output queuing delay at the sending TCP buffer is less than 1.49 seconds.  
From the results, we observed that queuing delay at the receiving TCP buffers are 
lower compared to sending TCP buffers, since Tor quickly reads all the available cells 
from a TCP and TLS socket into the Tor input buffer for processing. Therefore, the 
receiving TCP buffer increases in size but then emptied as the data quickly processed to 
Tor application. However, queuing delays in the sending TCP buffer occasionally swell 
because data are waiting for the remaining cells in the Tor output buffer, resulting in longer 
delay before packet being dispatched to outgoing connection.  
In overall measurements, we concluded that the results show queuing delays in the 
TCP socket buffers on the receiver and sender sides over time are relatively significant. 
When we measured the average CPU usage at the exit node when downloaded the file, 
the average CPU usage is 2%. The result shows that the CPU utilization does not affect the 
delays in the node, since the processing value is low. 
 
 
(a)                                                      (b)         
Figure 13. Cumulative distribution of queuing delays at (a) receiving TCP buffer and (b) 
sending TCP buffer. The results are from the setup exit OR. 
                                                            
19The queuing delays at the receiving and sending TCP socket are directly measured by capturing the traffic 
rates of packets at the node. 
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4.5.1.3. Unequal	  Bandwidth	  Contributed	  to	  Increasing	  Queuing	  
Delay	  
 
We discussed the problems caused by multiplexing the outgoing circuits to single TCP 
connection in the previous Sections. One factor that contributed to many performance 
problems in Tor is the unequal bandwidth of selected ORs. This variance of allocated ORs 
capacities often leads to socket un-writable because the TCP socket buffer reaches its 
maximum limit. Since there is not enough bandwidth on some ORs to put more data, the 
overall performance of Tor is degrading. Note that the TCP output buffers contains two 
kinds of data: 
• Packets that have been transferred to other ORs or client OPs but are not yet 
acknowledge. 
• And the queued packets due to TCP congestion control. 
In general, the effects of longer queue in the sending TCP buffer can propagate back to 
the Tor application layer and the transmission speed or quality of communications are 
badly affected. This is because the delaying in data transmission can accumulated more 
data in the kernel buffer when the packet drops occurs or, when the end-to-end throughput 
is very low.  
Figure 14 shows the experimental results of cumulative distribution function for the 
queuing delays in Tor application level. We observed that 50% of the queuing delays for 
entry, middle and exit ORs are approximately less than 5.9 microseconds. This result is 
measured from the time each OR actually copied the cells from the input buffer to circuit 
queues and, when the cells further transferred to corresponding Tor output buffer. The 
increase in Tor buffer occupancy also contributed to increase in queuing delays20 in Tor. 
Despite the increase of queue in the Tor output buffer, the overall delays in Tor are 
significantly low since the queuing delays in Tor application level is very low 
(microseconds). However, since Tor has separate service link rates that multiplex on one 
TCP connections between each Onion router (OR), delays are varies for all hops.  
                                                            
20Since Tor reads all the cells from incoming socket to Tor input buffer, the input buffer increases in size but 
then emptied as the data processed in the circuit queues and further transferred to corresponding output 
buffers. 
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Figure 14. CDF of cells queue in Tor. 
 
4.5.2. Second	  Approach	  
 
In the first experiment approach, we showed that the queuing delays in the receiving and 
sending TCP socket buffers are relatively significant, which contributed to increasing 
delays in the node and overall total delays in the Tor network.  
In this second approach, we examined if the packets occupying the TCP socket buffers 
on the receiving and sending sides also leads to unnecessary memory exhaustion and, 
affects the TCP advertised window sizes on each OR along the circuit.  
 
4.5.2.1. TCP	  kernel	  buffers	  
 
We analyzed the effects of receiving and sending TCP kernel memory usage that stores the 
queuing packets. Note that the TCP kernel buffers on the receiving and sending sides are 
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responsible to hold the copied packets from the receiving and sending TCP stack, 
purposely for in-order delivery, TCP flow control and reliability.  
Table 2 shows the bound for the receiving TCP kernel buffers at the entry and exit 
nodes, which are 199 MB and 28.1 MB respectively. The sending TCP kernel buffers21 
remains fixed for both relays as 32 KB. The allocated kernel non-page memory on entry 
node is 95.2 MB and exit node is 4 MB. The risk to these allocated TCP kernel memory 
buffers is when multiple circuit streams are multiplexed on a single TCP connection. A 
single node accommodating 6 TCP circuits would require more TCP kernel buffers for all 
the circuits.  
With this scenario, the kernel sending buffers that holds the copied packets could slow 
down the TCP performance when more packets are waiting to be sent. In addition, the TCP 
stack can puts more pressure on the kernel buffers to reduce the memory usage and size 
when reaching the maximum of the allocated kernel memory. 
Based on the second experiment analysis, the obvious problem that we observed 
which contributed to node delays is, when a node sends and receives too much packets at 
once at the TCP stack of exit and entry nodes. Each packet requires time to keep track of its 
socket number, and while each socket must still manage the data, the congestion control 
can happen due to larger TCP input and output queues. These problems contributed to 
unnecessary delays in the overall Tor performance.  
Next, in Table 2 we have learned that entry node allocated large chunks of TCP kernel 
receive buffer per connection compared to exit node. Different allocated TCP kernel 
memories on the entry and exit nodes would affects the download performance in general, 
in terms of read and writes data to corresponding TCP sockets. 
When we executed the nodemonitor.py algorithm on the setup entry and exit nodes, 
we observed that the average processing rates on the entry node for receiving TCP sockets 
is 402 KB/s, and sending TCP socket is 386 KB/s. While the average processing rates for 
exit node on the receiving and sending TCP sockets are 230 KB/s and 207 KB/s, 
respectively. Since the exit node receives and send data slower compared to entry node, the 
                                                            
21By default the sending TCP kernel buffer for each socket is 32 KB. 
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exit node is causing the TCP throughput to degrade. The packets in the entry node will 
have to buffer up waiting for the corresponding packets to arrive from the middle and exit 
nodes. This situation can leads to increasing TCP buffer length in all the nodes when too 
many packets are queued  
 
Table 2. Allocation of TCP kernel memory usages at the entry and exit relay nodes. 
KERNEL MEMORY PYSICAL MEMORY 
Relay nodes Receiving TCP 
kernel buffers 
Sending TCP 
kernel buffers 
Non paged RAM in used RAM available 
Entry 199 MB 32 KB 95.2 MB 2.3 GB 5.5 GB 
Exit  28.1 MB 32 KB 4 MB 1.7 GB 6.3 GB 
 
Figure 15 shows the effects of kernel memory on the sending TCP buffers for both 
entry and exit nodes, which increase the buffer queue length ratio. 50% of output TCP 
buffer length at the entry is less than 9 KB. And 50% of output TCP buffer length at the 
exit node is less than 10.8 KB. 
Since we only constructed a single circuit at a time of experiment and downloaded a 
339 MB file, the buffer length ratio in the sending (output) TCP buffer for both entry and 
exit nodes are relatively small. However, the result shows a behavior risk of sending TCP 
kernel buffers to never go empty. These drawbacks can degrade the performance of node 
when a single node accommodates multiple circuits, due to increasing TCP buffer length. 
Based on the result, we concluded that the TCP socket buffer that holds many data 
occasionally affects the increasing buffer queue length and delays in the node. 
We measured the CPU utilization for both nodes when downloading a 339 MB in the 
second approach. The result for the average CPU utilization is similar to the previous 
experiment in the first approach, which has slightly increased to 3%. We also concluded 
that the average CPU usage does not significantly affect the node delays since the average 
CPU usage on both nodes are still low. 
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Figure 15. CDF of sending (output) TCP buffer queue length at the entry and exit nodes when 
download a 339 MB file. 
 
 
4.5.2.2. TCP	  advertised	  window	  sizes	  
 
Increasing queuing packets in the receiving TCP buffers can reduce the TCP advertised 
window in Tor nodes for not receiving more data. We measured the two nodes (entry and 
exit) at the same time when download a 339 MB file to observed this scenario.  
Figure16 (a) and (b) shows this behavior on both entry and exit nodes for inability to 
read more data over time. We also describe a vertical line across the two graphs to indicate 
the periods of time when the TCP socket is un-writable. We observed that both nodes 
occasionally fail to quickly dispatch data resulting in lower TCP advertised window. The 
TCP advertised window at the entry node gradually increases till it stays on the 35 KB, and 
further increase to 40 KB. At the exit node, the TCP window increases from 37 KB at the 
time of measurement and stays at 42 KB. 
The differences of TCP window sizes between the entry and the exit nodes result in 
the invocation of TCP flow control, on inability to read more data. Both nodes also have 
lower TCP processing rates at the receiving and sending sides, which contributed to lower 
ability to receive more data. The TCP window sizes for both nodes are dropped lower than 
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the maximum 64 KB over time. This situation indicated that the TCP buffers on the 
receiving side cannot accept more incoming packets, due to free space was already filled 
with waiting packets to process into Tor. And since sending TCP buffer also holding up 
packets that consuming buffers space formerly available for new packets, Tor cannot write 
the cells from the application layer into the TCP stack.  
 
(a)  Entry node 
 
(b)  Exit node 
Figure 16. Measurement base on node inability to read more data at the (a) entry node and 
(b) exit node. The advertised TCP window sizes drops below the 64 KB for entry and exit 
nodes. 
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4.6. Discussion	  
 
Below is our discussion based on factors that contributed to the identified problems, when 
performing the first and second experiments of delay analysis in the Tor network. 
We observed that packets queued in the TCP output buffers before being sent to other 
ORs is a primarily sources of increasing latency in Tor. We now discussed the problem 
factors below.  
 
4.6.1. Circuit	  Scheduling	  Design	  Error	  
 
One of the factors that added to increasing latency in Tor, which rapidly degrading the 
throughput of circuit traffics, is the unfair scheduling of Tor among many incoming circuits. 
The light interactive circuits significantly ease off due to bulk circuits on the same 
connection. This result in ineffective priority selection in Tor since Tor only considers a 
subset of writable circuits. As a result, circuits from different connections are not 
prioritized correctly.  
Furthermore, since Tor utilizes the libevent library to control all the socket 
connections with different ORs [19]. Libevent is in charge of bridging the connection 
between TCP sockets and the input and output buffers in Tor [19]. Therefore, libevent is in 
charge of summoning the method that removes the cells from the output buffer. We 
observed that this configuration sometimes contributed to problems in Tor. The libevent 
scheduler algorithm sometimes fails to do its function of equally removes data that stays in 
the buffer, which result in increasing queuing delay in the TCP socket buffer as shown in 
the first experiment approach. 
On the other hand, the problem is socket itself was un-writable. This problem implies 
that the other end of the TCP connection returns a window of size zero, which indicates 
that they are currently unwilling to receive any new data. We further discuss this issue on 
the next Section.  
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4.6.2. Limitation	  on	  TCP	  Advertised	  Window	  Sizes	  
 
We used the window scale22 option which is set to 2 to increase the receive window size 
above its former maximum value of 65536 Bytes. From our experiment measurements in 
Section 4.5.2.2, the calculated window sizes are still lower than the maximum value. There 
are problems which we identified due to variances in the processing rates at the entry and 
exit ORs receiving window. In Section 4.5.2.1, we observed that the average processing 
rates on the entry node for incoming traffics is 402 KB/s, and sending outgoing traffics is 
386 KB/s. While the average processing rates for exit node on the receiving and sending 
TCP sockets are 230 KB/s and 207 KB/s, respectively. Since the exit node receives and 
send data very slow, even though we used the window-scaling option, the calculated 
window sizes are still below the maximum value. This problem propagates back to the 
middle and entry ORs, which increased the queue length in the sending TCP buffers. As a 
result, the lower window sizes we observed in the entry node and exit nodes are caused by 
overloaded of queuing data in the TCP kernel buffers.  
 
4.6.3. Token	  Bucket	  Rate	  Limiter	  
	 
Tor has currently implemented token bucket to performed traffic shaping mechanism [22], 
and regulate the flow of traffics from client to entry guard node at a given rate [23]. A 
default setting of Tor on each OR starts with fixed measures of tokens and decrements as 
the cells sent to the outgoing connection. As the OR token reaches zero, the OR must wait 
until the tokens are refilled. To reduce the CPU utilization, tokens are refilled just once 
every second. 
It has been already observed by [18], that refilling the tokens so occasionally 
contributes to part of Tor's overall delays. In addition, currently deployed configurations of 
Tor do not enable throttling by default. Tor must focus on system wide settings that 
function properly and updated as the network changes. Henceforth, it is impractical to 
naturally tune each OR hub. 
                                                            
22 Since we are using Ubuntu Linux for entry and exit ORs, the window scale option is used by default for 
Linux OS.  
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In Chapter 5, we addressed this limitation in the current design of Tor by applying the 
congestion detections in Tor application level, and potentially improve the flow rates of all 
circuit traffics (both light and bulk circuit traffics).  
 
4.7. Conclusion	  	  
 
In this Chapter, we have performed a system performance evaluation to determine sources 
of problems, which contributed to increase end-to-end latency in Tor.  
In Section 4.5.1, we concluded that increasing transport latency, which caused by the 
queuing delay in the TCP socket buffers, is a source of increasing total delays in Tor. There 
exists a significant latency of data waiting to transfer in the sending buffers in Tor and TCP 
socket buffers. In addition, multiplexing circuits over a single connection contributed to 
unnecessary latency, since it causes Tor scheduler mechanism to operate unfairly towards 
connections with smaller demands on throughput.  
Furthermore, in our second experiment approach in Section 4.5.2, we observed that 
TCP stack puts more pressure on the kernel buffers to reduce the memory usage when 
reaching the maximum of the allocated kernel memory. Based on our second experiment 
analysis, the obvious problem which degrades the performance of Tor is, when a node 
sends and receives too much packets at once at the TCP stack of exit and entry nodes, 
unnecessary delays occurs due to larger packet queues. As a result, the increasing queuing 
packets overloaded the buffers and reducing the receiving TCP advertised window. 
Next Chapter presents our proposed solution to address the identified problems in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 5  
Circuit	  Switching	  Approaches	  for	  Avoiding	  
Congestion	  in	  Tor	  	  
 
Chapter 5 presents our proposed method for improving the Tor’s performance with the goal 
of addressing the problems analyzed in the previous Chapter 4.  
Our proposal focused on the circuit switching approach, which transports the bulk 
circuit and light circuits through separate path when congestion occurs in Tor. We switch 
the bulk circuit traffics to higher capacity ORs through different TCP path over a secure 
protocol and, aiming to improve the performance of both bulk and light circuit traffics. 
Our solution uses per circuit connection for bulk circuit after switched to different 
TCP connection. We de-correlate circuits from the same multiplexed TCP streams that 
contributed to increasing queuing packets. In a simple term, our method approach improves 
the congestion state of the selected ORs in Tor by distributing the TCP sockets needed to 
free up the overloaded kernel space, which was shared by multiple circuit traffics. 
First, in Section 5.1, we discussed the overview of circuit switching approach. The 
overview gave the brief details of switching active bulk circuit method in Tor application 
layer when bottleneck occurs. This method helps to prevent the bulk clients from 
overwhelming the network and preventing the majority of Tor users with light traffics to 
have better throughput performance. 
Second, we addressed the performance problems in Tor by designing and 
implementing a circuit switching approach with separate kernel-mode TCP connection for 
each outgoing circuit from Tor. This design establishes a significant performance benefits 
for each circuit traffic flow rates, since separate kernel-level TCP connection is dedicated 
to every outgoing circuit. The details are explained in Section 5.2. 
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Third, in Section 5.3, we performed simple modification of Tor default algorithm by 
adding the control schemes in the entry ORs to quickly detect the congestion, and perform 
the active circuit switching to new TCP connection.  
Fourth, in Section 5.4 and 5.5, we tested our proposed method and measurement 
approaches in the laboratory setup testbed and partly in the live Tor network, to observe the 
effectiveness of the circuit switching approach.  
Finally in Chapter 5, we show our contribution of designing the circuit switching 
method and explaining the procedure involves. We also discussed the realistic method for 
circuit selection and measurement approach in Tor.  
 
5.1. Overview	  of	  Circuit	  Switching	  Approach	  
 
Before showing the overview of the circuit switching approach, first we explain the term 
circuit switching, which we used in our proposed method.  By default, Tor uses distributed 
circuit switching network approach [2], which consists of distributed ORs in the Tor 
network. This technique of decentralized OR enhancing the anonymity of Tor by routing 
traffics through dedicated point-to-point connections of three ORs using the onion routing 
protocol. Since Tor enhances its anonymity by multiplexing many circuit traffics to single 
TCP connection, Tor breaks down the application data into fixed 512 bytes and sends them 
over the virtual circuit across multiple onion routers. The difference between the circuit 
switching of telephone network and Tor virtual circuit switching is, for telephone network, 
the telephone company reserves a specific path to destination number for duration of call, 
and during that time, no one else can use the physical lines involved. In Tor virtual circuit 
switching network, the dedicated point-to-point circuit can transfer data from many Tor 
clients that multiplexes along the single circuit connection.  
Additionally, with the packet switching or packet-based network, the message gets 
broken into small data packets and travel around the network seeking out the most efficient 
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route to reach the destination23. Tor does not use packet-based network since it is not 
suitable for data streaming and may encounter increasing packet drops and higher delays.  
In this thesis, when implementing our approach of switching the active bulk circuit to 
different TCP connection after congestion is detected, we used the circuit switching term, 
which was already used and common in Tor. The approach of switching the circuit traffic 
to different TCP path lessens the overhead of interactive circuit streams while still allowing 
good throughput for bulk streams.  
Figure 17 shows the circuit switching in the Tor network. The dash line indicates the 
other possible path to the web server. The circuit switching approach adopted many 
possible paths through different ORs, but only one path is selected during data transfer. A 
circuit constructed is dedicated to the connections to reach the web server for the duration 
of data transfer. However, if the congestion occurs in Tor (i.e., congestion occurs along the 
circuit path from the entry to exit ORs), the entry ORs detected the congestion and 
switched the circuit traffic to new TCP connection that are less congested to improve the 
network capacity and end-to-end throughput.  
Figure 18 shows the overview of circuit switching approach when cells are travelling 
in the outward direction from the client OPs to the web server (the switching occurs at the 
entry OR). The box dash-line indicates the area when switching of traffics occurs from Tor 
circuit queues to output buffer, then transfer to the corresponding TCP connection. The 
switched dash-line indicates the circuit traffic that was switched to another output buffer in 
Tor, after bottleneck occurs due to cells queue in the previous output buffer24 rises above 
the maximum threshold. Note that the previous route a represented by the solid-line. Each 
output buffers a calculated by the exponential weighted movement average (EWMA1)25 
algorithm. After the circuit traffic is switched to different output buffer, then transfer to 
different TCP connection that connected to middle OR2 are successfully completed, no  
                                                            
23 Each packet may go on a different route from the others, and each packet has the header contains the 
destination address. 
24 Each Tor output buffer size is 32 KB and TCP output buffer is 16 KB.  
25 We applied per incoming circuit connection of EWMA to monitor the output buffer occupancy in Tor. 
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Figure 17. Circuit switching in the Tor network. 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Overview of circuit switching approach in the entry OR. 
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more new cells of corresponding CircID that was switched are sent to the previous output 
buffer from the circuit queues in Tor. Note that the remaining cells of the switched CircID 
that stored in the previous output buffer must be send to the web server, before that 
respective CircID, which connected to the middle OR1 is discarded. More details of 
switching procedures are explained in Section 5.3.4. This approach helps the remaining 
light circuits, which multiplexed to single output buffer that monitored by EMWA1 to have 
their data sends quickly.  
We investigated the switching circuit method as a component to prevent bulk circuit 
traffics from over-burdening the network. We believe that by switching the bulk circuit and 
other high traffic clients to different TCP connection that are less congested will improve 
the quality of communications for all light and bulk clients. This strategic approach reduces 
the bottlenecks on a single OR that multiplexes multiple TCP streams and, improving the 
overall end-to-end throughput for majority of Tor users. Moreover, we wish to improve the 
Tor network in general to become much more usable to all Tor users around the world and, 
make Tor more diverse in order to enhance its anonymity by greater mixture of circuit 
traffics.  
 
5.2. Design	  of	  Circuit	  Switching	  Approach	  
 
In the views of our previous discussions, we accept the fact that reliability should be kept 
up on per hop basis for Tor circuits. Subsequently, in this thesis, we performed the 
designed methodology for maintaining the TCP connections between each neighboring pair 
of ORs within adequate utilizations of bandwidth by all circuits. 
Figure 19 shows the design of our circuit switching method. We proposed a method 
using a separate kernel-mode TCP connection for each incoming circuit from Tor after 
switching the active bulk circuit. While designing the separate kernel-mode TCP for each 
bulk circuit after switched, we consider the approach of TCP specification of efficient 
event delivery packets between OPs and entry ORs, and ORs-to-ORs. Therefore, after 
switching the circuit to different path, each TCP connection follows the original TCP 
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functions, which supports the connection management, reliable data transfer, flow control, 
and congestion control. 
 
 
Figure 19. Design of circuit switching method in the entry OR26. 
 
Our design is similar to TCP-over-DTLS, which was outlined by Reardon and 
Goldberg [12, 19]. There approach shows the reliability of transferring the data (in-order 
delivery) between ORs. The difference with our configuration and design to TCP-over-
DTLS [12, 19] is the circuit management. The circuit switching strategy in Tor uses the 
kernel-mode TCP connections for every circuit after switching, while TCP-over-DTLS 
uses a user-space TCP implementation. Furthermore, in our circuit switching design, we 
use the default TCP and TLS, which are already deployable in Tor to protect the 
communication between ORs, whereas TCP-over-DTLS uses DTLS, which has problem 
with license compatibility when used in Tor network architecture. 
Torchestra [24] applies the methods, which are related to our work in isolating the 
bulk traffic from the light traffic. They prevent bulk traffic from delaying the flow rates of 
                                                            
26 The 𝑁!!" represent the incoming circuits and the 𝑁!!"# represent the outgoing circuits. There are separate 
kernel-mode TCP connections for each bulk circuit after switching from Tor application level. 
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light traffic. In their proposed method, two TCP connections are used for OR-to-OR 
communication. One TCP connection is configured for the light circuits and the other for 
bulk circuits. To benefit from using Torchestra method, all the ORs on the circuit need to 
be redesign and upgraded, as two TCP connections are required between every pair of ORs 
on a circuit. This is the drawback of Torchestra approach. We learned that the problem to 
their approach [24] is by opening two connections for light and heavy traffics between the 
same pair of ORs, which can rapidly degrade the overall performance of light and bulk 
traffics if both pair of ORs is congested and, accommodating many incoming circuits in 
Tor. 
The difference between our circuit switching method and Torchestra [24] method is, in 
each client OP in our design continues to maintain a single TCP connection with each of 
their entry guard OR. The modifications proposed are only local to entry OR. This means 
that not all middle and exit OR along the circuit path need to upgrade to benefit from 
switching circuit when congestion occurs. For example, if the entry OR a the only OR that 
upgraded to detect congestions and open another TCP connection for bulk circuit to switch 
to different TCP path, the middle OR on the new TCP path does not need to open another 
TCP connection. The middle OR on the new TCP path will treat the incoming traffic as 
single incoming circuit from other OR in the Tor network, and accept the connection. In 
addition, the exit and middle ORs would not be able to know if entry belongs to the set of 
upgraded ORs or not. This simple approach makes our switching method easier to 
implement in the current Tor network architecture. 
 
5.3. Modification	  in	  the	  Entry	  OR	  to	  Detect	  Congestion	  and	  
Performs	  Circuit	  Switching	  
 
In the previous Chapter 2, we talked about the circuit construction (see Figure 5), each time 
the client OP attempts to extend the circuit by one more hop, the client OP sends an extend 
relay cell with the CREATE command cell to the last OR on the circuit. And the extended 
OR replies with CREATED cell to confirm the connection status.  
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In our design, we maintained the same implementation of Tor circuit construction 
method and we also maintained the same queuing architecture of Tor. However, our design 
switches the bulk circuit traffics that multiplexed with light circuit traffics on the same 
congested output buffer. When the bulk traffic is switched to new circuit, the previous old 
circuit must be closed.  
This Section explains the modification of Tor algorithms on the entry ORs to 
accommodate circuit construction and circuit switching when congestion occurs. Firstly, 
we begin with the implementation of control metrics in the entry OR to detect congestion 
along the circuit. We applied two metrics to evaluate and monitor the unfair distribution of 
many circuit traffics through the congested OR. One is the output buffer occupancy in Tor 
application, and the other is the number of TCP socket un-writable events. 
 
5.3.1. Tor	  output	  buffer	  occupancy	  
 
This control scheme can incur a significant overhead for determining incoming and 
outgoing circuit rates that occupying the output buffer in Tor. By default, Tor has a 
buffering capacity for the instantaneous incoming and outgoing circuit traffics in the 
application layer for input and output buffers, and the receiving and sending TCP kernel 
buffers at the TCP stack (see Figures 18 and 19).  
We applied this metric to monitor the OR throughput, which we denoted as the 
available capacity of OR, and the expected throughput of a circuit traversing the selected 
OR. We measured the relative rates for each circuit by measuring the buffer occupancy of 
all incoming and outgoing traffics.  
Since we proposed a separate kernel-mode TCP connection for outgoing circuit after 
switching, we applied the exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) algorithm to 
monitor each output buffer over time. This metric is used to classify circuits into light and 
heavy traffics in Tor. In addition, this method helps us to find out which circuit overflows 
the Tor output buffer.  
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The EWMA algorithm we used in this thesis is computed in much the same way as the 
EWMA algorithm proposed by Tang and Goldberg [10]. However, the difference is, in our 
method, whenever the circuit’s cell counter is incremented27, the cell counter of the 
outgoing circuit to which that circuit belongs is also incremented. This is what our control 
scheme is based on to identify which circuit contributes to overflowing the output buffer.  
We continuously update the EWMA value for each circuit when performing our 
experiment. We rely on the observation that bulk connections always have the higher 
EWMA values than the light circuit traffics. This is because the bulk clients are steadily 
transferring their data. When the OR output buffer is overloaded and the sending TCP 
socket cannot receive any more data, the circuit traffic that produce the congestion is 
switched to another TCP connection, which preemptively built by the OP at the beginning 
of circuit creation. This gives a better choice of switching the bulk circuit that causes the 
bottlenecks to occur. The elimination of connection sharing between bulk and light traffics 
ensures that we isolate the effects of bulk circuit traffics on the light ones. Furthermore, a 
cell dropped or lost from one circuit will only affect that particular circuit; all the other 
circuits are not affected. 
 
5.3.2. TCP	  Socket	  Un-­‐Writable	  Events	  
 
Joel Reardon [19] has fully detailed the effects of peer acknowledging data that return 
slowly even if the data transferred properly. Since the TCP output buffer is where TCP 
keeps the unacknowledged packets. In a worst case, when the transmission is too slow, the 
sending TCP buffer size can grow above the allocated memory, and the operating system 
reports the socket as un-writable. 
Figure 20 shows the experiment we performed to monitor this situation when an un-
writable event occurs. Note that the un-writable events indicate the TCP socket buffer 
cannot receive any more new data. We detect the socket as un-writable when executing the 
node monitor (TorCtl script), and observe the writing events for the outgoing circuit when 
reported as zero bytes.  
                                                            
27The connection level cell EWMA is for each client and does not affect other per-circuit connection EWMA. 
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Figure 20 also shows that Tor cannot write data at the first event in 7 seconds, second 
event in 19 seconds and third event in 34 seconds. The sending TCP socket cannot accept 
any new data because the buffer is full. Furthermore, this event tells us that there is 
congestion occurs at a single TCP connection that shares multiple outgoing circuits.  
 
 
Figure 20. TCP socket buffer un-writable events. 
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5.3.3. Congestion	  Detection	  Algorithm	  
 
The congestion detection is running in the entry OR28. Circuit traffic that causes the 
congestion to occur is considered as the bulk traffic, and only the entry OR is responsible 
for switching the bulk circuit traffic, and the entire bulk circuit is switched at once. In 
addition, the current distribution of the bandwidth in Tor network shows that the entry 
guards ORs have the higher probability of being chosen due to higher bandwidth and stable 
properties [15]. Therefore, applying congestion detection and circuit switching method in 
the entry OR is much more effective to reduce the congestion along the circuit.  
For chosen buffer occupancy over time, the entry OR collects statistics about the 
number of cells sent on each circuit queue to the corresponding output buffer in Tor.  
We modified a small portion of stock Tor algorithm to calculate and estimate the 
EWMA periodic samples of instantaneous output buffer occupancy B for each incoming 
circuit in Tor, which expressed in Equation (4). 
 
   𝐵! = 𝛾 ∗  𝐵!!! + (1−𝛾) ∗  𝐵!"#$%&                   (0 < 𝛾  <1)     (4) 
 𝐵!"#$%& is the current collected number of sample cells sent from the circuit queues 
and occupied the output buffer in Tor, when running the EWMA algorithm. The EWMA 
parameter 𝛾 is the fractional weight of the previous buffer estimate in the EWMA estimator, 
for estimating the current buffer occupancy. Furthermore, 𝛾 determines the depth of kernel 
memory usage in the allocated output buffers in Tor. The larger 𝛾 has a greater influence 
on the number of cells occupying the output buffer by the incoming circuits. 
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code to classified circuit traffic that causes bottleneck 
to occur and switches the bulk circuit to different TCP connection.  We define α and β (line 
                                                            
28 It is simple and effective to work at the entry OR to determine the attribute circuit congestion to other ORs. 
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1) to be the minimum and maximum buffer threshold values29, below α is considered as 
buffer is under full (line 21) and above β is considered as buffer overfull (line 9). If the 
current buffer occupancy 𝐵! at time t is within the acceptable range of minimum and 
maximum (α ∗  𝐵!!! ≤  𝐵!  ≤ β ∗    𝐵!!!) (line 18), we do not take any action to switch the 
circuit that has higher EWMA value. However, if the Tor output buffer rises above the 
maximum threshold (𝐵! > β ∗  𝐵!!!) (line 9) or the sending TCP kernel buffer cannot 
accept any new data30, we switch the circuit that has the higher EWMA value. This 
approach allows the circuits with lower EWMA value (light interactive circuit) to have 
better throughputs.  
We have experimented for switch timing at the entry ORs when congestion occurs 
with the appropriate α and 𝛽  threshold values used in the control metrics. The most 
appropriate minimum and maximum thresholds for many circuits are 𝛼 = 0.1 (3.2 KB) and 𝛽 = 0.5 (16 KB), because it also has smaller circuit switching time and output better 
throughput for all bulk and light circuits. These threshold parameters are fractional of the 
total allocated memory for each output buffer size in the OR, which is 32 KB. Details of 
the experiments results are shown in the analysis of time to switch circuit in Section 5.3.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29Note that the buffer occupancy thresholds also show how aggressive the flow rate of each incoming and 
outgoing circuit. 
30That is the situation when congestion occurs and TCP socket is un-writable. 
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Algorithm 1. Decision pseudo code to estimate the output buffer occupancy and switches the 
active bulk circuit traffic. 
1.  α = 0.1, β =0.5 
2.  C ←getConnectionList() 
3.  L ←   L:length() 
4.   M ←getMetaEWMA() 
5.   B ←getOutputBuf 
6.   S ←getSocketBufEvent 
 
7.  If L > 0then 
8.    M ←  M: increment 
 
9.       if (𝐵!  > β∗ 𝐵!!! or S →0) do   // buffer overfull || socket un-writable 
10.             for i←  1 to L do 
11.     if C[i].ClientConnection() then  // get connections 
12.       if C[i].EWMA >M then  // compare circuit with high EWMA value.           
 
13.                   Switch C [i] →  B[i] // switch connection with high EWMA to  
corresponding output buffer connection. 
 
14.               end if  
15.                        end if 
16.                  end for 
17.       end if 
18.       if (α ∗ 𝐵!!!≤ 𝐵!  ≤ β ∗ 𝐵!!!) 
19.         Do nothing      // accept the current buffer usage 
20.       end if 
21.       if (Bt  < 𝛽∗ 𝐵!!!)                 // buffer under full 
22.         L ←  L: increment                       // OR can accept new circuits 
23.          Drop_circuit(circID,conn()) //OR can drop of any inactive circuit to free  
space.   
24.        end if 
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5.3.4. Circuit Switching Procedures 
 
This Section explains in details the proposed analysis of circuit switching. We explained 
where the congestion detection point and circuit switching initiator point.  
Figure 21 shows the procedures of the circuit switching we applied to OP2 circuit as the 
bulk circuit traffic that switched to different TCP connection. The solid lines indicate the 
initial circuit built by all client OPs. The dashed lines indicate the new circuits passing 
through different TCP connections. The configured bandwidth on all the ORs is 1.5 Mbps. 
The flow of traffics is from the client OP to the web server. In this environment, the 
communication between the OP and the exit OR uses Tor protocol over TLS protocol. The 
communication between the exit OR and the web server also uses the TLS protocol. The 
web server accepts the TLS session resumptions [25] to resume connections after switching 
the bulk circuit and, continue on receiving the packets from another exit OR. 
In the proposed approach, initially the entire client OPs build two circuits to the web 
server and one of the circuit is selected for data transfer. The switching of circuit to a 
different TCP connection happens in the entry OR. The entry OR sends the control message 
to other ORs when its current output buffer rises above the maximum threshold and when its 
sending TCP socket is un-writable.  
To make this approach easier to implement, we applied the method of Gopal and 
Heninger [24] of connection switching protocol between two opening TCP connections. The 
similarity with their work is, we considered only single OR to fully responsible in switching 
a bulk circuit and the entire circuit switches at once.  
In this thesis, we applied two control cells that Gopal and Heninger [24] defined to 
manage the connection transfer, which are SWITCH and SWITCHED_CONN cells that 
sent by the entry ORs when congestion occurs. A SWITCHED_CONN and SWITCH_ACK 
cells have no payload. The SWITCH cell's payload contains a flag that indicates all the cells 
for the old circuit will be sent on the new TCP path. Hence, the ORs on the old circuit can 
discard the corresponding circuit ID of switched bulk circuit.  
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The differences are, first, we defined a SWITCHED_ACK message sent that by the 
receiving node to inform the initiator (sending OR) that the switching of circuit connection 
is completed and, the initiator can continue to send cells on the new connection. The second 
difference is, we distributed the circuit traffics from the entry ORs to other different ORs. 
When the entry OR switched the circuit to different TCP connection, the old circuit is 
discarded after the entry OR sends the DESTROY cell31. This process of sending the 
DESTROY cell has already been implemented in the Tor protocol specification [33]. 
Third difference is only the bulk circuit that carries heavy traffics is switch to new TCP 
connection, based on our two control schemes explained in the previous Section. After 
switching to the new circuit, the OP owning the bulk circuit streams continues to send and 
receive data from its pending requests.  
We described the circuit classification and switching of active circuit in single entry 
OR (entry OR1) and, switching of active circuit to different entry OR (from entry OR1 to 
entry OR2) below. 
 
 
Figure 21. Circuit switching approach and experiment setup. 
 
 
                                                            
31 The DESTROY cell contains a single octet, which the entry OR sends to the adjacent middle OR, and the 
middle OR extend to the exit OR on an appropriate directions of CircID. 
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5.3.4.1. Mechanism	  to	  Switch	  the	  Circuit	  in	  Single	  Entry	  OR	  
 
This Section explains the mechanism of switching the circuit in a single entry OR. Figure 
21 shows the switching of client OP2 circuit at the entry OR1. The flow of circuit traffics is 
from the OP to the web server.  
The steps are as follows:  
1. First, we allowed the entry ORs and middle ORs to relay traffics within the Tor network 
based on the circuit selected by all client OPs. All OP1, OP2, OP3 and OP4 circuits are 
multiplexed on the single entry OR1 and passed through the middle OR1 and exit OR1.  
2. Before the entry OR1 switches the circuit to different TCP connection, the entry OR1 
monitors the incoming circuit traffics and checked if there is no congestion occurs on all 
the ORs along the circuit. The Algorithm 1 keeps track of the buffer occupancy if it stays 
within the acceptable range between the minimum and maximum thresholds and, 
whether the TCP socket is un-writable. 
3. When the entry OR1 detects the client OP2 circuit is flooding the output buffer occupancy 
beyond the maximum threshold, the congestion occurs. The entry OR1 switches the 
current circuit of client OP2 that send the cells with sequence number 1 and 2 to a 
different Tor output buffer in the Tor application layer (i.e., the OP2 circuit is switch to 
different output buffer in Tor to corresponding TCP kernel-mode at the TCP stack level, 
then transfer through different TCP path that goes to the middle OR2). The remaining 
cells with sequence number 3 and 4 are transferred through the new circuit that the client 
OP2 preemptively built. The process of switching circuit involves the entry OR1 sends a 
SWITCH cell on the old bulk circuit (OP2 circuit) with right CircID to inform the middle 
OR1 that no more cells for this circuit are coming on this connection. The middle OR1 
then sends the SWITCH cell to the exit OR1 and discard the circuit when receiving the 
DESTROY cell. When the exit OR1 receives the SWITCH and DESTROY control cells, 
the exit OR1 first sends the cells with sequence number 1 and 2 to the web server then it 
tears down any associated edge connections for the corresponding circuit ID. The cells 
with sequence number 1 and 2, which are received by the web server, are kept in the 
input queue and processed when the remaining cells with sequence number 3 and 4 arrive 
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from the middle OR2 and exit OR2.  
Next, we describe the details of OP2 packets received in the web server from exit 
OR1 (sequence number 1 and 2) and exit OR2 (sequence number 3 and 4). Tor uses 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) session resumption [25], which enables the Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) to resume sessions of sending the packets with sequence number 3 
and 4 to the web server, after the client OP2 sends the “Stream Identifier” of the packets 
and relay begin cell that contains the IP address and port number of the web server. Tor 
applies this approach to resume sending of data to the web server after the active circuit 
traffic is switched to the exit OR2. Furthermore, the TCP segments that both exit OR1 and 
exit OR2 nodes sends to the web server has the “Stream Identifier” header [4], which 
holds the length of the relay payload, relay command and stream identity.  
Initially, when the client OP2 constructs a new TCP connection through the exit OR1 
to reach the web server, the OP2 chooses the “Streams Identifier” for all the streams data. 
The client OP2 constructs the relay begin cell with a payload encoding the IP address and 
port number of the destination host web server (i.e., after receiving handshake reply 
message from the web server). When the exit OR1 receives the streams data (sequence 
number 1 and 2) in Tor gateway layer, the exit OR encapsulates the cells, and sends it out 
to the appropriate host via the TCP/IP connection to reach the web server. Note that TCP 
layer is responsible for providing in-order delivery, and reliability for TLS incoming and 
outgoing data. When the entry OR1 switches the circuit to middle OR2 and exit OR2, the 
client OP2 resumes the session, which includes sending “Stream Identifier” and relay 
begin cell. When the exit OR2 receives the information of relay begin cell, it sends the 
packet with sequence number 3 and 4 to the same web server IP address and port 
number. With the same information encoding in the relay begin cell, the packets sent by 
the exit OR1 and exit OR2 can be successfully delivered and processed (reordering of 
packets) by the web server.  
4. After step 3, the entry OR1 then sends a SWITCH_CONN cell on the new TCP 
connection followed by the circuit's cells to the middle OR2. Once the middle OR2 
received the cell, it sends a SWITCH_ACK cell back to entry OR1 (the initiator). The 
entry OR1 instructs the middle OR2 to send the SWITCH_CONN cell to the exit OR2, 
and the exit OR2 sends back the confirmation SWITCH_ACK cell to middle OR2.  
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Next, we explain the details of communication between the exit ORs and the web 
server. In Tor application layer, the entry OR1 gateway protocol instructs the gateway 
protocol at the exit OR1 to send the packets (sequence number 1 and 2) to the web server 
when the connection is ready. The web server then successfully accepts the data after the 
exit OR1 sends the packets. In addition, as soon as the exit OR1 receives the SWITCH 
and DESTROY control cells, the exit OR1 tears down any associated edge connections 
for the corresponding circuit ID to web server. Furthermore, since the connection 
between the exit OR2 and the web server are preemptively built by the client OP2 through 
middle OR2 and the exit OR2 nodes. When the exit OR2 receives the SWITCH_CONN 
control cell and sends back the SWITCH_ACK cell indicating the connection is ready to 
be use, the entry OR1 (at the gateway layer in Tor) instructs the exit OR2 to transfer the 
remaining packets with sequence number 3 and 4 to the right destination web server. The 
web server then receives the TCP segments and sends the ACK message back to the exit 
OR2. Since Tor uses the Transport Layer Security (TLS) session resumption [25] to 
resume connections after switching of circuit, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) can 
resume sessions of sending the packets with sequence number 3 and 4 to the web server 
via exit OR2.  
Note that our method can still works for general applications even if the web server 
does not accept or uses the resumption of TLS session. In cases that the web server does 
not uses the TSL connection, if Tor maintains the same exit OR connection to the web 
server, the switching of circuits only occurs within the Tor network. In addition, since 
our circuit switching procedures also use the default Tor protocols (i.e., all the OPs 
circuit can multiplexes and de-multiplexes at the single exit OR1 to reach the web server), 
the connection between the exit OR and the web server can still be maintain to transfer 
the data. 
 
5.3.4.1.1. 	  The	  switching	  of	  traffics	  to	  alternative	  circuit	  via	  single	  
entry	  OR	  
 
We take into consideration that when switching the active bulk circuit traffics from old 
congested traffic to new alternative circuit, the packets with the sequence number 3 and 4 
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can’t be easily decrypted along the new circuit after switching the circuit from the entry OR1. 
This is because the encryption keys are different for each OR in the new circuit compare to 
the previous old circuit. As a result, the packet drops rates experienced along the alternative 
circuit can be very high.  
Figure 22 shows the improvement of cryptographic problems communication for 
switching traffics to alternative circuit via single entry OR. When the entry OR1 tears down 
the circuit to middle OR1 and exit OR1, the entry OR1 send a single byte of CLOSE cell to 
inform the client OP2 that the appropriate outgoing CircID of transferring streams to middle 
OR1, exit OR1 and the web server is closed. This will prompt the client OP2 to use the 
alternative circuit32 and resend the packets 3 and 4 with the right CircID header to the web 
server. The entry OR1 will adapt the switching to alternative circuit that preemptively built 
based on the requests from the client OP2. The request message is the RESOLVE cell to 
append the cells with sequence number 3 and 4 to the alternative circuit. The entry OR then 
continue to transfer the traffic through different TCP connection and giving more space for 
the light traffics on the previous circuit to have better throughputs.  
Note that incase of downloading traffics from the web server, there will be no problems 
in terms of packets transferring through the alternative path after circuit is switched. This is 
because client OPs encrypts all the packets using the encryption keys for each OR along the 
circuit that was built. Therefore, the client OPs has all the shared cryptographic keys for all 
the selected ORs and can easily adapted to changing circuit traffics and receiving data.  
In addition, switching the circuit traffics via different entry OR should not affecting the 
flow of traffics because the client OPs can continue to send or receive the packets at the 
point of disconnect from the previous old circuit to the new circuit. The client OPs can 
encrypt the cells with the keys of ORs along the new alternative circuit and send it to the 
right CircID connection. We further explained this scenario in Section 5.3.4.2.  
 
                                                            
32 Note that the resending of packets via the alternative circuit are encrypted with the keys of middle OR2 and 
exit OR2 by the client OP2. Therefore the transferred packets are easily decrypted and encrypted by the middle 
OR2 and exit OR2 on the alternative circuit. 
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Figure 22. Switching of traffics to alternative circuit via single entry OR. 
 
5.3.4.1.2. When	  to	  Establish	  the	  Alternative	  Circuit	  
 
By default, Tor tries to maintain at least a certain number of clean circuits, so that new 
streams can be handled quickly [4, 33]. Clean circuit is the one not yet been used to transfer 
any traffics [4]. Specifically, in our case, we constructed two circuits that passes through the 
selected entry OR on startup33 and maintained one alternative clean circuit, which passes 
through the same or different exit OR. Note that the alternative circuit is created at the 
beginning of circuit construction with the old circuit, or can be preemptively built on 
immediate demand by Tor client when the entry OR detect congestion along the circuit. 
Furthermore, Tor client can construct new circuit anytime when there is only one circuit or 
the alternative circuit is highly congested to relay traffics.  
In Figure 21, the dash line indicates the alternative circuit for new circuit path when the 
congestion occurs at the old circuit. We configured each client to construct two circuits 
using the Tor’s auto-circuit algorithm [26], which means the client can only have two 
circuits to reach the web server. One circuit is selected to transfer data and the other circuit 
is kept as alternative path. Our configuration of circuit selection is shown in Algorithm 2 
(see Section 5.4). 
 
                                                            
33 Startup is when Tor client construct a circuit through Tor network during circuit construction period.  
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5.3.4.1.3. How	  to	  Select	  the	  Alternative	  Circuit	  	  
 
Since the clean circuit are already built by the client OP and maintained by Tor even if the 
data is not transferred through the circuit, the entry OR select that circuit as the alternative 
circuit. The entry OR knows its predecessor (client OP) and successor (middle OR) in the 
path with their respective circuit identifications (CircID) assigned on the cell (Control Cell) 
header. Note that the control cell has the CircID that interpreted and assigned by the OP and 
OR to their adjacent TCP connection, and the CircID is unique for each connection.  
The entry OR sends the cells to their corresponding alternative CircID connection when 
switching the circuit path. Figures 18 and 19 shows the overview of circuit switching 
designed, which the entry OR switches the cells of bulk traffic to new alternative circuit 
output buffer in the Tor application level, then transfer the data to corresponding TCP kernel 
output buffer.  
In Figure 21, the entry OR1 knows the middle OR1 and middle OR2 that client OP2 
selected to construct circuits. The entry OR1 can easily switches the traffic to alternative 
circuit, which passes through the middle OR2 by sending the control switching messages. 
The switching of circuit traffics happen in the circuit layer as explained in the overview 
Section 5.1 and, the design of circuit switching in Section 5.2. 
Furthermore, we selected the alternative circuit based on pre-configured ORs (see 
Section 5.4.2.1) and randomly selected ORs that are less congested (see Section 5.4.2.2) in 
the live Tor network. 
 
5.3.4.2. Mechanism	  to	  Switch	  the	  Circuit	  to	  Different	  Entry	  OR	  
 
This Section explains the mechanism to switch the circuit to different entry OR. Figure 21 
shows the switches of client OP4 circuit from the entry OR1 to entry OR2. The flow of 
circuit traffics is from client OP to the web server.  
The steps are as follows: 
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1. Initially, the OP1, OP2, OP3 and OP4 are multiplexed on the entry OR1 and passed 
through the middle OR1 and exit OR1. 
2. When the entry OR1 detects the OP4 circuit is flooding the output buffer occupancy 
beyond the maximum threshold 𝛽, and the congestion occurs. The entry OR1 switches the 
current circuit of OP4 via another entry OR2 that OP4 preemptively built. The 
mechanisms to switch the OP4 circuit to different entry OR2 are explained in the next 
step. 
3. The entry OR1 sends a SWITCH_CONN control cell to the middle OR2, and the middle 
OR2 extends the SWITCH_CONN cell to the exit OR2. If the entry OR1 does not receive 
any SWITCH_ACK in reply back from the middle OR2 and exit OR2, or the 
SWITCH_ACK remains unattached for SocksTimeout, (default 2 minute) at the entry 
OR1 [4], the entry OR1 discards the control cell and sends an error message back to the 
client OP4 as appropriate to close the SOCKS connection. The client OP4 will 
immediately switch its circuit to alternative circuit via entry OR2, which was 
preemptively built and successfully connected to the web server [4]. Note that Tor build 
circuits preemptively, which means, a number of circuits are already constructed and kept 
ready even if there is no data to be sent yet through entry OR2, middle OR2 and exit OR2. 
The connection to the web server a maintained by the client OP4 after circuit 
construction. When a circuit passing through entry OR2 is ready to be used, Tor (client 
OP4) attaches the request's stream to the circuit and sends a BEGIN, BEGIN_DIR and 
RESOLVE ORs pending cells as appropriate to attach to entry OR2, middle OR2 and exit 
OR2. This configuration of stream attachment to new circuit was made by default in Tor 
algorithm to continue on transferring the TCP streams [4]. Since our proposed study also 
works with the default Tor algorithm, this switching of circuit to different entry OR is 
made possible for all client OPs. 
 
5.3.4.3. Inward	  Direction	  of	  Circuit	  Switching	  	  
 
We have been discussing the process of circuit switching approach when cells are 
travelling on the outward direction from client OP to the web server. In this Section, we 
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explained the inward direction of circuit switching, when cells are travelling from the web 
server to the client OPs during download. For inward direction of circuit switching 
approach, since the control metrics to detect the circuit congestion are running on the entry 
OR, when the bottleneck occurs due to cells queue in the Tor output buffer or sending TCP 
buffer towards the client OP. The entry OR responsible to send an error message after the 
remaining cells in the Tor output buffer and sending TCP buffer are sent to the appropriate 
bulk OP. The entry OR sends the error message with corresponding CircID to notify the 
bulk client OP to close the SOCKS connection. This prompted the client OP who owns the 
heavy traffic to use another circuit, which was already preemptively built, and continue on 
with the download from web server at the position of data discontinued in the previous 
circuit. Note that the backup circuit that connected to the web server a maintained by the 
each client OP after circuit construction. 
The process of Tor client attaches the stream data to the new circuit and continue the 
download are same with the switching mechanisms explained in Section 5.3.4.2, which 
involves sending a BEGIN, BEGIN_DIR and RESOLVE ORs pending cell as appropriate 
to attach on the new entry OR2, middle OR2 and exit OR2. The exit OR2 then contacts the 
web server to continue on with the data transfer (download) based on the request from bulk 
client OP.  
 
5.3.5. Time	  to	  Switch	  Circuit	  	  
 
To evaluate the appropriateness of α and β on switch timing in Algorithm 1, we performed 
an experiment for different values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 thresholds and made decisions based on 
switch timing, when active bulk circuit switches to different TCP connection on entry OR 
nodes. Switch timing is the time when sending the last cell on the old circuit path up to 
when the first cell is sent to the new circuit. Circuit switching occurs when there is a 
bottleneck in the output buffer occupancy in Tor (i.e., when the cells queue rises above the 
minimum 𝛼 and maximum 𝛽 thresholds in the entry OR), which are monitored by the 
EWMA. We evaluated the switch timing by uploading a 12.3 MB file for 60 repeated times. 
The threshold values for α and β are directly configured in the Algorithm 1 that runs in the 
entry OR. 
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Figure 23 shows the cumulative distribution of circuit switch timing to evaluate the 
appropriateness of 𝛼 and 𝛽 used in Algorithm 1. We observed that 50% of circuit switch 
timing when α = 0.05 and β = 0.1 is less than 1 s. This switch timing indicates the time it 
took the entry OR1 to successfully switch the active bulk circuit to different TCP path and 
continues on with the data transmission at the position of data discontinued in the previous 
circuit. When we configured the 𝛼 = 0.1 and 𝛽 = 0.5, 50% of switch timing of active bulk 
circuit to different TCP path is also less than 1 s, whereas 50% of circuit switch timing of 𝛼 
= 0.3 and 𝛽 = 0.75 is less than 2.15 s. When further configured the 𝛼 = 0.5 and 𝛽 = 0.9, 
50% of circuit switch timing is less than 3 s, which is slightly higher compared to other 
threshold values. We observed that when increasing the minimum 𝛼 and maximum 𝛽 
threshold values, the switch timing also increases due to more cells queue up in the Tor 
output buffer. As a result, the entry OR1 requires more time to process the cells and send it 
to the corresponding output buffer. On the other hand, when configured the 𝛼 and 𝛽 
threshold values too low as 0.05 and 0.1 respectively, though it has lower circuit switching 
delay, the transfer rates for multiple circuits are very low, because the buffer occupancy 
quickly reached the maximum threshold value of 𝛽 = 0.1 (3.2 KB). Furthermore, when α = 
0.05 and 𝛽 = 0.1, a single entry OR cannot accommodate large number of incoming 
circuits due to smaller output buffer size. Therefore, for our experiment configuration, we 
selected the most appropriate minimum α and maximum β thresholds as 𝛼 = 0.1 and 𝛽 = 
0.5, because it has smaller average circuit switch timing required to switch the active bulk 
circuit to different TCP connection. 
After obtaining the appropriate 𝛼 and  𝛽, we tested the appropriateness of 𝛼 and 𝛽 for 
whole laboratory testbed experiment in Figure 21, to obtain the average delays of circuit 
switching during uploading a 12.3 MB file to the web server. We performed 60 repeated 
measurements at the entry OR1 and entry OR2 nodes for all circuits, and observed the 
switching times of active circuit to different TCP connection. We combined all the 
measurement results and calculated the distribution of circuit switching time to obtain the 
average delays.  
Figure 24 shows the cumulative distribution results of switching times at the entry OR1 
and entry OR2 nodes, when 𝛼 = 0.1 and 𝛽 = 0.5. The results show that 50% of circuit 
switching time at the entry OR1 and entry OR2 are both less than 1 s to successfully switch 
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the circuit and, continue on with the data transmission at the position of data discontinued 
on previous old circuit. 
 
 
Figure 23. Cumulative distributions of circuit switch timing to evaluate the appropriateness 
of α and β used in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
Figure 24. Cumulative distributions of switching time for all the circuits that switched to 
different TCP connection at the entry OR1 and entry OR2 nodes, when α = 0.1 and β = 0.5. 
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5.4. Circuit	  Selection	  Method	  
 
Tor’s circuit selection algorithm has experienced numerous progressions since it started in 
2003 [2, 3]. All the changes to selection method are planned to enhance client performance, 
reliability and network load adjustment.  
By default, client OP randomly selected ORs in the live Tor network to construct 
circuit based on higher bandwidth ORs [2, 3]. Since Tor operation based on voluntarily 
basis, not all ORs are capable (or willing) to push the same measure of traffic; therefore, 
the congestion state of circuit selection in the Tor network is of great variances.  
Wang et al. [15] expressed that congestion can either be short term or long term. For 
short-term congestion, they introduced the instant responses method to select the circuit 
that is less congested. For long-term congestion, they proposed a path selection algorithm 
that takes congestion time into account. Circuit that has lower congestion time will select 
as the best path.  
In this thesis, we worked with the default settings of Tor circuit algorithm to 
automatically attempt and maintained several pre-built circuits so that circuit construction 
time does not affect the user’s experience. We configured the Tor’s auto-circuit algorithm 
[26] in the client OPs to expose the functionality of TorCtl library. This allows us to tune 
the OPs operations timely, such as query the runtime and available bandwidth to control 
the number of circuits built and, specifies the number of hops. Each client OP builds two 
circuits, which being used in our experiment34. Only one of those circuits is chosen as the 
next new circuit when the user’s circuit time out occurs or tears down.  
Algorithm 2 defines the main function of auto-circuit configurations, which was 
developed by Tor project [26] and applies in tor-autocircuit-0.2.tar.gz. 
 
                                                            
34The client OP may continue to measure the circuit and obtains the congestion times. Those tests can be done 
quickly with no overhead. Note that this measurement can be possibly done on the Tor’s stream-level BEGIN 
cell, circuit-level SENDME cell and CONNECTED cell pairs.  
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Algorithm 2. Tor auto-circuit script configured in the client OPs. 
1. # Number of circuits to build 
2. num_circs = NUM,       # specify the number 
of circuits built 
3. # Do not use a country twice in a route  
4. # [True --> unique, False --> same or None --
> pass]  
5. unique_countries = “Insert Parameter of 
Line 4”,   
6. # Configure max continent crossings in one 
path   
7. # [integer number 0-n or None --> Continent 
Jumper/Unique Continent] 
8. continent_crossings = 3, 
9. # Configure max ocean crossings in one path  
10. # [integer number 0-n or None --> Ocean 
Jumper/Unique Ocean] 
11. ocean_crossings  = 1, 
12. # Specify countries for positions [single 
country code or None] 
13. entry_country  = country code, 
14. # Specify countries for positions [single 
country code or None] 
15. middle_country  = country code, 
16. # Specify countries for positions [single 
country code or None] 
17. exit_country= country code, 
18. # List of countries not to use in routes  
19. # (empty) list of country codes or None 
20. excludes  = country code 
21. # Number of hops in circuits 
22. pathlen  = 3,                // default hops in Tor 
network 
23. # True   - produces exits in an ordered fashion 
for a specific port. 
24. # False  - If uniform is set to True, exists will 
be produced in a uniform fashion, 
25. # Otherwise it produces exits in a bandwidth 
weighted fashion. 
26. order_exits   = False, 
27. # Maximum percentile requirement of 
bandwidth rankings to be included in the 
circuit 
28. percent_fast  = 100, 
29. # Minimum percentile requirement of 
bandwidth rankings to be included in the 
circuit 
30. percent_skip= INSERT_LOW_BW, 
31. # Minimum hop bandwidth 
32. min_bw= INSERT_MIN_BW, 
33. # True - the same router can't appear more 
than once in a path, otherwise no path 
restriction 
34. # False  - no two nodes from the same /16 
subnet can be in the path and the same router 
can't appear more than once in a path. Set to 
False when using percent_fast or 
percent_skip 
35. use_all_exits = False, 
36. # True   - produces nodes in the uniform 
distribution 
37. # False  - produces nodes in the bandwidth 
weighted distribution 
38. uniform = Insert Parameter of Line 36 and 
37, 
39. # Name of the exit node or None 
40. use_exit= None, 
41. # True   - entry node must have "Guard", 
"Valid", and "Running" flags set 
42. # False  - entry node must have "Valid" and 
"Running" flags set 
43. use_guards= True, 
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5.4.1. Circuit	  Selection	  in	  the	  Laboratory	  Setup	  Testbed	  	  
 
In the first part of our evaluation, the circuit selection method is manually configured, since 
we want to observe if the circuit switching method of active TCP connection can improve 
the unfair distribution between the bulk and light circuit traffics. Note that we discussed the 
dynamic selection of circuit switching in Section 5.4.2. 
We configured and selected paths through our setup ORs in the testbed environmnet. 
All the ORs periodically send their online information to Tor directory servers. This is 
important because the directory severs can assign flags to our ORs based on daily 
information it received. The circuit selection is configured through the ORs from the same 
subnet and can appear more than once. To make this configuration possible, in Algorithm 2 
line 5, we set the parameter to False to allow our setup ORs to easily select by our client 
OPs when constructing the circuit35. The main purpose why we performed this circuit 
selection approach is to worked in a small geographical area experiments and observe if 
our method provide improvement of distributing the light traffics and heavy bulk traffics. 
In addition, we aimed to evaluate and confirmed the effectiveness of our circuit switching 
approach in Tor. 
Figure 25 shows the experiment setup of selecting the ORs and constructing the circuit 
in the laboratory testbed. We used our selection Algorithm 3 to obtain the ORs located in 
our university (Japan), and configured 2 ORs for entry gateway into Tor network, 2 middle 
ORs to relay traffic within the Tor network and, 2 exit ORs for gateway outside of the Tor 
network. These ORs are inputted into Algorithm 2 for circuit construction. Since we are 
using our own setup ORs in the first evaluation, Algorithm 3 also obtains those setup ORs 
details.  
This approach is done successfully when building the circuit through the allocated 
L=Sets of our ORs for each respective hop. The client selects two circuits when initiates 
the sending requests to construct a circuit on start up. 
                                                            
35Note that with this approach, we slightly reduce the anonymity strength of the Tor network [4], since we 
used all the ORs within the same country and hence, any OR that is comprised by the adversaries can enable 
any attacks [20].  
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Figure 25. Circuit selection in the laboratory testbed. 
 
The configurations for testbed set up are stated below, 
All the ORs were running on the commercial 1 Gbps network in our University 
laboratory. The client OPs are running on another network in our university. The client OPs 
and ORs were running on Ubuntu OS 14.04.2 LTS CPU 2.60 GHz 32 bit with 4 GB of 
RAM. We maintained the same memory and CPU for all the ORs to gain similar 
performance across the entire network. We run all the ORs for more than a month to gain 
stability in performance. We configured ORs at the entry and middle position to relay 
traffic within Tor and, the exit ORs opens the TCP port 80 to reach the web server 
(https://www.dropbox.com/home). We worked with the Tor stable source code 0.2.4.19 for 
all the OPs and ORs in our testbed. The ORs were running in the Internet with the 
bandwidth capacity of 1.5 Mbps. The solid lines indicate the initial circuit built by OPs and 
the dashed lines indicate the switched circuit (new TCP path) after the old circuit is 
congested and tear down. The entry OR1 and entry OR2 are configured to open two TCP 
connections for OPs circuits. This is to improve the flow rates of data, TCP window sizes 
and end-to-end TCP throughput in proportion to RTTs along the circuit.  
We use Netem emulator tool to enforce delay effects for the incoming TCP traffics to 
all the OPs. The delays enforced to OP1, OP2, OP3 and OP4 to the entry OR are 120 ms, 60 
ms, 20 ms and 10 ms, respectively. These settings enable us to configure circuit as bulk and 
light traffics through the Tor network. Finally, the entire client OPs are uploading 12.3 MB 
file simultaneously to the web server. 
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Algorithm 3. Select region and country code to make input in Algorithm 2. 
1. def input req (inputans1):    // Function 
definition for country code and region 
2. inputans1 = raw_input  // Enter country 
code or region  
3. inputans1 = inputans1.upper() 
4. return inputans1 
5. inputans1 == “country code” 
 
# Router details obtained from the Tor 
directory servers 
6. for col in row: 
7. rname.append(col)  # router name 
8. countcode.append(col) # country code 
9. bwidth.append(col)   # bandwidth 
10. uptime.append(col)   # uptime 
11. ipaddress.append(col) # IP address 
12. fastflag.append(col)  # fast flag 
13. guardflag.append(col)  # guard flag 
14. stableflag.append(col) # stable flag 
15. validflag.append(col) # validflag 
16. colnum += 1 
 
 
5.4.2. Circuit	  Selection	  in	  the	  Live	  Tor	  Network	  
 
5.4.2.1. Pre-­‐configured	  the	  Countries	  for	  Circuit	  Selection	  
 
We next performed a comprehensive circuit path selection and performance analysis on 
dynamically selecting ORs in the live Tor network, to test our circuit switching approach. 
We evaluated the proposed approach in the live Tor network where our entry OR1 and entry 
OR2 works as the entry OR gateways into Tor, and the middle ORs and exit ORs are 
selected from the public Tor network. We selected the good route through the middle and 
exit ORs that have the reliable and higher OR capacities, to ensure fairness between the 
bulk and light circuit before switching and after switching the bulk circuit. We configured 
the Tor clients to build circuits to ORs on a specified geographic distance between each OR 
in the circuit (i.e., we specify the countries for each hop). And routers were selected using 
uniform selection specified in Algorithm 2 Line 38, one-by-one from the current list of 
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running routers to distribute the traffics. Furthermore, we set the Algorithm 2 line 5 
parameters to True for unique country36 OR, which will be allocated on all hops.  
The detail information for each OR from the Tor Network status database was 
retrieved using the Algorithm 3. We use this Algorithm 3 to determined the OR name, 
fingerprint, bandwidths, flags, uptime, positions and IP address, which are automatically 
downloaded from the Tor database. In addition, Algorithm 3 selects the ORs that fulfilled 
the performance flags requirements (guard, stable and fast flags), reliable bandwidth 
capacity, and automatically inputted them to Algorithm 2 for circuit construction. 
Figure 26 shows the topology of circuit selection and circuit switching approach in the 
live Tor network. There are 50 ORs, which are uniformly selected from the Tor directory 
server, based on the advertised bandwidths, fast and stable performance flags. From the 
total lists of 50 ORs, we allocated 25 middle ORs and 25 exit ORs. All the middle ORs 
relay traffics within the Tor network and the exit ORs has the exit policy to relay traffic 
outside of Tor. The client OPs were running on another network in our university. The OPs 
and the entry ORs were running on Ubuntu OS 14.0 LTS CPU 2.60 GHz 32 bit with 4 GB 
of RAM. We run all our setup entry ORs in the Tor network for more than a month to gain 
stabile performance. We run the Tor stable source code 0.2.4.19 for all the OPs and the 
entry ORs. The entry OR has the bandwidth capacity of 1.5 Mbps. The solid lines indicate 
the initial circuit built by the client OPs and the dashed lines indicate the switched circuit 
traffics after the old circuit is congested. The entry ORs configured to open two TCP 
connections for OPs circuits to pass through within the Tor network. 
The objective of running our own setup ORs is to easily control and observe37 the 
circuit-switching algorithm, which monitors the four circuits that multiplexed on a single 
entry OR when congestion occurs. In addition, to analyze any improvements in throughput 
for all circuits after the bulk circuit is switched. We ensure the entry OR located in our 
                                                            
36The circuit path selection is based on the countries geographic locations for each OR, the entry ORs are in 
Japan (JP), middle ORs are in Germany (DE) and the exit ORs are located in the America (US). We enforced 
the diversity by no two nodes from the same /16 subnet can be in the same path, and the same router cannot 
appear more than once in a path [4]. 
37Note that we only monitor and analyze our own circuit traffics in the live Tor network.  
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testbed must have the guard flag at the entry point to confirmed the high uptime, stable 
performance and have higher advertised bandwidths. 
 
 
Figure 26. Circuit selection in the live Tor network. 
 
As shown in Figure 26, the entry OR1 select and switches the bulk circuit one-by-one 
from the current download list of active running ORs in the Tor network to distribute the 
traffics. We constructed a circuit for each 4 client OP with default 3-hops. The circuit 
switching protocols approach applied in the live Tor experiment are same with the 
procedures steps explained in Section 5.3.4. 
 
5.4.2.2. Random	  circuit	  selection	  
 
Another circuit selection approach we experimented and evaluated is the random selection 
of active OR for best path in the live Tor network. This approach requires each OP to 
isolate the circuit congestion in a minimal RTT time. The best approach would be for all 
client OPs to build their circuit path pre-emptively in order to determine best circuit path. 
The client OPs would need to separate the circuit’s propagation delay from the delay due to 
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congestion. In addition, to determine the congestion times along the circuit, the client OP 
performs the instant responses time for each circuit.  
Each client OP built and measured the RTTs along a circuit and saved the RTTs in a 
list of {RTT1, RTT2...RTTk}. After all measurements of circuits are done, the client OP 
selects the circuit with smallest RTT, which indicate quick instant responses of all ORs 
along the circuit. Each OP repeated the RTTs measurement on each circuit 5 times to 
calculate the 95% confidence interval. This approach enables the OP to randomly select the 
less congested middle and exit ORs in the live Tor network. 
Table 3 shows the RTT measurements from all client OPs, which are saved in a 
configuration list. Each client OP only selects the circuit with smallest RTT to obtain the 
best path in the Tor network. 
 
Table 3. RTTs for all circuits that each client OP pre-emptively built in the live Tor network. 
Tor 
clients 
RTT1 
Circuit #1 
RTT2 
Circuit #2 
RTT3 
Circuit #3 
RTT4 
Circuit #4 
RTT5 
Circuit #5 
RTT6 
Circuit #6 
OP1 2.6 ± 1.3 s 1.2 ± 0.5 s 4.45 ± 1.2 s 2.8 ± 1.4 s  4.2 ± 1.6 s 2.0 ± 0.8 s 
OP2 2.3 ± 1.6 s 2.0 ± 1.6 s 2.1 ± 0.4 s 3.4 ± 2.7 s 3.2 ± 1.3 s 4.6 ± 1.2 s 
OP3 1.8 ± 0.9 s 4.7 ± 1.8 s 3. 3 ± 0.9 s 3.1 ± 0.7 s 2.1 ± 0.9 s 2.8 ± 1.7 s 
OP4 2.4 ± 0.7 s 3.5 ± 1.4 s 2.0 ± 1.9 s 4.1 ± 2.5 s 1.9 ± 0.7 s 2.0 ± 1.5 s 
 
5.5. Measurement	  Approaches	  
 
In the previous Sections, we discussed the two circuit path selections for first and second 
part of our evaluations. The aim is to observe the effectiveness of circuit switching 
approach when applying both experiment scenarios in the live Tor network. Furthermore, 
we aim to improved the end-to-end throughput and reduce the queuing delays of packets 
that contributed to increasing the end-to-end latency in Tor.  
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Our enquiry into sources of latency in Tor began with an examination of congestion 
along the circuit as previously discussed in Chapter 4. Our particular interests in measuring 
the improvement of our work are the increase of OR capacities and, the network 
throughput of total data sent along the circuit. We measured the time taken for cell 
processing, the time taken to dispatch messages, and the time data spent waiting in the 
buffers. Finally, the packet-sniffing tool Wireshark was used to report information about all 
the Internet traffics being generated by the running ORs. 
Before presenting the measurement techniques, firstly we explained the metrics we 
used for observing improvement relating to the transport latency of various Tor circuits 
before we switched and after switching the bulk circuits to another TCP connection (i.e., 
after congestion occurs). 
These metrics are defined and used by Raymond et al. [27].  
• ORs capacity refers to the number of bytes that a relay can forward per second 
on all circuits going through it. 
• ORs utilization refers to the fraction of the relay capacity that is in use at any 
point in time. 
• For a fully utilized OR, the available capacity is nothing other than the max-min 
fair-share for a circuit going through that relay. 
• OR available capacity refer to the throughput that a circuit is able to command 
from the relay at any point in time, which is a function of the (raw) relay 
capacity as well as the number of circuits using that relay in a max-min fair 
fashion. 
• For a relay that is not fully utilized, the available capacity is the expected 
throughput of a newly created circuit going through that relay. 
• Normalized OR capacity refer to the relative overall capacity of a relay. 
• Tor network capacity refers to the expected throughput of a circuit traversing 
the ORs.  
Our measurement approaches are mainly based on three interacting mechanisms:  
• (1) A probing mechanism to obtain a statistic data collection. 
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• (2) A feedback mechanism by interacting with the sockets. 
• (3) And circuit construction mechanism to obtained timing between client, ORs 
and the web server. 
 
5.5.1. Statistic	  Data	  Collection	  
 
We collected statistic data variables by performing direct probing techniques during 
compile time38 of constructing the circuit and transferring data.  
We compile and run a source code of Tor monitor program at the ORs and, study the 
timing variable when value display the incoming and outgoing transfer rates of the data 
from the receiving TCP socket to Tor input buffer (upstream), and down to the sending 
TCP socket (downstream). 
We also configured and executed the TorCtl python bindings [28] on all the OPs. 
TorCtl is a python Tor controller protocol library with extensions to support path building, 
with various constraints on node and path selection as well as statistics gathering [28]. 
Since we are interested in gathering statistics results on circuit creation, stream 
bandwidth, and circuit failure information, we extended the StatsSupport.StatsHandler, 
which is another event handler implementation with hooks to record statistics. 
Below is the TorCtl usage script [28] we used for measurements. We attached a 
listener to connection and print the amount of traffic going over Tor network per second. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
38 The memory allocated to store the results during execution is currently configured at compile time. Each 
variable can be an unbounded size, or a fixed-size captured data for analysis.  
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Algorithm 4. TorCtl usage for read and written events. 
1. import time 
2. import TorCtl 
 
3. class BandwidthListener(TorCtl.PostEventListener):   // Bandwidth listener 
4. def __init__(self): 
5. TorCtl.PostEventListener.__init__(self) 
 
6. def bandwidth_event(self, event): 
7. print "tor read %i bytes and wrote %i bytes" % (event.read, event.written)  // output the information  
                for read and write  
                events of data 
 
8. # constructs a listener that prints BW e  
9. myListener = BandwidthListener() 
 
10. # initiates a TorCtl connection, returning None if it was unsuccessful 
11. conn = TorCtl.connect() 
 
12. if conn: 
13. # tells tor to send us BW events 
14. conn.set_events(["BW"]) 
 
15. # attaches the listener so it'll receive BW events 
16. conn.add_event_listener(myListener) 
 
17. # run until we get a keyboard interrupt 
18. try: 
19. while True: 
20. time.sleep(10) 
21. except KeyboardInterrupt: pass 
 
 
5.5.2. Interaction	  with	  Socket	  Measurement	  
 
Since our analysis focus on reducing the congestion in Tor and increasing the capacity in 
the Tor network. We measured the circuit traffic before congestion and when reaching the 
congestion state, based on the buffer usage over time and socket un-writable event.  
We collected timing information from our Tor ORs by using the libpse [29]. We 
recorded the time focuses on cells entering the circuit queue, and the cells transferred from 
the circuit queue to the outgoing buffer in Tor. In addition, we recorded the time when the 
cells leave the output buffer. 
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We introduced libspe-programming script [29] to give the port number to a nearby 
interaction socket. A thread is generated that acknowledge localhost connection on that 
port. All runtime parts of libspe are controlled through this socket. Moreover, information 
gathering captured the cumulative distribution functions for every single timing variable 
and output the results to a file. We performed 60 repeated measurements during uploading 
a 12.3 MB file to the web server. 
Furthermore, we used the node monitor program script that runs on each OR to 
analyzed the OR capacity, which changes over time in terms of data flow rates. The node 
monitor program output the OR capacity, which shows the number of bytes that a relay can 
forward per second on all circuits going through it. We calculated the changes in the OR 
capacity by taking the difference of capacity “after switching” the active bulk circuit and, 
“before switching” the circuit traffics, Cafter – Cbefore. The increase of OR capacity after 
switching shows an improvement to our proposed method.  
 
5.5.3. Timing	  Measurement	  on	  Client	  OP,	  ORs	  and	  the	  Web	  Server	  
 
Our enquiry to improve the Tor performance is based on the timing information on client 
OP, ORs and the web server. To accurately measured these statistics; we measured the 
circuit and obtained the results from the OPs to the web server during uploading a 12.3 MB 
file39. Furthermore, we used the Algorithm 4 to measured the OR connection events. We 
pushed a bandwidth probe packet through the TorCtl port and measured the end-to-end 
throughput from the client OP to the web server. We performed 60 repeated measurements 
after 10 minutes intervals when every upload is completed40.  
The end-to-end latency is measured by sending a single cell of 512 Bytes (a TCP data 
packet, which is part of the HTTP request) from the OP to the web server via a 3-hops 
circuit. The average end-to-end latency varies depending on the extent of a circuit’s 
                                                            
39 We performed an uploading of 12.3 MB file to determine an upper bound on the buffer usage, network 
capacities, end-to-end throughput and latency.  
40 Sending a constant stream of data is used to measure throughput, so we can properly measure the transfer 
rates and latency.  
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congestion, and the both side directions of all selected ORs. We obtained the delays 
experience by a single cell along the circuit and through the ORs (due to queuing and 
processing delays in the node), by applying the measurement method used by Wang et al. 
[15].  
We gathered the timing data from the Tor ORs by utilizing the libpse programming 
tool [29], since the OR runs two threads: (1) the listening thread and (2) the writing thread. 
For the listening thread, the OR acknowledges new connections and adds the new 
connection to a link list. Whereas, for the writing thread, the OR repeats the sending of 
timestamp message to every single acknowledge sockets that are writable.  
 
5.5.4. Parameter	  Settings	  
 
We have performed measurement evaluations for switching circuit method in two cases, 
testbed experiments as explained in Section 5.4.1 and the live Tor network experiments in 
Section 5.4.2. For both cases, the parameters settings configured at the entry OR are the 
same. The parameter settings are, (1) socket buffer size and (2) EWMA parameter, which 
controlled the traffic usages on a single entry OR.  
 
5.5.4.1. Socket	  Buffer	  Size	  
 
We configured the TCP socket buffer size varying from minimum 8 KB to average 16 KB. 
To easily measure the TCP socket buffer usage over time, we executed a libevent echo 
socket script to output the kernel memory usage over time. Our objective is to monitor the 
end-to-end throughput of a data transfer over an overlay-circuit with different TCP socket 
buffers on each hop. The results can show us if OR with more than one TCP connections 
can indeed increase the entire Tor network capacities.  
In Section 5.3.2, we explained the kernel output buffer usually swells up until the 
acknowledgements are received.  
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Figure 20 shows the experiment measurement when un-writable events occur, which 
indicated the TCP socket buffer cannot receive any more new data. To get the exact value 
of buffer usage when these events occur, we echo the libevet socket at every run time. 
Libevent is responsible for invoking the method that removes data from the TCP buffers on 
every call and handle new connection when created. Therefore, echoing the libevent buffer 
events consists of an underlying transport socket buffers, which outputs the buffer usage 
over time.  
Algorithm 5 shows the libevent echo socket script that handles the scenario when new 
connection is created and, echoes the results for read and writes events of socket buffers. 
 
Algorithm 5. Libevent echo socket 
1. #define UNIX_SOCK_PATH "/tmp/mysocket“ 
2. static void accept_conn_cb(structevconnlistener *listener, evutil_socket_tfd, structsockaddr *address, 
intsocklen, void *ctx)              # all libevent to handle when a new connection is created 
3. { structevent_base *base = evconnlistener_get_base(listener);# got a new connection! Set up a 
bufferevent for it. 
4. structbufferevent *bev = bufferevent_socket_new(base, fd, BEV_OPT_CLOSE_ON_FREE) } 
5. static void echo_read_cb(structbufferevent *bev, void *ctx)   # A "bufferevent" consists of an  
underlying transport (socket buffer) 
6. {structevbuffer *input = bufferevent_get_input(bev); 
7. structevbuffer *output =bufferevent_get_output(bev); 
8. evbuffer_get_length(input,output); #output the buffer length 
9.   } 
  
5.5.4.2. EWMA	  parameter	  (γ)	  
 
In Section 5.3.3, we explained the EWMA parameter  𝛾, which is the fractional weight of 
the previous buffer estimate in the EWMA algorithm. Since 𝛾 determines the depth of 
kernel memory usage in the allocated output buffers in Tor, it is essential to tell us if the 
single OR is overloaded with queuing data and when congestion occurs. This is because the 
larger 𝛾 has a greater influence on the number of cells occupying the output buffer by all 
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incoming circuits. Therefore, switching of bulk circuit to new TCP connection and, 
dropping of old circuit is based on the depth of kernel memory usage allocated on the 
output buffer.  
In our experiment, we configured the 𝛾 = 0.7. With this configuration, we are able to 
distinguish the bulk and light circuit traffics. This was done for each per circuit output 
buﬀer allocated for incoming circuit queues on all the entry ORs. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Experimental	  Results	  
 
In this Chapter, we showed our experimental analysis for circuit switching method. We 
evaluated the effectiveness of circuit switching method and offer the following 
contributions, 
• We showed the results that circuit switching approach increases the capacity of OR and 
reduces the circuit congestion. 
• We reduced the congestion along the circuit by applying the control schemes to 
monitor the buffer occupancy in the entry ORs. 
• We compared the results for default stock Tor with our switching method on a setup 
testbed environment and partly in the live Tor network.  
• The circuit switching method improves the performance for all light and bulk users in 
Tor.  
In Section 6.1, we performed the manual circuit switching of traffics to observe any 
improvements and ensure that our modifications do not contributed to higher delays.  
In Section 6.2, we applied the dynamic switching of circuit traffics in the live Tor 
network and observed the effectiveness of the circuit switching approach.  
 
6.1.	  Analysis	  of	  Circuit	  Switching	  Method	  in	  the	  Testbed	  
Environment	  
 
We performed a series of experiments for the first part of our evaluation in our setup 
experiment testbed. We applied two conditions on all the ORs to accept cross traffics and 
not accepting other cross traffics in the public Internet, when relaying our own circuit 
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traffics. The main purpose is to analyze the effectiveness of circuit switching method in 
relation to variances of network loaded. 
 
6.1.1. All	  the	  Setup	  ORs	  does	  not	  Accept	  Traffics	  from	  the	  Internet	  
 
6.1.1.1. EWMA	  Values	  for	  Each	  OP	  Circuit	  	  
 
During upload of 12.3 MB file to the web server41, Tor detect the congestion occur at the 
entry OR1 because the client OP circuits are largely occupying the output buffer, which 
goes above the maximum. When we multiplexed all the 4 circuits to entry OR2, we also 
observed the upper bound of buffer usage also rises above the maximum 𝛽 threshold 
specified.  
Table 4 shows the output results of EWMA values in Equation 4 (see Section 5.3.3) 
for each client OP circuit, which transferred cells to the corresponding output buffer in the 
entry OR. The table result shows the unfair distribution of cells in the entry OR. The 
average EWMA values for client OP2 and OP3 are higher compared to client OP1 and OP4 
circuit. The result matches with the previous findings [15-18, 24], which stated the delays 
in the OR are the principal contributor to increasing delays in Tor. More importantly, we 
observed that although we enforced the link delays to each respective client OP circuit to 
the entries ORs, the client OP2 and OP3 still transferred data quicker to achieve higher 
EWMA values compared to OP4 circuit.  
The variances of delays on all the ORs affects the performance of OP4 circuit although 
it has a very lower link delay to entry OR. In addition, it is very likely that the Tor circuit-
scheduling algorithm itself plays a role in the variation in delays across a given router. 
 
                                                            
41 We performed 60 repeated measurements during uploading a 12.3 MB file to the web server, to obtain the 
reliable results of OR capacities changes after circuit switching. Note that the flow of traffic is from the OP to 
the web server. 
 87 
Table 4. EWMA value for each circuit with moving average of cells to Tor output buffer. 
 
 
To improve the flow rates and reduce the congestion along the multiplexed circuits, the 
entry OR1 switches both client OP2 and OP3 circuits to different TCP connection (see 
Figure 25), which goes through the middle OR2 and further transferred to exit OR2. The 
client OP2 and OP3 traffics pass through the alternative circuit to improve the flow rates of 
the remaining light OP1 and OP4 circuit traffics through middle OR1 and exit OR1, and also 
to reduce the bottleneck at the entry OR1. 
 
6.1.1.2. OR	  Capacities	  After	  and	  Before	  Switching	  the	  Bulk	  Circuit	  
 
Figure 27 shows the cumulative distribution for differences of OR capacities42 on entry 
ORs, middle ORs and exit ORs after switching the bulk circuit43.  
In overall tests that we performed, 50% of increased OR capacities after taking the 
differences of OR capacities (Cafter – Cbefore) for entry OR1, middle OR1 and exit OR1 are 
less than 1.3 Mbps, 2.4 Mbps and 1.5 Mbps, respectively. We also measured the entry OR2, 
middle OR2 and exit OR2 under the same weighted of multiplexing circuits for all the OP 
circuit traffics, and observed the results consistently show significantly improvement of 
ORs capacities after switching the bulk circuits. 50% of increased capacities for entry OR2, 
middle OR2 and exit OR2 are less than 1.8 Mbps, 1.8 Mbps and 1.4 Mbps, respectively. 
The slight improvement in OR capacities after switching the bulk circuit indicates the 
                                                            
42Note that the allocated bandwidth to relay traffic on all the ORs is 1.5 Mbps. 
43We observed that changes in Tor router capacities before and after bulk circuit switched and calculated the 
differences of capacities by Cafter – Cbefore. The difference shows the improvement of OR capacities. 
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increased throughputs of the remaining light circuits and also the switched bulk circuit. The 
transfer bytes are able to transfer quickly for all the ORs at any point in time. 
 
Figure 27. Cumulative distribution of all the OR capacities increase after switching the bulk 
circuit, Cafter- Cbefore. [Capacity Mbps]. 
 
In Figure 25, when OP4 circuit traffic load switches to all three OR2 nodes, the load of 
traffic for OP4 circuit “before switching” and “after switching” is measured by each OR 
capacity and throughputs. The end-to-end throughput for old OP4 circuit (before switching) 
is 88 ± 24 KB/s. The average capacity of entry OR1 before switching the OP4 circuit (solid 
blue line) is 0.98 Mbps, for middle OR1 is 1.01 Mbps and for exit OR1 is 0.78 Mbps. After 
switching the OP4 circuit to all three OR2 nodes (blue dash line), the average capacities for 
entry OR2, middle OR2 and exit OR2 are 1.48 Mbps, 1.41 Mbps and 1.57 Mbps respectively. 
Since all the OR2 nodes are less congested compared to all three OR1 nodes, the end-to-end 
throughput for OP4 circuit after switching (blue dash line) to new circuit path is improved 
by 120 ± 13 KB/s. Note that the initial capacities of all three OR2 nodes (i.e., before OP4 
circuit traffic passes through all three OR2 nodes) are 3.28 Mbps for entry OR2, 3.21 Mbps 
for middle OR2, and 3.07 Mbps for exit OR2. Our approach also improves all three OR1 
nodes capacities after switching the OP4 circuit to all OR2 nodes, by increasing the 
capacities to 2.48 Mbps for entry OR1, 3.31 Mbps for middle OR1 and 2.38 Mbps for exit 
OR1. The differences of the OR capacity after switching and before switching gives the 
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increase of capacities for each OR as shown in Figure 27. This improvement in OR 
capacities helps to improve the flow rates of the current OP4 circuit passing through all 
three OR2 nodes. 
From the experiment results, since we configured our setup ORs not to accept other 
cross traffics from the Internet. We observed larger percentage of 92% increase of 
capacities for all ORs after bulk circuits are switched. Only less than 8% of our 
experiments show no improvement. At one instance, the entry OR1 and entry OR2 have the 
capacity of 0 Mbps, which indicates no improvement in the network capacity (the OR 
capacity before and after switching the bulk circuits are the same). 
Moreover, the experiment results showed that if we can appropriately select the circuit 
to switch the traffics based on higher capacity ORs, the overall Tor performance can be 
improved. In addition, when connecting the congested OR to higher capacity OR, the flow 
rates of data and the network capacity are improved. 
 
6.1.1.3. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Throughput	  	  
 
Table 5 shows the impact of increasing network capacity to average end-to-end 
throughputs for all the circuits from client OP to web server.  
Figure 28 shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughput for all circuits. 
Table 5 and Figure 28 compares two cases, (1) the default Tor multiplexes circuits and (2) 
the results of circuit switching approach44. We showed the effective drop rate45 of a 
multiplex circuits compared to circuit switching approach. From the results, we observed 
the entry OR that switches the bulk circuit traffics to different TCP connections for all OPs 
are gaining better average end-to-end throughput, compared to default Tor multiplexing 
circuits. There are issues that arise in our evaluation method, which needs consideration. 
                                                            
44Note that circuit-switching results for all OPs are measured begins from the initial stage when the light and 
bulk circuits are multiplexed at a single TCP connection up to when the bulk circuit switching occurs, and file 
transfer completes.  
45The effective drop rate is the percentage ratio of packets dropped, to total number of packets we observed in 
the experiment. 
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The average end-to-end throughput for switching the active bulk circuit to different TCP 
connection sees higher variances (95% confidence interval is quite large). The reason is 
0.09% of packet drop occurs when switching the active bulk circuits (circuits with higher 
EWMA values) to different TCP connection. Packet losses becoming a problem for our 
control scheme because it can contribute to additional delay if frequently occurs.  
However, the beneficial of our approach is packet loss does not affect throughput in 
total. The obvious reason is that each TCP sub-flow of the circuit traffic is not affecting 
each other in-terms of queuing delay in their respective output buffer. As a result, the 
average end-to-end throughput is still improved.  
Figure 28 shows that 50% of end-to-end throughputs for Tor multiplexed circuits are 
less than 134 KB/s, whereas 50% of end-to-end throughputs for circuit switching approach 
at the entry ORs after congestion occurs are less than 264 KB/s. The distribution of end-to-
end throughput for circuit switching approaches shows significant improvement in the 
overall network throughput for all light and bulk circuits. 
In case of Tor multiplexed circuits, Tor suffers an unreasonable throughputs reduction 
when 0.04% packet drops occur as shown in Table 5. Packet losses or reordering causes the 
socket to indicate no data is available to read even if other circuits have their sequential 
cells available in the buffers. Furthermore, packets sit in the output kernel buffer and cause 
the socket to un-writable because of no space.  
 
Table 5. Comparisons of average end-to-end throughput for Tor multiplex circuits and circuit 
switching approach. 
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Figure 28. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughput for all circuits from client OP to 
the web server. 
 
 
6.1.1.4. Transitional	  Delay	  Effects	  
 
Since Tor forward message over many possible long Internet links, higher delays occurs 
compared to immediate connection. The ORs are found all around the globe, so the total 
delays experience by transfer cells across the overlay connections can undoubtedly be 
many milliseconds. These delays raises a question of how much additional delay can 
accumulate on the traffic when there are packet drops occurs at the transport and Tor 
application layer.  
In Table 5, the measurement results show that packet drop occurs when data are 
queued for processing or forwarding during switching the active bulk circuits, which slows 
down the light traffics. We realized that in this case, if switching the TCP connection were 
used in parallel configuration then queuing delays in the IP layer would typically be higher. 
Hence, higher number of parallel TCP connections on a single OR through a common 
bottleneck result in a higher packet loss rate.  
Figure 29 shows the effects of loss event probability per circuit. The graph shows that 
as the number of different circuit increases on the ORs and bulk circuit switches to separate 
TCP connection to lower the bottleneck, the probability of losses increases compared to 
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when all the circuits are multiplexed to single TCP connection. Separate TCP connections 
on a single OR have higher loss probability of packet losses, which happen more frequently. 
When we vary the 4 circuits that multiplexed over a single connection, separate TCP 
experience loss probability drastically increases as the number of TCP connections 
increases (in overall cases).  
Even though Tor multiplexed circuits have lower loss probability, the worst drawbacks 
in multiplexing many circuits into single TCP connection is the longer queues of packets 
waiting to be send, and the higher average delays for multiple circuits.  
We next discussed the average end-to-end latency experienced by the cell as it routed 
into Tor, from the client OP to the web server.  
 
 
Figure 29. Loss event probability per circuit. 
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6.1.1.5. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Latency	  
 
Table 6 shows the average end-to-end latency of Tor multiplex circuits compared to circuit 
switching results. The average end-to-end latency for Tor multiplexed circuits is higher 
compared to all OPs circuit performance after switching the bulk circuit. Next we 
calculated the cumulative distribution to observe the overall latency and confirmed the 
improvements in Table 6.   
Figure 30 shows the cumulative distribution of the end-to-end latency. The Tor 
multiplexed circuits refer to all the OP circuits that are multiplexing at the entry ORs, 
middle ORs and exit ORs. The distribution of end-to-end latency46 for all circuits when 
switching the bulk circuit traffics to different TCP connections shows, 50% of end-to-end 
latency is less than 1.68 seconds, whereas 50% of end-to-end latency when multiplexing all 
the circuits to single TCP connection is less than 2.65 seconds. From the result, the circuit 
switching approach enhances the flow rates of data and has lower end-to-end latency in 
comparison to Tor multiplex circuits.  
Testing done on our setup ORs shows that when increasing the capacity of network by 
applying circuit-switching method, the overall end-to-end latency decreases and the 
throughput in the Tor network increases. 
Our next experiment is to test our method by allowing all setup ORs to accept cross-
traffics in the live Tor network. Our goal is to observe the control metrics we applied to 
detect the congestion on the entry OR is effective or not when accepting cross-traffics in 
the public Tor. 
 
Table 6. Average end-to-end latency. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
latency (sec) 
Tor multiplex circuits  2.5 ± 2.16  
All OP circuits after 
bulk circuit switched 
 1.5 ± 1.41  
 
                                                            
46 The end-to-end latency is measured for every 60 experiments when uploading a 12.3 MB file. 
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Figure 30. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end latency from the client OP to the web server. 
 
6.1.2. All	  the	  ORs	  Accept	  Traffics	  from	  the	  Internet	  
 
The second condition of our evaluation is to perform experiments when all the ORs accept 
cross-traffics in the public Internet. The purpose is to analyze the effects of cross traffics 
through our setup ORs when applying the circuit switching method. In addition, we would 
like to confirm that our testbed measurements can indeed approximate the improvement 
when accepts traffics from the live Tor network. 
 
6.1.2.1. Model	  Accuracy	  of	  ORs	  Increase	  Capacities	  
 
We first measured the performance of our Tor bulk and light clients, which we obtained 
and compared in the previous results.  
Figure 31 compares the distribution of OR capacities after switching the bulk traffics. 
The changes of network capacity are variances compare to Figure 27. In Figure 31, the 
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changes of network capacity are lower for all ORs. 50% of entry OR1, middle OR1 and exit 
OR1are less than 1.39 Mbps, 1.35 Mbps and 0.9 Mbps respectively. And for entry OR2, 
middle OR2 and exit OR2, 50% of capacities are less than 0.46 Mbps, 2 Mbps and 1.57 
Mbps respectively. 
One of the reasons for variances of OR capacities is the increasing number of cross 
traffics that passes through our setup ORs. The probability of losses increases compared to 
when all the circuits are multiplexed at one TCP connection47. Apart from the transport 
layer queues and the need to wait for retransmissions, the application layer queues in the 
overlay implementation also cause significant delays and variances in the OR capacities. 
We believe this is one of the main causes to variances in the OR capacities.  
 
 
Figure 31. Cumulative distribution of all OR capacities increase after switching the bulk 
circuit, Cafter - Cbefore [Capacity Mbps]. 
 
                                                            
47 The properties of TCP congestion control also contributed to fluctuation of Tor network capacities. This is 
because TCP is a connection-oriented protocols, therefore, when any packet drops occurs. The lost packets 
need to be retransmitted. In a worst congestion state, the retransmission of lost packets in Tor does not 
happen. Therefore, the queuing packets increase and the overall network capacities reduced.  
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6.1.2.2. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Throughput	  
 
Now that we have observed our switching model closely approximates the increase 
capacity of our setup ORs when accepting cross-traffics in the live Tor network. As we 
previously discussed, packet drops is a drawbacks that plays are variances of network 
capacities over time. We next shift our attention to the end-to-end throughput analysis.  
Table 7 compares the end-to-end throughput for Tor multiplexed circuits and circuit 
switching approach. The results shows similar upload throughputs with Table 5 results, 
however, the average end-to-end throughput in Table 7 is slightly lower. The fastest 50% 
throughputs are more likely achieved when less congested ORs are selected for switching 
the bulk circuit. When allowing the cross traffic to passes through all the setup ORs, Table 
7 shows the end-to-end throughput of 109 ± 35 KB/s for Tor multiplexed circuits and, 175 
± 87 KB/s for all OP circuits after bulk circuit is switched to different TCP connection. The 
improvement shows that light traffics are given enough bandwidth to transfer their data 
quickly. Therefore, in overall experiments, we observed that switching the bulk circuits 
shows consistently improvement of throughput performance than multiplexing circuits to 
single TCP connection.  
To confirm these improvements of average end-to-end throughput, we performed the 
download time distributions when applying the circuit switching approach and compared to 
Tor multiplex circuits. 
Figure 32 (a) compares the download time of 12.3 MB file observed by OPs when 
stock Tor and circuit switching are applied. The graphs shows similar results of 50% 
download times for both cases, when switching the bulk circuit and stock Tor multiplexing 
approach. The result shows significant improvement for circuit switching approach after 
the bulk circuit switched to separate TCP connection. The download times for Tor 
multiplex circuits range from 40 to 120 seconds, whereas for circuit switched method, the 
download times range from 30 to 105 seconds. 
Figure 32 (b) shows significant time-to-first-byte improvements when client OP 
request data after bulk circuit is switched to separate TCP connections, compared to stock 
Tor multiplex circuits. At 50%, it took the default stock Tor less than 4.6 seconds before 
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the browser starts changing by showing the web contents, whereas for circuit switching 
approach, the client OP only waits for less than 2.2 seconds to saw web contents. The 
circuit switching approach achieved an improvement of 48%. Note that Figure 32 (b) is 
measured repeatedly before and after the circuit traffic is switched to separate TCP 
connection to obtain the improvement of first byte received from the web server.  
 
Table 7. Average end-to-end throughputs of (1) Tor multiplex circuits and (2) circuit 
switching approach.  
Configurations Average end-to-end 
throughput (KB/s) 
Effective drop 
rate 
Tor multiplex circuits 109 ± 35 0.05% 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
175 ± 87 0.08 % 
 
 
(a)                                                                                    (b) 
Figure 32. (a) Download performance and (b) Time-to-first byte result of OP circuit in the 
testbed experiment.  
 
With the circuit switching method, as we previously observed in the first part of our 
evaluation, the bulk circuits might experience more delays after switching to different TCP 
path because such circuits encountered higher drop rates as seen in Table 7. 
From our observations in the testbed environment results in Table 5 and Table 7, the 
main reason which causes the increase of effective drop rates of the proposed method is 
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that, when the entry OR sends the SWITCH_CONN control cell to other ORs for circuit 
switching and no SWITCH_ACK is sent from either middle ORs or exit ORs. The entry 
OR tears down the attempted switch circuit and does not quickly attach the request's stream 
to different TCP connection or, send the CLOSE cell message back to client OPs. In that 
case, Tor considers the reason to drop off all the remaining transferred cells. The client OP 
has to restart a new circuit and retransmit the whole data again at the beginning. This 
problem occasionally happens when switching the bulk circuit to OR, which a highly 
congested and has very lower capacity.  
From the results, the performance improvements can be observed even for bulk clients 
when more bandwidths are available on the new TCP path. We observed the time for first 
byte to arrive at the client OP is improved as shown in Figure 32 (b). This improvement 
suggests that the congestion along the circuit is reduced. 
 
6.1.2.3. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Latency	  
 
In the second cases when allowing our setup ORs to accept cross-traffics in the live Tor 
network, the previous results in Table 7 shows reduction in average end-to-end throughput 
compared to Table 5. This is because the latency experienced (due to other cross-traffics in 
the Tor network) by the data transfer from the OP to the Tor network is increase (higher 
propagation delays in between OPs to ORs and ORs to ORs). 
Table 8 shows the average end-to-end latency for Tor multiplexing circuits and all the 
OPs circuits after switching the bulk traffics.  
Figure 33 shows the distribution of end-to-end latency delays across pairs of ORs from 
the OP to the webserver.  
First, we observed that 50% of end-to-end latencies measured using default stock Tor 
for multiplexing circuits are greater than circuit switching approach. The results in both 
Table 8 and Figure 33 have the similar outcomes with the results in the first part 
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evaluation48 in Section 6.1.1.5. For these reasons we concluded that the circuit switching 
approach displays the least delay for light and heavy circuits when many different circuits 
shared bandwidth across each pair of setup ORs. For the case of default stock Tor approach, 
circuit traffics multiplex through one TCP connection can accumulate delays49 at many 
different processing stages as it moves through the network [12, 19 and 30].  
 
Table 8. Average end-to-end latency. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
latency (sec) 
Tor multiplex circuits  3.01 ± 1.66 sec 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
 1.96 ± 1.31 sec 
 
                            
Figure 33. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end latency from the client OP to the web server. 
 
                                                            
48 The results in Section 6.1.1.5 are when all the ORs do not accept the cross traffics in the Internet, but only 
our own circuit traffics.  
49 The light interactive circuit experienced higher delays due to longer queuing behind the bulk traffic in the 
Tor's buffers and TCP socket buffers.  
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6.1.3. Congestion	  Analysis	  in	  the	  Testbed	  Environment	  	  
To verify our method really improves the congestion problems in Tor, we take into 
consideration the end-to-end latency, which we measured in our experiments as a 
congestion signal.  
We previously observed in Chapter 4 that the congestion occurs at the OR level when 
a node reaches its bandwidth rate limit. We also observed that the OR is congested when 
the outgoing cells are waiting in the OR output queue for longer period.  
To evaluate the congestion of Tor network, first we evaluated the number of circuits 
accommodated to single TCP connection. When an OR is congested, the amount of 
congestion time is added to the RTT of transferring bytes from the OP to the web server, 
before it can reach the client OP. In addition, the amount of time is frequently much larger 
than the non-congested circuit measurement.  
We isolated the congestion Tc for each client OP circuit by measuring the RTT for 5 
repeated measurements when sending single byte of cell to the web server. RTTmin is the 
minimum round trip time and RTTmax is the maximum round trip time. The difference of 
RTTmax – RTTmin is the congestion time Tc experience along the circuit. We compared the Tc 
for all the OPs circuits when multiplexed to single TCP connection, to the Tc for each OP 
circuit after the bulk circuit is switched to different TCP connection. We also measured the 
Tc for the remaining circuits after bulk circuit is switched to different TCP connection.  
Table 9 shows the comparison of congestion Tc measurements. The congestion 
experienced by all four circuits that multiplexed to single TCP connection is higher 
compared to the remaining circuits after the bulk circuit is switched to different TCP 
connection. When measured the congestion experienced by single OP circuit, the 
congestion experienced in Tor is lower compared to default approach of Tor when all the 
circuits are multiplexed to single TCP connection. We observed that the congestion Tc 
experienced in Tor is variance for all the measurements. The variances are due to the extent 
of circuits’ in Tor.  
However, we found out that the congestion experience after switching the bulk circuit 
is the best case, since the congestion Tc is reduced for all measurements. The improvement 
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results confirm the previous results of increasing Tor network capacity, end-to-end 
throughput and lower end-to-end latency measured in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2.  
Next we need to verify the evaluation of congestion for number of circuits that 
multiplex to single TCP connection in the live Tor network, and observe the effectiveness 
of circuit switching method. Section 6.2.3 shows our evaluation for congestion in the live 
Tor network.  
 
Table 9. Congestion analysis in the testbed environment. 
Client OP RTT1  RTT2 RTT3 RTT4 RTT5 RTTmin RTTmax TC 
All circuits 
multiplexed 
to single 
TCP 
connection 
3.0 ± 
2.0 s 
4.0 ± 
1.0 s 
 2.0 ± 
1.36 s 
3.0  ± 
3.24 s 
4.0 ± 
1.39 s 
2.0 ± 
1.36 s 
4.0 ± 
1.39 s 
2.0 ± 
0.03 s 
Remaining 
circuits 
after bulk 
circuit is 
switched 
3.0 ± 
1.85 s 
2.0 ± 
1.37 s 
1.5 ± 
1.6 s 
2.9 ± 
0.9 s 
2.0 ± 
1.34 s 
1.5 ± 
1.6 s 
3.0 ± 
1.85 s 
1.5 ± 
0.25 s 
OP1 
2.0 ± 
0.87 s 
1.6 ± 
0.9 s 
2.0 ± 
1.67 s 
1.0 ± 
0.4 s 
1.0 ± 
0.24 s 
1.0 ± 
0.24 s 
2.0 ± 
1.67 s 
1.0 ± 
1.43 s 
OP2 
2.1 ± 
1.67 s 
 3.0 ± 
1.92 s 
1.6 ± 
1.2 s 
1.3 ± 
1.9 s 
2.0 ± 
0.4 s 
1.3 ± 
1.9 s 
3 ± 
1.92 s 
1.7 ± 
0.02 s 
OP3 
1.8 ± 
0.7 s 
1.3 
±1.98 s 
2.45 
±2.2 s 
2.37 ± 
2.1 s 
1.56 ± 
1.1 s 
1.3 ± 
1.98 s 
2.45 ± 
2.2 s 
1.15 ± 
0.22 s 
OP4 
3.3 ± 
0.9 s 
2.14 ± 
0.8 s 
1.3 ± 
1.28 s 
1.39 ± 
1.0 s 
2.67 ± 
1.7 
1.3 ± 
1.28 s 
2.67 ± 
1.7 s 
1.37 ± 
0.58 s 
 
6.2. Analysis	  of	  Circuit	  Switching	  in	  the	  Live	  Tor	  Network 
In order to understand the effectiveness of circuit switching method, we performed many 
experiments in the live Tor network from May 2013 to January 2014. These evaluations 
offers the ability to evaluate large scale distributed networked systems using commodity 
hardware and other operating system (OS) of ORs running in the public Internet. 
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Figure 26 shows the setup topology to test our proposed method in the live Tor 
network. The selected middle and exit ORs are running on the Tor network while entry 
ORs are running on our setup testbed environment. All the ORs update their information to 
the Tor directory authorities. Communication among the different ORs in the Tor network 
and the destination servers is routed through the setup entry ORs, which provides the 
underlying traffic monitoring control. Network parameters such as the bandwidth, 
propagation delay and drop rate are configured on the network topology to provide realistic 
underlying network measurements. 
Experiments in the live Tor network have the similar approach and conditions with the 
laboratory testbed experiments. The conditions are, 
• The entry ORs does not accept cross-traffics from the Internet50. Note that our setup 
entry ORs may not accept the cross-traffic but the middle and exit ORs selected in 
the live Tor network can accept traffics, since we don’t have control over those 
public ORs. 
o The selected ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs 
before switch. 
o The ORs in the new circuit have higher bandwidth than the ORs before 
switch. 
• The entry ORs accepts cross traffic from the Internet51.  
o The selected ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs 
before switch. 
o The ORs in the new circuit have larger bandwidth than the ORs before 
switch. 
                                                            
50 For ORs to disallow any cross traffic in the Internet, we simply turned off the option to publicly contact the 
Tor directory servers and, configured the ORs to act as a bridge. Bridge relays (or "bridges" for short) are Tor 
ORs that aren't listed in the main Tor directory. Therefore, for other circuit to access it, they must request our 
IP address to relay their traffics (i.e., other client OPs only use our ORs based on our approval). 
51 Entry ORs allowing cross traffics in the Internet are publicly listed and available in the Tor directory 
servers. The ORs details and status are uploaded to the directory servers. 
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o Lastly, the ORs in the new circuit are randomly52 selected (dynamically). 
 
6.2.1. All	  the	  Entry	  ORs	  do	  not	  Accept	  Traffics	  from	  the	  Internet	  
 
6.2.1.1. OR	  Capacities	  After	  and	  Before	  Switching	  the	  Bulk	  Circuit	  
 
We randomly selected 25 middle ORs and 25 exit ORs that have the same bandwidth of 1.5 
Mbps with the setup entry ORs to construct the circuit and transfer files. The objectives are 
to obtain the performance of circuit switching after congestion occurs and, compare the 
results with the larger bandwidth ORs and ORs that are randomly selected in the live Tor 
network.  
 
 
(a)             (b) 
Figure 34. Cumulative distribution of ORs capacities on entry OR1 and OR2 after and before 
switching the circuit. Note that before switching is when all the OPs circuits are multiplexed 
to one TCP connection. (a) ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs 
before switching. (b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs before 
switching. 
                                                            
52 In a random selection of OR experiments, we worked with the default Tor bandwidth weighted algorithm. 
However, individual Tor routers manually selected or randomly selected have vastly different bandwidth 
capacities, ranging from 30 KB/s to over 50 MB/s. 
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Figure 34 (a) shows the cumulative distribution of entry OR1 and entry OR2 capacities, 
which are increase after switching the bulk circuit to different TCP connections. We 
observed that 50% of capacity measured at the entry OR1 was less than 1.67 Mbps and 
entry OR2 was less than 1.64 Mbps. This increase of entry OR1 and entry OR2 capacities 
shows an improvement of flow rates after both entry ORs switches the bulk traffics to other 
middle and exit ORs in the public Tor network. 
During measurements, we observed that some public ORs are highly congested with 
other cross-circuit traffics in the live Tor network and their bandwidth are falsely 
advertised. Therefore, when we switched the bulk circuit to another TCP connection after 
congestion occurs at the entry OR1 and OR2, we observed no improvement in the ORs 
capacities. Less than 10% of the measurements show the capacity changes at the entry OR1 
and entry OR2, are below 0 Mbps. This indicates no increase in the OR capacities after 
switching the circuit to different TCP connection. Therefore the bottleneck experienced 
along the middle and exit ORs still reducing the overall network capacity.  
However, when performing the second conditions of selecting and switching the bulk 
traffics to higher bandwidth ORs to prove if switching to higher capacity ORs can improve 
the network capacities, we observed the distribution of capacities measured after switching 
circuit is slightly higher. 
Figure 34 (b) shows the cumulative distribution of capacities on entry ORs when 
switching the bulk circuit to larger bandwidth ORs. 50% of entry OR1 capacities are less 
than 1.9 Mbps and, 50% of entry OR2 capacities are less than 2.2 Mbps. From the results, 
however, when compared to Figure 34 (a), there is no big difference when entry ORs 
switched the bulk circuit to higher bandwidth ORs after congestion occurs. We observed 
the number of bytes that each entry OR forwards per second on all the circuits that 
measured in Figure 34 (b) are almost the same with Figure 34 (a).  
However, in overall measurements for both cases in Figure 34 (a) and (b), we 
observed 90% of increased capacities in the entries OR1 and OR2, when switching the bulk 
circuits on the same OR bandwidths are less than 2.5 Mbps and 3 Mbps respectively. And 
90% of increasing capacities on entries OR1 and OR2 when switch the bulk circuit to higher 
capacity ORs are less than 3.1 and 3.4 Mbps, respectively. This improvement of increasing 
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ORs capacities shows the throughput rates for both entry ORs are increased. We next 
discuss the impact of switching the bulk circuit to ORs in the live Tor network and analyze 
the average end-to-end throughputs. 
 
6.2.1.2. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Throughput	  
 
Table 10 shows the average end-to-end throughput measured for all four OP circuits to the 
web server. Figure 35 (a) shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughput when 
all the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
We compared both results with the results in Table 11, which shows the average end-
to-end throughput measured when the ORs in the new circuit have higher bandwidth than 
the ORs before switching. Figure 35 (b) shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end 
throughput when all the ORs in the new circuits have higher bandwidth. 
We observed that the average end-to-end throughput degrades for Tor multiplex 
circuits when packet drop occurs at the rate of 0.03% as shown in Table 10. The results in 
the live Tor network confirm the results in Table 5 and Table 7, which we tested on our 
experiment testbed. Though Tor multiplexes circuits to single TCP connection may gain 
lower overall drop rates compared to circuit switching approach, the behavior of one-
circuit drops can adversely affect all the other incoming circuits’ and reduce the average 
end-to-end throughput.  
Considering the average end-to-end throughput for all the circuits after the bulk 
circuits switched to different TCP connection in the live Tor network. Figure 35 (a) and (b) 
shows the 50% of end-to-end throughputs for all the circuits are higher compared to when 
Tor multiplexed circuits to single TCP connection. When switching the circuit to new TCP 
path that has the same bandwidth, the result shows 50% of end-to-end throughput is less 
than 350 KB/s. And 50% of end-to-end throughputs for Tor multiplex circuits are less than 
250 KB/s. The same improvement also shown in Figure 35 (b), which shows 50% of the 
end-to-end throughputs for circuit switching to larger bandwidth ORs are less than 316 
KB/s. And 50% of end-to-end throughputs for Tor multiplex circuits are less than 239 KB/s. 
 106 
From Figure 35, we observed that for both cases (a) and (b), when switching the circuit 
to ORs that are same or higher, the results for switching the active bulk circuit to same 
bandwidth ORs gain better throughput rates than switching to higher bandwidth ORs. This 
differences shows that the better throughput performance depends very much on the 
available capacity of the ORs and, ORs that are less congested. 
Though the performance is improved after switching the bulk circuit, it is still unclear 
since throughputs are variances when deployed our control scheme in the live Tor network. 
Our circuit switching approach attempts to reduce the network load and better utilizing the 
network capacities. However, from the result, the overall bottlenecks introduced by the 
bulk traffic still degrades the Tor performance, since the drop rates are still higher as shown 
in Table 10 and 11 for both cases53. And the throughputs in Table 10 and Figure 35 (a) are 
also higher compared to Table 11 and Figure 35 (b) after switching the bulk circuit traffics.  
 
Table 10. Average end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web server. 
We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the circuit switching approach for all OPs, when 
the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
 
 
Table 11. Average end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web server. 
We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the circuit switching approach for all OPs, when 
the ORs in the new circuit have higher bandwidth than the ORs before switching. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
53 Switching of active TCP connection to different connection took an average delay of 1 second to 
successfully completed, and continues on with the data transmission. Cells that are dropped cause the average 
delays to increased up to 1 second.  
Configurations	   Average	  end-­‐to-­‐end	  
throughput	  (KB/s)	  
Effective	  
drop	  rate	  
Tor	  multiplex	  circuits	   210	  ±	  10	   0.06	  %	  
All	  OP	  circuits	  after	  
bulk	  circuit	  switched	  
349	  ±	  67	   0.10	  %	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(a)                                                   (b) 
Figure 35. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web 
server. We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the circuit switching approach for all OPs. 
(a) When the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
(b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs before switching. 
 
 
6.2.1.3. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Latency	  
 
We next discussed the end-to-end latency, which is one of the important metric that easily 
recognized by most Tor users. Previously we showed that optimizing the throughput by 
switching the circuit path to less congested ORs increases the capacities and transfer rates 
of data. We need to verify that the selection of less congested path after entry ORs switches 
the active bulk circuits does reducing the queuing delays in the live Tor network.  
Figure 36 (a) and (b) shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end latency results 
for Tor multiplex circuits (before circuit switch) compared to all OP circuits after switching 
the bulk traffic to different TCP connection. Figure 36 (a) shows significant improvements 
when applying the circuit switching with ORs that have the same bandwidth with the ORs 
before switching. 50% of end-to-end latencies measured for all the OPs circuits after bulk 
circuit is switched are less than 1.71 seconds, while 50% of end-to-end latencies for Tor 
multiplexed circuits to single TCP connection are less than 2.74 seconds. The same 
improvement of reducing the end-to-end latency also shown in Figure 36 (b) when 
selecting larger bandwidth OR, 50% of end-to-end latencies for all the client OPs circuits 
after bulk circuit switched are less than 1.31 seconds, and 50% of end-to-end latencies for 
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Tor multiplexed circuits to single TCP connection are less than 2.1 seconds. When 
compared Figure 36 results to Figure 30 and Figure 33, all the results for circuit switching 
generally shows improvements of average end-to-end latency. The results shows in favor to 
our approach that by separating the connection sharing among bulk and light circuits, we 
surely reduced the end-to-end latency and improves the flow rates of data 54 . The 
conventional approaches where Tor multiplexes circuits to one TCP connection have 
higher average end-to-end latency. Next we discussed the scenario when the entry ORs 
accepts other cross-traffics in the public Internet and, using middle and exit ORs in the live 
Tor network. 
 
 
(a)                                                       (b) 
Figure 36. Cumulative distribution of the end-to-end latency from the client OP to the web 
server. (a) When the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before 
switching. (b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs before 
switching. 
 
 
6.2.2. All	  the	  Entry	  ORs	  Accept	  Traffics	  from	  the	  Live	  Tor	  Network	  
In this Section we evaluated the scenario when the entry ORs accepts cross-traffics in the 
live Tor network. We analyzed each metric (capacity, average end-to-end throughput and 
                                                            
54 We also take into consideration that, with this time of average end-to-end latency as 1.71 seconds, it can be 
easily seen that client OPs would detect congestion very late. On the other hand, the users can obviously felt 
the slowness of transferring data to the web server.  
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latency) and showed how stable the control metrics of circuit switching we applied in the 
live Tor network.  
Working with the conditions previously stated, we first discussed the OR capacity 
changes when the entry ORs switches the bulk circuit to same ORs bandwidth, higher ORs 
bandwidth and random selected ORs.  
 
6.2.2.1. OR	  Capacities	  After	  and	  Before	  Switching	  the	  Bulk	  Circuit	  	  
 
In this Section, we further explored the fundamental differences of capacities when 
switching the active bulk circuit traffics to ORs that have the same/higher bandwidths and 
randomly selected ORs.  
Figure 37 (a), (b) and (c) shows the cumulative distribution of OR capacities on entries 
OR1 and OR2 after and before switching the circuit. The results show similarities for Figure 
37 (a) and (b) after switching the bulk traffic to ORs with the same and higher bandwidth 
capacities. 50% of entry OR1 and entry OR2 capacities in Figure 37 (a) are less than 2 
Mbps and 1.85 Mbps, respectively. And 50% of entry OR1 and entry OR2 capacities in 
Figure 37 (b) are less than 2 Mbps and 1.25 Mbps respectively. We observed that there are 
higher variances of ORs capacities when compared (a) and (b) results to (c), since less than 
40% of capacities measured shows no increase for entry OR1 after switching the circuit to 
new TCP connection on randomly selected ORs. For overall 50% measurements we 
performed for Figure 37 (c), the entry OR1 and entry OR2 capacities are less than 0.75 
Mbps and 1.75 Mbps, respectively.  
From the measurement results, even though our approach gains small improvement in 
OR capacities after switching, we concluded that the performance in the live Tor network 
is unpredictable since some of the randomly selected ORs have very lower bandwidth 
capacity of 53 KB/s. These variances of OR capacities55 contributed to differences of entry 
                                                            
55 The problems are due to when Tor fills all of sending sockets to maximum allocated capacity, the kernel 
will clearly unable to immediately send all packets to the network. Therefore, with many active sockets for 
switching the circuits to different TCP path would contribute to increasing delays if not handled properly.  
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OR1 and entry OR2 capacities. The measurement results confirms the previous results that 
the probability of losses are increasing for switching the circuit to different TCP 
connections, because of highly congested ORs that are randomly selected in the live Tor 
network.  
      
(a)                                             (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 37. Cumulative distribution of OR capacities for entry OR1 and OR2, after and before 
switching the bulk circuit. (a) When the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with 
the ORs before switching. (b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs 
before switching. (c) ORs in the new circuit are randomly selected. 
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6.2.2.2. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Throughput	  
 
From the previous results, we observed that the diversity of bandwidth provided by Tor’s 
volunteer-operated routers, in particular the low available bandwidth ORs affects the 
overall network capacities. Since the previous experiment results shows variances of 
overall network capacities in Tor when applying the circuit switching in the live Tor 
network, the average end-to-end throughput is more likely to be affected when accepting 
the cross-traffics in the public Internet. 
We performed the experiment for the average end-to-end throughputs measured from 
the OP to the web server when uploading a 12.3 MB file to observe this scenario. Table 12, 
13 and 14 shows are variances of average end-to-end throughput results when the entry 
ORs accepts traffics in the Internet.  
Figure 38 (a) (b) and (c) shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughputs 
measured from OP to the web server. We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the 
circuit switching approach for all OPs circuits. For Figure 38 (a), 50% of end-to-end 
throughputs when Tor multiplexes all OPs circuits at the entry ORs are less than 150 KB/s, 
while 50% of end-to-end throughputs when switching the active bulk circuits to ORs that 
have the same bandwidth as the previous ORs are less than 310 KB/s. We also observed 
the case when switching the circuit to ORs that have higher bandwidth. In Figure 38 (b), 
50% of end-to-end throughputs are less than 350 KB/s. When randomly selected the ORs 
that have different bandwidths from the entry ORs, the throughput performances are in 
great variances as shown in Figure 38 (c). 50% of end-to-end throughputs for Tor 
multiplexes circuits are less than 128 KB/s (the throughput is reduced), and 50% 
throughputs of circuit switching approach are less than 308 KB/s (the throughput result is 
still the same as Figure 38 (a) and (b) for circuit switching approach).  
These variances of average end-to-end throughput on all Tables and Figures results 
often correspond to circuits that used ORs, which are highly congested. By combining 
multiple circuits with low bandwidth ORs, the attainable throughput is bound by the 
aggregate of each individual circuit’s throughput. These problems are shown in Table 14 
and Figure 38 (c), when randomly selecting the middle and exit ORs in the live Tor 
network. The worst case of throughput performance is when randomly selecting the ORs in 
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the live Tor network, and the best case of throughput performance is when selecting the 
ORs with higher capacity to relay traffics. 
Our analysis indicates the control schemes we applied help to quickly detect the 
congestion occurs in Tor before the output buffer overflowing. All the measurement results 
in Table 12, 13, 14 and Figure 38 (a) (b) and (c) shows the switching approach of bulk 
circuit to different TCP connection improves the average end-to-end throughput for all four 
client OP circuits. In addition, although the packet drops increases when switching the bulk 
circuit to different TCP connection for all measurement results, we still observe the 
throughput performances are enhanced because packets drop on the bulk circuit does not 
affects the light circuit traffics.  
 
Table 12. Average end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web server. 
We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the circuit switching approach for all OPs, when 
the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Average end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web server. 
The ORs in the new circuit have higher bandwidth than the ORs before switching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
throughput (KB/s) 
Effective drop 
rate 
Tor multiplex circuits 189 ± 25 0.28 % 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
312 ± 59 0.89 % 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
throughput (KB/s) 
Effective drop 
rate 
Tor multiplex circuits 201 ± 19 0.68 % 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
329 ± 37 1.09 % 
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Table 14. Average end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web server. 
The ORs in the new circuit are randomly selected. 
 
 
 
 
  
(a)                                                   (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 38. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end throughputs measured from OP to the web 
server. (a) When the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before 
switching. (b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs before 
switching. (c) ORs in the new circuit are randomly selected. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
throughput (KB/s) 
Effective drop 
rate 
Tor multiplex circuits 127 ± 25 0.98 % 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
308 ± 42 1.90 % 
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6.2.2.3. End-­‐to-­‐end	  Latency	  
 
From our previous experiment results, we learned that selecting the circuit randomly in Tor 
subjected to worst case of performance due to lower average end-to-end throughputs.   
In this Section, we explored the effects of variances of end-to-end latency in the live 
Tor network. Table 15, 16 and 17 shows the average end-to-end latency for all conditions 
we experimented, the results shows the slightly improvement compared to Tor multiplex 
circuits.  
Figure 39 (a) (b) and (c) shows the cumulative distribution of end-to-end latency from 
the client OP to the web server. Figure 39 (b) shows the best case when switching the 
circuit to ORs that have higher capacity ORs. 50% of end-to-end latencies for circuit 
switching approach are less than 1.62 seconds.  
We observed that when switching the bulk circuit traffics to randomly selected ORs in 
the live Tor network, the path selection algorithm also ignores a circuit that takes too long 
to build. The Tor’s bandwidth weighted algorithm helps to avoid the congested ORs; 
however, it does not solve all the network congestion problems.  
Table 17 and Figure 39 (c) show the highest end-to-end latency when Tor multiplexes 
circuits to single TCP connection, and when bulk circuit is switched to different TCP 
connection. This is because lower bandwidth ORs were often randomly chosen to construct 
circuits and transfers data, which degrades the overall throughput performance and 
increases the average end-to-end latency. 50% of end-to-end latencies when Tor multiplex 
circuits and switching the bulk circuit to randomly selected ORs in the live Tor network are, 
less than 3.26 seconds and 2.16 seconds, respectively (see Figure 39 (c)). 
Table 15 and 16 show the stable performance results with Figure 39 (a) and (b) after 
switching the active bulk circuit to different TCP connection, which have the same and 
higher bandwidth ORs than the previous ORs. The average end-to-end latencies results 
show no greater variances after switching the active bulk circuit. 50% of end-to-end 
latencies for all OPs circuits after switching the bulk circuit to same and higher bandwidth 
ORs are less than 1.72 seconds and, 1.62 seconds respectively.  
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Table 15. Average end-to-end latency. 
We compared the Tor multiplex circuit and the circuit switching approach for all OPs, when 
the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
latency (sec) 
Tor multiplex circuits 2.07 ± 2.76sec 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
 1.80 ± 2.61 sec 
 
 
Table 16. Average end-to-end latency. 
The ORs in the new circuit have the higher bandwidth than the ORs before switching. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
latency (sec) 
Tor multiplex circuits 3.12 ± 2.77sec 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
1.91 ± 1.72sec 
 
 
Table 17. Average end-to-end latency. 
The ORs in the new circuit are randomly selected. 
Configurations Average end-to-end 
latency (sec) 
Tor multiplex circuits 3.22 ± 2.04sec 
All OP circuits after bulk 
circuit switched 
2.66 ± 1.57sec 
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(a)                                                        (b) 
 
           (c) 
Figure 39. Cumulative distribution of end-to-end latency from the client OP to the web server. 
(a) When the ORs in the new circuit have the same bandwidth with the ORs before switching. 
(b) ORs in the new circuit have the larger bandwidth than the ORs before switching. (c) ORs 
in the new circuit are randomly selected. 
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6.2.3. Congestion	  Analysis	  in	  the	  Live	  Tor	  Network	  
Previously in Section 6.1.3, we explained and evaluated the congestion along the circuits 
that carries multiple TCP streams in the testbed environment. In this Section 6.2.3, we 
further evaluated the congestion state for number of circuits that multiplex to single TCP 
connection in the live Tor network.  
In the previous Sections, we observed that the result for end-to-end latency 
experienced in the live Tor network is of great variances, which increases the overall 
congestion in Tor.  
Table 18 shows the congestion results for all the circuits, which multiplexed to single 
TCP connection. We compared the results with the remaining circuits through the single 
TCP connection after the bulk circuit is switched. We also make comparisons to single 
bulk circuit after switching to analyze the differences of congestion along the circuit.  
From Table 18, we observed that the congestion for all circuits multiplexed to single 
TCP connection is 3.02 ± 0.27 s, which is higher than the remaining light circuits and 
single client OP circuit. When the congestion is detected on the entry ORs and the entry 
ORs switches the bulk circuit to different TCP connection, the congestion experienced by 
the remaining light circuit traffics along the old circuit is reduced to 2.2 ± 0.56 s. This 
reduction of circuit congestion shows the remaining circuit traffics experienced lower end-
to-end latency along the circuit path.  
In addition, when evaluating the single bulk circuit traffics to the web server after 
switching, the congestion is lower, which shows the effectiveness of our method over the 
default approach of Tor multiplexing circuits. 
We further analyzed the congestion in the live Tor network when numbers of circuits 
are multiplex to single TCP connection and compared with the circuit switching approach. 
We allowed other circuit traffics to enter our entry ORs in the live Tor and we monitored 
the flow rates of data when multiplexed to single TCP connection. 
Figure 40 shows the experiment results for the congestion analysis of incoming TCP 
connections that multiplexed at our setup entry ORs. Since we publicly advertised our 
setup entry ORs in the Internet, other circuit traffics can passes through our entry ORs. 
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Table 18. Congestion analysis in the live Tor network. 
Client OPs RTT1  RTT2 RTT3 RTT4 RTT5 RTTmin RTTmax TC 
All circuits 
multiplexed 
to single 
TCP 
connection 
3.6 ± 
2.2 s 
5.09 ±	  
1.3	  s 
3.34 ±	  
0.67	  s 
2.07 ± 
1.03 s 
4.0 ± 
1.39 s 
2.07 ± 
1.03 
5.09 ± 
1.3 s 
3.02 ± 
0.27 s 
Remaining 
circuits 
after bulk 
circuit is 
switched 
3.1 ± 
1.07 s 
1.6 ± 
2.74 s 
3.5 ±	  
2.9	  s 
2.6 ± 
0.7 s 
3.8 ± 
1.6 s 
1.6 ± 
1.04 s 
3.8 ± 
1.6 s 
2.2 ± 
0.56 s 
OP1 
2.4 ± 
1.27 s 
2.3 ± 
0.34 s 
2.8 ± 
1.02 s 
1.6 ± 
1.2 s 
3.14 ± 
2.4 s 
1.6 ± 
1.2 s 
3.14 ± 
2.4 s 
1.54 ± 
1.2 s 
OP2 
1.6 ± 
1.8 s 
 3.4 ± 
1.2 s 
1.48 ± 
1.3 s 
2.4 ± 
1.7 s 
2.6 ± 
1.5 s 
1.48 ± 
1.3 s 
2.6 ± 
1.5 s 
1.12 ± 
0.2 s 
OP3 
2.7 ± 
1.7 s 
3.6 ± 
2.4 s 
2.1 ± 
0.8 s 
1.9 ± 
2.6 s 
3.9 ± 
2.7 s 
1.9 ± 
2.6 s 
3.9 ± 
2.7 s 
2.0 ± 
0.1 s 
OP4 
2.9 ± 
2.1 s 
2.1 ± 
1.57 s 
1.89 ± 
1.4 s 
3.34 ± 
1.1 s 
3.74 ± 
1.6 s 
1.89 ± 
1.4 s 
3.74 ± 
1.6 s 
1.85 ± 
0.2 s 
 
The results show the congestion analysis for 6 incoming TCP connections (4 circuits 
from our setup clients and 2 circuits in the public Internet) that multiplexed to single output 
TCP connection. Note that before switching the circuit, the number of circuits multiplexed 
to one TCP connection is six and we experimented for switching the active bulk circuits to 
another TCP (which is created by the entry OR in our testbed environment) connection 
after congestion is detected. Furthermore, in our experiment, the entry OR switches the 
bulk circuit which has the highest EWMA values. Therefore, the number of circuits that 
switched to different outgoing TCP varies depending on the total incoming circuits. We 
compared the results of the remaining circuits with the multiplexed circuits to single TCP 
connection. 
From the results, we observed that as the number of incoming TCP connections 
increases to 6 in the entry OR, the congestion Tc experienced also increases compared to 
single and lower number of incoming TCP connections. The congestion increases when the 
number of TCP connections increases, due to packet drops on one circuit can affects all the 
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other circuit traffics, and leads to longer queue in the sending TCP buffer [12]. When 
compared the results to circuit switching approach of switching the bulk circuit to different 
TCP connection, the congestion Tc experienced by the remaining circuits are lower 
compared to multiplexed circuits. The remaining circuits do not have to queue behind the 
bulk circuit when bulk circuit triggered any congestion, since there are more bandwidth 
resources allocated to quickly transfer the data. 
 
 
Figure 40. Comparisons of congestion analysis for multiplexing circuits to single TCP 
connection and, remaining circuits after bulk circuit switched to different TCP connection.   
 
6.3. Discussion	  
 
Our methodology of performing the circuit switching of active bulk traffic is measured 
based on the individual transferred cell with their corresponding sequence number. This 
approach allows the entry OR to keep track of the bulk and light traffic that multiplexed on 
a single circuit and relate to their transfer load. The entry OR is in charge of switching the 
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bulk circuit traffic and all the other ORs along the circuit can do buffering and delivering of 
cells. 
Firstly, lets discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of active circuit switching 
method.  
Circuit switching 
method 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Allocation of kernel 
buffers 
• The circuit switching method reduces 
the congestion on a single allocated 
kernel buffer in Tor and Transport TCP 
layers.  (See Sections 5.1 and 5.2) 
• The memory management of kernel 
buffers in the entry OR is a slow 
operation process, and complex to 
implement when many TCP 
connection are created. 
• Higher OR capacity, 
throughput and lower 
latency.  
 
 
 
• Switching of active bulk circuit to higher 
OR capacity improves the performance 
of OR capacities, end-to-end 
throughputs and latency in Tor.  
• Switching of active bulk circuit to 
different TCP connection does not 
always output better performances. 
Larger variances (95% confidence 
interval is quite large) of 
throughputs occur because the ORs 
in the live Tor network have 
different capacities. Hence, the 
latencies also variance.  
• Simple and intuitive 
quality of service 
• Circuit-switching method is simple to 
implement since only the entry OR 
needed to upgrade.  The middle and exit 
ORs does not need to upgrade to benefit 
from circuit switching when congestion 
occurs.  
• Simple modification of algorithm is 
effective to reduce congestion and 
improve the network capacity when 
switching the bulk traffic to higher 
capacity OR.  
• Switching of traffics via a single 
entry OR results in increasing 
packet drop ratio and causes 
overhead along the circuit.  
• The quality of service reduces 
when queuing cells increase along 
the alternative circuit due to 
cryptographic problems.  
• Congestion detection • When implementing our control scheme, • The switching method is slow to 
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the entry OR quickly detects congestion 
in Tor or in the TCP socket buffers. The 
entry OR automatically switches the 
bulk traffics to new TCP connection, 
which improves the congestion and 
throughputs for all light and bulk 
traffics. 
• The control schemes to detect 
congestion in the entry OR ensure that 
the output buffer occupancy in Tor, and 
sending TCP socket buffers are fairly 
shared amongst bulk and light clients. 
detect congestion on the middle 
and exit ORs, because the control 
algorithm only runs in the entry 
OR.  
• Effective drop rates • Circuit switching method improves the 
circuit throughputs though the effective 
drop rates are higher compared to default 
Tor multiplexing approach. This is 
because when cells drops occur on one 
circuit, the throughputs for the other 
circuits are not affected.  
• The effective drop rates for circuit 
switching approach are increasing, 
due to actively switching the bulk 
traffics from the congested circuit. 
• These problems contributed to 
increasing overhead compare to 
default Tor multiplex circuits. 
• Anonymity • The circuit switching method uses the 
current protocols in Tor to relay the TCP 
traffics over TLS security protocol. 
The circuit from the client to the web 
server is also encrypted.   
• The same default circuit construction of 
Tor is applied. Therefore, the 
communication between ORs is 
protected and it would be difficult for 
any adversaries to extract specific circuit 
identification. Therefore, the anonymity 
of Tor is still maintained. 
• The anonymity of Tor client is lost 
if the entry guard OR or the exit 
OR is attacked by the adversaries. 
In addition, switching the active 
bulk traffic to false ORs will 
expose the privacy of Tor clients.  
• Since we modified a small portion 
of Tor algorithm and included the 
newly controlled messages in Tor, 
by changing the active 
communication traffics can reduce 
the anonymity of Tor. 
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6.3.1. Variances	  of	  End-­‐to-­‐end	  Throughput	  
 
There are issues that arise in our evaluation method, which needs consideration. The 
average end-to-end throughput for switching the active bulk circuit to different TCP 
connections sees higher variances (95% confidence interval is quite large). The reason is 
0.09% of packet drop occurs during switching the active bulk circuits (circuits with higher 
EWMA values) to a different TCP connection.  
We performed an experiment in Table 19 for all conditions previously stated in the 
testbed and live Tor network based on OR capacities, to compare the effect of packet 
dropping on the current Tor version when multiplexing circuits, with our proposed method 
for overall network throughput and circuit delay. We can see that the overall average 
network throughput for switching bulk circuit after congestion occurs is slightly higher 
with 95% confidence interval. The variances are due to degradation in performances, since 
the circuit delays are also higher for switching the active bulk circuit to different TCP 
connection. The circuit delay of the remaining circuits that are multiplexed by Tor is lower 
because the remaining circuits are not going through switching processes.  
Section 5.3.5 clearly shows the time to switch the circuit with appropriate α = 0.1 and 
β = 0.5 thresholds used in the Algorithm 1.  
Figure 23 shows that 50% of circuit switching time at the entry OR1 and entry OR2 are 
both less than 1 s to successfully switching the bulk circuit, and continue on with the data 
transmission at the position of data discontinued on the previous circuit. The results in 
Figure 23 are corresponds to the results in Table 19.  
Therefore, we concluded that cells dropping and cells queued for reordering are 
consequences of the implementation of circuit switching networks, and are the prime 
reasons for throughputs and latencies variances in our experimental results.  
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Table 19. Average throughputs and delays of different reordering configuration56. 
Configuration Network Throughput Circuit delays 
Tor multiplex circuits 186 ± 23 KB/s 653 ± 356 msec 
All OP circuits after bulk circuit 
switched 
199 ± 88 KB/s 996 ± 135 msec 
 
6.3.2. Threat	  Model	  
 
There are common threats that occur in the Tor network that can reduce the anonymity of 
the Tor clients [32]. One of the general main threats in Tor is if the knowledgeable 
attackers who can watch path of the Tor network captured the entry or exit ORs, then the 
attackers can comprise our proposed method. When the entry OR and Tor client selects any 
false ORs, the adversaries can also possibly watching the two ends of the circuit at the Tor 
entry or exit gateway.  
To reduce the chances of such attack in Tor, we worked with the default approach of 
Tor by relaying the TCP traffics over TLS security protocol, so the circuit from OP to exit 
OR are encrypted. Any adversary who monitored the entry ORs or exit ORs can still find it 
difficult to count the total number of circuits to performed traffic analysis on switched bulk 
circuits or previous old circuits. In Section 5.4.2.1, we discussed our selection method 
based on the performance flags assigned on ORs by the Tor directory servers. These 
performance flags are guard, stable and fast ORs with high bandwidth. This approach helps 
the Tor client and entry ORs to select and switched the traffics through valid Tor ORs and, 
reduces the changes of selecting the false ORs.  
 
                                                            
56 “Circuit delays” are results when bulk data are switched to another circuit. The circuit delay for Tor 
multiplexed circuits are results taken in the presence of other circuit traffics. Data was collected for over time 
when uploading a 12.3 MB file, and each configuration was run 10 times to obtain the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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6.3.3. Tor	  Performance	  Issues	  
 
We discussed in Chapter 4 that writing as much data to kernel memory can fills up the 
allocated space when congestion occurs. In addition, higher throughput circuit traffics 
always fill the entire kernel socket buffer whether or not the kernel can sends data. These 
problems added to poor scheduling choice between light and bulk traffics, because when 
the bulk traffics arrive, Tor instantly schedule and write it to the kernel and outgoing TCP 
connection. 
In Chapter 4 and 5, we observed the congestion in Tor and its effect on Tor’s 
performance. Our evaluation indicates that the control metrics we applied can help 
reducing the queue length in the sending buffer of Tor. Our control metrics can also 
increase the throughput rates for all users, particularly those who rely on using the Tor 
network to access the web browsing. When implementing our control metrics, it quickly 
detects congestion and automatically shifts the bulk traffics to new TCP connection, which 
gives better throughputs to light web traffics. 
In Chapter 5, we concluded that if we can appropriately select the best circuit to switch 
the active bulk traffic, based on higher OR capacities, we could also able to improve the 
overall network capacities and flow rates of data (this means by connecting the congested 
TCP output connection to a higher OR capacities). 
We extend our evaluations in Section 6.2, to wider live Tor experiments when the ORs 
accept other cross traffics in the public Internet. The purpose of this experiment is to 
analyze the effects of cross traffics through our setup ORs when applying the circuit 
switching approach. Interesting that when applying the circuit switching of bulk circuit, the 
changes of OR capacities are variances in the live Tor network (see Figure 31 and Figure 
37). In many cases we observed that some public Tor routers are highly congested with 
other cross-circuit traffics and their available capacities are falsely advertised. Therefore 
when we switched the bulk circuit to another TCP connection after congestion occurs at the 
entry OR1 and OR2, we observed no improvement in the OR capacities. Less than 10% of 
the measurements show the capacity changes at the entry OR1 and entry OR2 below 0 
Mbps. This indicates no increase in OR capacities after switching the bulk circuit to 
different TCP connection. The problems are due to the overhead along the alternative 
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circuit switching traffics, which increases the end-to-end latencies and decrease the overall 
network throughputs.  
In addition, Table 12, 13 and 14 shows variances of average end-to-end throughput 
results when entry ORs accepts traffics in the public Internet. These variances of average 
end-to-end throughputs often correspond to circuits that used at least one low-bandwidth 
OR. These problems degrade the overall network throughput and higher packet drop rates 
in the application level and transport level. Hence, we discovered that the biggest hindrance 
to boundless utilization of the network capacity is not only the total capacity in Tor, but 
higher variances of circuit delays and also network load that is not widely distributed.  
The worst case is when randomly selecting the ORs in the live Tor network to switch 
the active bulk circuit traffic. And the best case is when switching the circuit to higher OR 
capacities, which improves the network throughput for the entire client OPs. 
 
6.3.3.1. Overhead	  Issues	  in	  the	  Proposed	  Method	  
 
In order for Tor to offer the highest improved performances, it is necessary to lessen the 
overhead problem on the alternative circuit traffics. We observed that switching of traffics 
on a single entry OR results in increasing packet drop ratio, and might causes overhead on 
all the ORs. One main reason is the entry ORs, middle ORs and exit ORs on the alternative 
circuit seems to queue up the switched transferred cells from the previous circuits, which 
occupying the sending TCP kernel buffers and increase the packet drop rates on each 
separate kernel-mode TCP connection. The ORs along the alternative circuit cannot 
decrypt the transferring cells because of the cryptographic problems, which we discussed in 
Section 5.3.4.1.1. This problem can slows down the flow rates of bulk circuit traffics and 
increasing the end-to-end latencies in Tor.  
In general, the techniques of Tor to maintain the alternative circuits cannot contribute 
to overhead, if the alternative circuit path is not congested by other bulk circuit traffics in 
the live Tor network. Tor always maintains a backup clean circuit to transfer circuit traffic 
when the previous used circuit is highly congested [4].  
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However, since Tor client continues to send a probe-padding cell to maintain the 
alternative circuit while Tor is not using it for every N seconds, this extra padding cell can 
cause overhead on circuit traffics and OR for maintaining the connection. By default, Tor 
uses the circuit timing KeepalivePeriod 60 seconds, to send a padding cell on the 
alternative circuit connections from closing when it is not been used [4].     
In our proposed method, before choosing which alternative circuit to use, we applied a 
reasonable scheme to test the congestion on all the circuits to switch the bulk traffics when 
congestion is detected. When the client used one circuit to transfer their circuit traffics, 
each client also continue to measure the alternative circuit by obtaining the congestion 
times (see Section 5.4.2.2 and 6.1.3.). The aim of these measurements is to select the best 
alternative circuit, which is less congested and can improve throughputs for all client OPs 
and network capacities.  
On the other hand, if all the clients continue to actively probing the circuit frequently, 
we might cause an overhead on other circuit by adding too much measurement traffics into 
the Tor network. Therefore, to performed a better approach of obtaining a less congestion 
time for each OR on a circuit. Tor client sends a single BEGIN cell (512 bytes) and get a 
reply of SENDME cell (512 bytes). These measurements can be done in Tor’s stream-level 
and circuit-level in the Tor application layer, without causing any overhead. As long as Tor 
holds on to a circuit or using the circuit, the client OP can send single probe cell without 
any additional overhead. In addition, the alternative circuits are pre-built therefore these 
measurements will not cause the client OP any further delays on ORs along the circuit. 
These measurements approach is effective on both live Tor network and in the testbed 
environment57.  
 
 
                                                            
57 Practically, in the testbed environment, we configured each client to construct only two circuits, so that the 
entry ORs are not overloaded after switching the traffics. And we don’t transfer any traffic on the alternative 
circuits before switching of traffic occurs; this is to make sure that the alternative circuit is less congested.  
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6.4. Conclusion	  	  
 
Our analysis indicated that our proposed scheme helps to increases the network capacities, 
average end-to-end throughputs and reduces the average end-to-end latencies when 
compared to default Tor multiplex approach.  
We discussed the realistic possible approach based on actual Tor client circuit 
performance and the ORs. We designed the solution that decrease the congestion in the OR, 
and also improves the Tor’s ability to detect the congestion earlier before the client OP 
drops down the whole circuit in Tor. 
The benefit of our approach is when packet losses occur, the throughput of all light and 
bulk clients are not affected. The obvious reason is that each TCP sub-flow of the circuit 
traffic is not affecting each other in-terms of queuing delay in the output buffers. Hence, 
the average end-to-end throughputs are still improved.  
The main drawback of default Tor approach when multiplexing many circuits to single 
TCP connection is the longer queue of cells, when single bulk circuit triggered congestion. 
Finally, we need a better infrastructure to implement and compared different path 
selection and route balancing algorithms. This is because when testing the conditions of 
applying the randomly selected ORs in the live Tor network, the Tor network simply does 
not have enough capacity to handle all the users that want better throughput. We also need 
to develop strategies to introduce incentives, which allow the switching approach of active 
bulk circuit to be more self-sustaining (i.e., without causing any packet drops when fairly 
distributing the circuit traffics).   
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Chapter 7  
Research	  Discussion	  
 
In this thesis, we studied the performance improvement of the Tor network. We focused on 
improving congestion in Tor at an individual OR and along the entire end-to-end Tor 
circuit. We then analyzed Tor’s socket interactions in Chapter 4 and discover two major 
issues affecting congestion: 
1. Tor writes sockets unfairly and Tor writes too much data to the socket buffer at 
once, which results in overflowing the kernel memory. 
2. There are increasing queue on the sending TCP kernel buffers compared to the 
receiving TCP kernel buffers. This problem contributed to variances of delays 
in the OR. 
In Chapter 5, our Algorithm 4 measures the throughput of every constituent circuit and 
computed the number of cells entering the Tor output buffers. Since Tor sends data to 
circuit queues on FIFO basis, lower priority circuit must wait up to time the higher priority 
circuit completely sends its data.  
Figure 40 shows that as the number of TCP connection increases, the congestion also 
increases, which depicts the failures of Tor scheduler algorithm.  
There are performance and security concerns that need to be discussed when switching 
the active bulk circuit to different TCP connection. We discussed these concerns and open 
issues of our circuit switching method, which includes the trade-off involved in the 
following Sections. 
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7.1. Switching	  Circuit	  to	  Separate	  TCP	  Connection	  
 
Gopal and Heninger [24] examined the issues about switching the active connection in 
their research work, since Tor avoids switching the active TCP connection to different TCP 
connection.  
In this thesis, we applied the switching method with the design that does not require 
other ORs on the circuit to upgrade. We switched the active connection to already running 
ORs in the Tor network, which are still usable for real application. In addition, we only 
worked with the current Tor configuration and algorithms. The main purpose of our control 
schemes is to ensure that the output buffer occupancy in Tor, and sending TCP socket 
buffer usage for the incoming traffics competes fairly and share the bottleneck between 
higher bandwidth ORs. This method achieves better throughput in proportion to all circuit 
traffics weighted on each ORs along the circuit, and increase the capacity of the Tor 
network. 
 
7.2. Sharing	  Bandwidth	  with	  many	  TCP	  Connection	  
 
Sharing bandwidth over numerous TCP connections can reduce the available bandwidth for 
circuits when the OR has exceptionally lower bandwidth. This is because the shared 
bandwidth will equally distributed for all TCP connections. For instance, if there are n 
circuits on a connection, every circuit will get a bandwidth B/n, so this would bring down 
the bandwidth for each circuit and overall OR capacity.  
For this reason, in our experiment testbed, we configured all the entry ORs to open only 
two active TCP connections, to make switching of active bulk circuit easily done, and 
improve the flow rates of traffics. 
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7.3. Experimental	  Limitation	  
 
To test and analyze our new switching proposal, we run a series of experiments in our 
setup testbed and partly in the live Tor network. To guarantee that we report precise results, 
we followed the measurement approach, which we defined in Section 5.5. We performed 
reiteration of measurements, estimations and calculating the 95% confidence intervals for 
all experiments results, in order to avoid biased outcomes due to different network 
environments. 
There are some experimental difficulties and limitation, which we came across when 
performing our method in the live Tor network. Switching the active bulk circuit to 
different TCP connection on randomly selected ORs often reduces the overall network 
capacities and throughput, since the client OP sometimes selecting the hibernating ORs or 
hanging on IP addresses that does not exist.  
One of our limitations is to automatically recognize the hibernating ORs when 
switching the active bulk circuits. At times the client OP randomly selected the ORs with 
false advertised bandwidth and congested ORs in the live Tor network.  
Other experimental limitations are explained in the next Sections.  
 
7.3.1. Managing	  TCP	  Stack	  Kernel	  
 
Another experimental limitation, which we confronted, was the memory management when 
creating new outgoing TCP in the entry OR. This is a slow operation because of 
implementation in getting adjacent block of kernel memory.  
In our experimental setup ORs, the memory management is a critical issue that every 
kernel level sockets consumes almost 10 MB of memory. Table 2 shows the results that the 
kernel-sending buffer of a single circuit occupies up to 32 KB. This implies that opening 
more sockets will bring about failure in memory allocation.  
Since we utilized the separate kernel-mode TCP connection for switched bulk circuit 
in Tor (see Section 5.2), switching of active bulk circuit moves the circuit-selection to the 
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kernel memory, where the operating system (OS) will schedules the transferring data from 
Tor to two separate TCP connections. If we don’t handle this memory management 
properly, we can over-burden the kernel memory with additional sockets and, reduces the 
effectiveness of circuit switching mechanisms.  
 
7.4. Anonymity	  and	  Security	  Implication	  
 
Other researches had stated that the anonymity of Tor client is lost if the entry guard OR 
and the exit OR on a circuit is attacked by the adversaries [32]. The possibility of such 
attacks depends very much on the adversary’s ability to control larger number of ORs in 
the Tor network.  
When performing our research work, we make sure that our schemes do not open 
other possible attacks, which will causes major drawbacks to anonymity of the Tor client 
OPs. There are chances that adversaries can comprise the anonymity if our newly added 
control messages reduce the default Tor algorithm for security and anonymity. Since we 
modify a small portion of Tor algorithm and included the newly control messages for 
circuit switching approach in the Tor application layer, we actually changed the active 
point-to-point TCP communication between the ORs in the Tor network.  
We believe that since our switching method does not require other middle and exit 
ORs on the circuit to upgrade, we still maintained the original design algorithm of Tor in 
the middle and exit ORs. The configuration we did at the entry ORs to send a control 
message to other ORs does not affects other ORs stable performance or, the path selection 
in Tor, because the same approach of default circuit construction in Tor is applied. We also 
applied the same Tor transport protocols and transmitting the TCP streams over TLS 
security protocols. Therefore, the communication between ORs is encrypted and would 
reduce the changes of any adversary to extract specific circuit identification to do their 
traffic analysis.  
Finally, since we focused on improving the performance of Tor as the integral aim of 
this thesis, we will take into consideration the congestion attacks [32] and denial of 
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services attack in our future work. We believe that by reducing congestion, specifically the 
queue lengths on the ORs, the congestion attacks [32] can also be reduced.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion	  and	  Future	  Work	  
 
In this thesis, we recognized the importance of circuit switching approach to reduce the 
congestion and improve the overall performance in the Tor network. Our design is easily 
deployable and requires minimal changes to only entry ORs. Experimental evaluation of 
circuit switching approach shows vast improvement gains in the network capacities, 
throughputs and reducing latencies. Additionally, our live experiment shows that switching 
of active circuit to different TCP connection has the possibility to obtain improvements of 
less than 2.2 seconds, for response times of first-byte after client OP request data. There a 
more than 48% improvement for download and upload times when circuit switching 
approach is used, comparing to default Tor multiplexing approach.  
In Chapter 4, we have identified that long packet queues in TCP buffers contributed to 
higher latency beyond round trip times and propagation delays, between client OP and the 
web server. The main factor, which causes the TCP buffers to increase, is Tor doesn't 
distribute traffics well when selecting ORs with unequal bandwidth. Since Tor has separate 
service link rates that multiplexed to single TCP connection between each OR, delays are 
varies for all hops.  
To address these problems, in Chapter 5, we applied the proposed circuit switching 
method to improve the flow of traffics for all light and bulk client traffics. We classified 
circuits as light and bulk traffics by using the exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) algorithm. When applying our circuit switching approach, we increased the OR 
capacities and improve the traffic load across all selected ORs. The light traffic does not 
need to wait behind bulk traffic when bulk circuit triggered congestion.  
Furthermore, since the bottleneck is quickly detected in the entry OR, the entry OR 
quickly switches the active bulk circuit to different TCP connection before the congestion 
problem slows down all the circuit traffics.  
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In our experiments, we measured the average delays for circuit traffics using a variety 
of methods of simple file upload and download, replaying traffic with the same timing in 
the real Tor network, and repeating HTTP traffic to obtained transfer rates to calculate the 
capacities, throughputs and latency delays. With simple 12.3 MB file transfer between OP 
and web server, we found that both light and bulk circuit traffics have improved after 
switching the active bulk circuit to different TCP connection.  
We concluded that even if the proposed control scheme is only installed in the entry 
OR to detect congestion, the communication quality is improved (according to our 
measurement results in Chapter 6). While there are several factors and limitation to be 
considered when deploying the control scheme of active circuit switching in Tor, the 
results suggested that the simple idea of separating bulk Tor users onto different TCP 
connection leads to real improvements in Tor’s performance and usability. 
 
8.1. Future	  Work	  
 
There are several possibilities to explore in Tor to further improve its overall performances. 
The first modification to studied in the future is the possibility of allowing every node to 
independently decide when to switch a circuit, rather than having only the entry OR node 
to detect the congestion and decide the switching of bulk circuit. This approach will enable 
the quick detection of congestion occurs in the middle OR node or exit OR node.  
However, before deploying this scheme, it would be best to evaluate this approach in 
the realistic Tor network, and calculate the complexity of the control metrics of circuit 
switching delays and overhead in the ORs.  
Secondly, a study on the actual Tor network should also includes a test of security 
properties, when active bulk circuit is switched to different TCP connection.  
Thirdly, we plan to study the in-depth use of multiple connections on multiple paths 
between the ORs in Tor. We wish to observe the effects of end-to-end throughput 
performances and overall Tor network capacities.  
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Finally, one important area is to consider an alternative queuing design in Tor that can 
reduce the number of times, when cells are copied to the Tor application layer. We need to 
improve and make sure that the queuing design in Tor and TCP socket buffers does not 
degrade the overall performances in the Tor network.  
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